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"Clearly Vicious as a Matter of Policy": The Fight Against Federal-Aid

PART THREE: To Control The Levers (Page 4 of 6)

The President Calls for MacDonald

MacDonald was summoned to the White House, where the President drew a system of east-west, north-south transcontinental highways on a map of the United States and requested a report on them. He also wanted MacDonald to study excess condemnation, which had become one of the President's pet ideas. Roosevelt suggested that MacDonald look into its use on the London-Brighton highway in England.

MacDonald was skeptical, as reflected in his testimony before the Senate Banking Subcommittee on February 24, 1938. Asked about the Bulkley bill, MacDonald thought the time had come for Congress to study the idea, but cited unsatisfactory European experience with the toll concept on special motor roads. Italy, for example, had tried to finance highways in this way, but had abandoned the idea. "All I can say is that people dislike to pay toll charges anywhere." Acquisition of the right-of-way would be "a tremendous problem," he said. "It is a business in itself and should not be left to the State highway departments or the Bureau of Public Roads." He favored a separate agency for the task.179

In developing the internal study for the President, the BPR used data collected during extensive statewide highway surveys conducted throughout the country and funded with the 1½-percent fund created by the Hayden-Cartwright Act of 1934. As for excess condemnation, MacDonald checked with his British counterpart, then sent a message, dated February 14, 1938, to the President's secretary, M. H. McIntyre:

The other day when the President was talking with me about highways, he mentioned that excess condemnation had been used in England. When I inspected the work in progress on the London-Brighton road, the road authorities did not mention any excess condemnation. I wired Major Frederick C. Cook, Chief Engineer of the British Ministry of Transport, asking if they were using excess condemnation, and he replied that it had not been used on the London-Brighton highway. I know that excess condemnation was used on two streets in London. Will you be good enough to ascertain from the President what leads I may pursue to find out more about the use of this policy?

Two days later, Roosevelt replied with a "MEMO FOR MAC," stating: "Tell him I cannot give him any more leads but anyway it is a sound policy."180

On April 16, 1938, MacDonald submitted a report on Proposed Direct Route Highways to the President's son, Colonel James Roosevelt, at the White House. The BPR found that, "A national system of direct route highways designed for continuous flow of motor traffic, with all cross traffic on separated grades, is seriously needed and should be undertaken." Probable traffic would not be "sufficient to liquidate through direct tolls the cost of high standard improvement for an extensive mileage of continuous routes..." The report clarified this point to avoid misunderstanding:

This does not mean, however, that such expenditures will not be actually paid for by the traffic. On the contrary, any expenditure actually required for the accommodation of the traffic on these highways will be more than repaid by the normal road-user taxes generated by their use.

Metropolitan sections and special facilities such as tunnels and bridges would be partially or wholly self-liquidating. The participation and cooperation of the States in developing direct route highways "is imperative." In short:

The problem of providing a wholly adequate national system of highways is to provide a considerable number of new routes to relieve the congestion in the metropolitan areas and to modernize the standards of existing highways in rural districts.

Only a few States recognized the right of the public to take lands in excess of actual needs and to profit from the increased value of the excess lands. Because laws in most States were inadequate for the purposes of a national system of direct route highways, the report suggested that a Federal Land and Financing Authority could be established to acquire excess lands by eminent domain.

The report was not intended for the public, but it outlined an initial vision of what became the Interstate System.

Toll Roads and Free Roads

Congress did not approve the Bulkley bill or any of several similar concepts, but having heard of the BPR study, decided to ask for a formal report, as reflected in Section 13 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1938. The BPR now had complete highway survey data from 46 States and the District of Columbia on which to base its analysis of the scheme described in the legislation (Delaware and New York were the exceptions).

On February 13, 1939, as the report was nearing completion, Secretary Wallace wrote to the President to place "a circumstance" before him. The Secretary summarized the report, including the conclusion that the toll network was not feasible. He added, "Incidentally, you will be interested to know that the transcontinental lines which you indicated for study have proved to correspond closely with the lines of heaviest flow of long distance travel." Congress had asked Chief MacDonald to submit the report, but the report "involves many of the things with which you have been concerned, and upon which you have already made pronouncements..." He concluded:

[Because] of the large amount of factual data which it contains with their great social and economic implications, it is certain to have considerable discussion, press comment, and quotation, it appears to us appropriate that you should transmit it to the Congress with any comments which you desire to make.

Through his secretary, Missy LeHand, Roosevelt sent word to Wallace and MacDonald that they must not do anything about "the transcontinental road report until the President gets back." The President, who was on a cruise, wondered if they could send him a copy on board ship. That proved to be impossible, but MacDonald did provide a 12-page digest on February 20.181

At a March 28 Cabinet meeting, Roosevelt expressed his views to Secretary Wallace. As summarized in a note by Mary Huss, Wallace's secretary:

[The] President would like Mr. MacDonald's report revised so as to make it less probable that the Cities will be able to get from Congress Federal funds for doing work for which the Cities should pay, and that the President wants the report revised so as to lay more emphasis on through highways as a mechanism for National Defense.

In response, the BPR adjusted the introduction but not the body of the report.182

On April 11, Secretary Wallace transmitted the report to the President. In keeping with the President's desire for a stronger defense angle, Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring cosigned Secretary Wallace's letter. It summarized the finding that financing construction of the proposed roads through toll collection would not be possible. The letter also stressed the need for a system of direct interregional highways to meet national defense needs and the travel of motorists in their own vehicles, "a travel which, in addition to its immediate recreational benefits, is a powerful force for national unity."

The President asked Chairman McKellar to review the report. He responded that he thought it "splendid" and should go to Congress.183

Roosevelt was still reviewing the report on April 24, when he wrote to an aide:

Will you find out from MacDonald of Highways where in this report I can find anything about the excess condemnation principle... and if this is analyzed is it given approval and put in the summary? If it is not in at all - why not?

The answer came back that day, citing references to excess condemnation in the report. In addition, that morning, MacDonald added a specific recommendation in the summary in support of excess condemnation.184

On April 27, the President transmitted the report to Congress. The first four paragraphs of the 10-paragraph letter summarized the report's support for "a special system of direct interregional highways, with all necessary connections through and around cities, designed to meet the requirements of the national defense and the needs of a growing peacetime traffic of longer range." He noted, too, the importance of improved facilities "in the general replanning of the cities."

The next four paragraphs discussed right-of-way acquisition, and explained the President's "great emphasis" on "excess-taking." This practice would reduce the cost, but it was also a matter of fairness to the Nation's taxpayers:

[The] man who, by good fortune, sells a narrow right-of-way for a new highway makes, in most cases, a handsome profit through the increase in value of all of the rest of his land. That represents an unearned increment of profit - a profit which comes to a mere handful of lucky citizens and which is denied to the vast majority.

In the final two paragraphs, the President concluded:

In its full discussion of the whole highway problem and the wealth of exact data it supplies, the report indicates the broad outlines of what might be regarded as a master plan for the development of all of the highway and street facilities of the Nation.

I recommend the report for the consideration of the Congress as a basis for needed action to solve our highway problems.

The resulting report to Congress, Toll Roads and Free Roads, would be the first public opportunity for the BPR to clarify its vision of the necessary highway network. The BPR found that some toll corridors would work but that tolls could not finance the entire network. Rather than end on a negative tone in response to the congressional request, the report offered a constructive proposal called "A Master Plan for Free Highway Development."185

Two days before forwarding Toll Roads and Free Roads, the President had submitted Reorganization Plan. No. 1 to Congress. Among many changes, the plan called for the BPR to shift from the Department of Agriculture, its home since 1893, to a new Federal Works Agency (FWA), which would also be the home of the WPA, the Public Works Administration, and the U.S. Public Buildings Administration. In addition, the BPR would become the Public Roads Administration (PRA) and the title "Chief" would become "Commissioner of Public Roads." By a Joint Resolution dated June 7, 1939, Congress approved the reorganization, which went into effect on July 1, 1939.

The President appointed John M. Carmody as Administrator of the Federal Works Agency. The Pennsylvania native had been Administrator of the Rural Electrification Administration.

The Federal Highway Act of 1940

In 1940, Congress was prepared to work on the reauthorization bill for the Federal-aid highway program in FY's 1942 and 1943. The President's budget message called for a reduction in the program to $146 million a year compared with $160 million in FY 1941.

At the start of the session in January, Senator Hayden and Representative Cartwright introduced bills with the authorization amounts left blank subject to hearings. When the dollar amounts were added to the House bill, Cartwright proposed to increase Federal-aid highway authorizations by a third, to $238 million a year. He reported the bill on April 29.

While Senator Hayden and his committee worked on the Senate bill, the war, especially in Europe, worsened. On May 31, President Roosevelt issued a statement that began:

The almost incredible events of the past two weeks in the European conflict, particularly as a result of the use of aviation and mechanized equipment, together with the possible consequences of further developments, necessitate another enlargement of our military program.186

No individual, no group, can clearly foretell the future. As long, however, as a possibility exists that not one continent or two continents but all continents may become involved in a world-wide war, reasonable precaution demands that American defense be made more certain.

He called on Congress for over $1 billion in supplemental appropriations for preparedness as well as legislation giving him the authority to call the National Guard and Army Reserves to active duty if needed.

On June 2, Administrator Carmody issued a statement to assure the Nation that the Federal Works Agency was able to meet the new defense demands:

We are equipped to handle virtually any type of construction work needed for national defense that civilians can do. Roads, airports, military bases and facilities, piers, docks, armories, housing, railroad sidings, power, water and sewer systems - these and numerous other works necessary to full defense protection can be built without delay through the trained staff immediately available.

He also stressed the longstanding cooperation between the PRA and the U.S. Army.

The following day, President Roosevelt met with Vice President Garner and Speaker of the House William B. Bankhead (D-Al.)187 as well as Representative Rayburn and Senator Barkley, the majority leaders in the two Houses. The President explained his plan to slash all government spending, excepting only activities directly connected with defense, by an average of 10 percent.

As a result of the changed circumstances, when Cartwright brought his bill to the House floor on June 3, he had cut the authorizations in his bill to $178 million. The 25-percent reduction eliminated much of the increase over the present year's authorization but the total was still above, rather than 10 percent below, the $160 million authorized for FY 1941. He explained:

It was and is the considered judgment of the Roads Committee that the amounts first proposed... were reasonable and fully justified in view of the great need for continued highway work in all the States. However, at a special meeting last Wednesday the committee agreed to amendments to the bill reducing all items 25 percent, with the understanding that the House leadership would cooperate in arranging for the bill to be considered and passed today under suspension of the rules. It is understood that with these reductions the bill will not be in conflict with the program of the President.

In other words, the committee felt that three fourths of a loaf was better than no loaf at all.

Representative James Mott (R-Or.), a member of the Committee on Roads and an anti-Roosevelt Republican, was blunter. He was opposed "to any reduction whatever in the 1940 bill," but he understood why a majority of the committee decided that some reduction was necessary:

One reason was that we are at present in a national emergency which is requiring huge expenditures for national defense, and that a majority of the committee were convinced that if the 1940 authorization carried as much as $238,000,000, the President would not sign this bill. In fact he did threaten to veto the bill if it carried more the $100,000,000. My own opinion is that a $238,000,000 road bill could have been passed over the President's veto. The trouble is, however, that if we had waited to bring up the bill in the regular manner it would have been so close to the time of adjournment that the President could have given it a pocket veto after adjournment, thus depriving us of the opportunity of undertaking to pass it over the veto.

The committee decided, therefore, to do the most practical thing in the circumstances. We reached an agreement with those who control the procedure on the majority side that if the original authorization were reduced by 25 percent the bill would be called up immediately under suspension of the rules, and they also undertook to give us reasonable assurance that if this bill were passed that it would become law. That is the reason the bill comes before the House under suspension...

I do not say the President will not veto this bill... because the President has never withdrawn his threat to veto any road bill which carried more than $100,000,000. But I do say that this bill, under our agreement, will be passed in time to compel the President, if he does veto it, to do so while the Congress is still in session. It will prevent him from giving it a pocket veto.

The bill passed the House the same day.

The Senate bill emerged from committee on June 17 and was considered on the Senate floor on June 22. Senator Hayden had reduced funding to $160,500,000 a year, mainly by reducing grade-crossing elimination funding to $20 million, instead of $50 million as in the House bill. The Senate added a provision to the bill that was a significant departure from the traditional Federal-aid highway program, which was based on State selection of projects. It provided that the Commissioner of Public Roads shall give priority to recommendations of the Army and Navy in approving State highway projects.

The Conference Committee formed to create a single bill out of the two versions completed its work in August. The final bill authorized $163.5 million a year. The provision on project priorities was changed to state that the Commissioner "may give priority of approval to, and expedite the construction of, projects that are recommended by the appropriate federal defense agency as important to the national defense." The key change - "may" instead of "shall" - gave the Commissioner flexibility in adopting or rejecting the defense agencies' recommendations.

President Roosevelt approved the legislation on September 5, 1940, just 2 months before going before the voters for an unprecedented third term, which he earned by defeating businessman Wendell L. Wilkie, although the victory was not as decisive as the President's victory over Governor Landon in 1936.

In his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1941, the President continued the Nation's move toward support of Great Britain and its allies. He concluded:

The destiny of America was proclaimed in words of prophecy spoken by our first President in his first inaugural in 1789 - words almost directed, it would seem, to this year of 1941: "The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered ... deeply, ... finally, staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people."

If we lose that sacred fire - if we let it be smothered with doubt and fear - then we shall reject the destiny which Washington strove so valiantly and so triumphantly to establish. The preservation of the spirit and faith of the Nation does, and will, furnish the highest justification for every sacrifice that we may make in the cause of national defense.

In the face of great perils never before encountered, our strong purpose is to protect and to perpetuate the integrity of democracy.

For this we muster the spirit of America, and the faith of America.

We do not retreat. We are not content to stand still. As Americans, we go forward, in the service of our country, by the will of God.188

Highways for the National Defense

On June 21, 1940, as part of the mobilization, the President asked Carmody for a study of the ability of the Nation's highways to meet defense needs. The President's brief letter read:

In order that we may be assured of the adequacy of our highway system to meet the needs of our national defense, I would like you, in collaboration with the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense and the War and Navy Departments, to have the Public Roads Administration of your Agency make a survey of our highway facilities from the viewpoint of national defense and advise me as to any steps that appear necessary.

I suggest that particular attention be paid to the strength of bridges, the width of strategic roads, adequacy of ingress to and egress from urban centers, and the servicing of existing and proposed Army, naval, and air bases.189

As part of the study, the Department of War updated its map of strategic highways, the latest version of a map first drawn in 1922, to help the PRA and the State highway agencies ensure critical roads were included in the Federal-aid system.190 For the report, the PRA used an interim map approved by the Secretary of War on November 20, 1940, illustrating a 74,600-mile network. (The refined map, dated May 15, 1941, and showing 78,000 miles of strategic roads, would be approved after the PRA completed its report.)

Commissioner MacDonald submitted the PRA's report to Carmody on February 1, 1941, with a transmittal letter stressing the changing nature of warfare as a result of Germany's aggressive actions:

[Following World War I] France built the Maginot line of defense fortifications, a conception based upon tradition and the historical pattern of previous wars with Germany. Holland relied upon her neutrality and perhaps her below-sea-level possibilities of flooding the land. These and other similar considerations may have influenced the planning of the German military machine. The relatively small number of motor vehicles and production capacity in the countries of Europe, so totally unlike the conditions in the United States, provided a rare opportunity to the German General Staff. At the very moment England was imposing limitations upon the motortruck [sic], Germany was subsidizing its use and, as a major national policy, engaging on a magnificent scale in the construction of a national system of super highways. The mileage actually completed before Germany's war machine went into action could not have had more than a limited utility, but the whole scheme was symbolic of Germany's conception of the new technique of warfare based upon fast and coordinated movement of mechanized power units over the land, upon the sea, and in the air.

Highways for the National Defense defined two types of defense roads:

First. The road program primarily required for defense operations.

Second. The road program required to improve inadequate sections of the strategic network.

The first type, known generally as access roads, required essential improvements of an emergency character. These roads were in the Federal reservation areas of Army cantonments, depots, and bases, as well as the shore establishments of the Navy; access roads of short mileage from main highways, railroads, and waterways to Army and Navy reservations and industrial plants engaged in defense production; and tactical roads providing access to more or less isolated points of strategic importance, generally along the coasts and borders.

The strategic network linked all important centers of defense industry and all military and naval concentration points. The main lines, as noted in the PRA's report, were included in the interregional network of toll-free express highways recommended in Toll Roads and Free Roads. The report explained:

Since, in its main lines at least, the strategic network is heavily used by civil traffic, and since purely military traffic imposes few if any highway requirements superior to those required for the adequate accommodation of civil traffic, it follows that almost any improvement that may be made to facilitate movement of traffic will be serviceable to an important civil-traffic stream as well as to military movements and defense traffic.

While access roads needed immediately for defense operation could be improved quickly, the report explained that upgrading the strategic network "can only be regarded as a long-time operation, and a practically continuous undertaking." In suggesting how costs should be allocated, therefore, the report relied on "the principle of major use":

The access roads, as to the traffic to be served or as to their priority, are in the main requirements of the defense program. The development of the strategic network is very largely required by civil traffic, but the potential defense needs will advance the priority of many projects.

The report recommended an appropriation to the PRA of not less than $150 million to pay all costs, including the cost of right-of-way acquisition, to correct the most serious deficiencies in access roads needed for military and naval reservations and defense-industry sites, and $25 million to improve tactical roads and reimburse out-of-pocket costs of State and local governments for repairs necessitated by the occasional use of roads for defense-related purposes.

For the strategic network, the most serious deficiencies involved 2,436 bridges with insufficient load capacity, 5,090 miles of rural roads less than 18 feet wide, and roads totaling 14,000 miles that did not have an all-weather surface. The report estimated that $458 million would be needed to eliminate these serious deficiencies. However, the report recommended a supplementary appropriation of not less than $100 million solely for this purpose:

This appropriation should be prorated to the States on the existing Federal-aid basis, and used solely for designated defense projects. It should be available to pay all legitimate costs of the projects on a somewhat higher basis of Federal participation than the existing 50-50 basis, but otherwise should be expended under the provisions of the Federal highway legislation.

The report also requested $12 million for engineering surveys and plans for the strategic network, with the funds to be apportioned and matched on the standard basis of the Federal-aid highway program.

In forwarding the report to the President, Carmody stressed the cooperation received from defense officials and the State highway departments. Regarding the States, he said:

These existing, well-organized highway organizations, cooperative in spirit, are in a position to furnish an irreplaceable and immediate contribution to quick action in the phases of the defense program dependent upon highway transport.

He stressed that preparation of the report had gone beyond road needs in anticipation of a new program:

Finally, we have received assurances of complete cooperation from the equipment manufacturers, the material producers and the highway contractors through their organized associations, in carrying forward the programs of construction in line with the best traditions of service to meet the country's requirements which are a product of this critical period.191

During a February 7 press conference, the President said he would seek authorizations from Congress for a post-defense public works program to lessen the effect of economic repercussions when the war ended. The projects would be an economic cushion for the return to a civilian economy.

One observer of the press conference was an anonymous PRA employee who summarized the portion of interest to the FWA:

The President said at his morning press conference today that Commissioner MacDonald was coming in to see him today to discuss "through national highways," which are his "favorite subject," civil and military highway needs, and the problem of excess condemnation. The President indicated that at this session of the Congress "certain authorizations" for public works would be introduced, and that highways would be a large part of the after-war national program to "take up the slack" of a reduced arms program.

According to the observer, the subject arose when the President was asked about proposals for a "defense super-highway" between Washington and Baltimore. Although the President was not familiar with the proposal, he wanted "a reservoir of public works projects, the President said, which will be all ready to start, or nearly so, to take up the slack." The report continued:

You may see at this session, he went on, certain authorization bills for public works - bills without appropriations.

This will mean, he said, that Congress will determine the type of work that is to be done - that is to be placed in this reservoir of projects. It does not mean that the money will be provided, merely that the work will be on the shelf, ready for quick action.

One of the types of work planned is highways. Tom MacDonald, the President stated, is coming in to see me at 12:15 about through national highways, a favorite subject of his. We will talk over all highway problems - civil as well as military.

And we are also going to talk about what I think is called excess condemnation - also a subject which MacDonald has given a great deal of thought.

This "excess condemnation," the President explained, means that the gov't will take advantage of the added increment that occurs to real estate when a highway, for example, is put through virgin territory. As an example, for instance, a man's farm might increase in value from five to ten thousand dollars. It is proposed that the Government buy more land than it needs for a 100-foot right-of-way, and get the benefit of this added value. Land thus acquired would be sold by the Government over a period of years.

In this way, the President said, the Government will get a profit and be able to pay back a large part of the whole of the capital cost.

The President also explained that one of the possibilities for a "reservoir" of public works would be a highway along the entire length of the Atlantic Coast. "Now I don't know where this might go, the President added - it might run along Chesapeake Bay - it might go any number of routes."

Asked about other types of public works that might be in the reservoir, the President cited hospitals, airports, housing and other public works that would yield the government a revenue.

After meeting with the President at 12:15, MacDonald told reporters that he did not know what authorizations would be requested for highways. He said his conversation covered only non-defense projects that might employ defense workers when the rearmament program slowed.192

On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt reacted to events in Europe by issuing a statement proclaiming an "unlimited national emergency." Germany was attempting to secure bases in Iceland, Greenland, the Azores, and elsewhere to control shipping in the Atlantic Ocean. The proclamation cited the limited national emergency declared on September 8, 1939, following the outbreak of war in Europe, then referred to:

... a succession of events [that make] plain that the objectives of the Axis belligerents [Germany, Italy, and Japan] in such war are not confined to those avowed at its commencement, but include overthrow throughout the world of existing democratic order, and a world-wide dominion of people and economies through the destruction of all resistance on land and sea and in the air.

Declaring that "indifference on the part of the United States to the increasing menace would be perilous," the President proclaimed that an unlimited national emergency confronted the country "which requires that its military, naval, air and civilian defenses be put on the basis of readiness to repel any and all acts or threats of aggression directed toward any part of the Western Hemisphere."

In a radio address, the President summarized the steps the United States had taken to aid Great Britain in its steadfast resistance to German attacks. He stated that Germany's objective, should it defeat Great Britain, was world domination:

Some people seem to think that we are not attacked until bombs actually drop in the streets of New York or San Francisco or New Orleans or Chicago. But they are simply shutting their eyes to the lesson we must learn from the fate of every nation that the Nazis have conquered... Nobody can foretell tonight just when the acts of the dictators will ripen into attack on this hemisphere and us. But we know enough by now to realize that it would be suicide to wait until they are in our front yard.

His broadcast statement concluded:

Therefore, with profound consciousness of my responsibilities to my countrymen and to my country's cause, I have tonight issued a proclamation that an unlimited national emergency exists and requires the strengthening of our defense to the extreme limit of our national power and authority.

This nation will expect all individuals and all groups to play their full parts without stint, without selfishness and without doubt that our democracy will triumphantly survive.

I repeat the words of the signers of the Declaration of Independence - that little band of patriots, fighting long ago against overwhelming odds but certain, as we are now of ultimate victory: "With a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor."

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FOOTNOTES

  1. Associated Press, "Time Believed Ripe for Superhighway," The Baltimore Sun, February 25, 1938.
  2. FDR Library, OF 1e, Box 11.
  3. FDR Library, OF 129, Roads and Highways, Box 3.
  4. FDR Library, OF 1e, Box 11.
  5. FDR Library, OF 1e, Box 11.
  6. FDR Library, OF 129, Box 3.
  7. For information on how the BPR's vision evolved, see "The Genie in the Bottle" in the September/October 2000 Public Roads at http://http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/00septoct/urban.cfm. Also see "Designating the Urban Interstates" at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/fairbank.cfm.
  8. The President was referring to the German blitzkrieg attack through Flanders in northern France.
  9. Speaker Bankhead was the son of Senator John Bankhead, the strong good roads advocate and sponsor of the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916.
  10. Roosevelt, Franklin D., Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States, Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 246-247.
  11. Highways for the National Defense: A Report to the Administrator, Federal Works Agency, Mr. John M. Carmody, by the Public Roads Administration, February 1, 1941, Senate Committee Print, 77th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1.
  12. For information on the origins of the map, see America's Highways 1776-1976, p. 142.
  13. Highways for the National Defense: A Report to the Administrator, Federal Works Agency, Mr. John M. Carmody, by the Public Roads Administration, Senate Committee Print, 77th Congress, 1st Session, February 1, 1941.
  14. "President Plans Post-Defense Jobs" and Associated Press, "MacDonald sees President," The New York Times, February 8, 1941; "White House Press Conference - February 7", MacDonald Papers, Texas A&M University, MAC 0189.
Updated: 10/15/2013
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