All projects, whether undertaken by using conventional procurement methods or by using a P3 approach, have known risks, "known-unknown" risks, and unknown risks. Known risks are risks that have been identified. Identified risks need to be proactively managed throughout the project life cycle by (a) identifying who owns the management of those risks and (b) determining what the risk entails, its triggers, and the contingency plans that would prevent those risks from occurring or that would lessen the impact on the project should they occur. At times, the risks may simply be accepted by a project if the cost to avoid or mitigate the risk is more than the cost of the potential consequences.
Unidentified risks can be known-unknown or unknown. Known-unknown risks are those that are known, but it is unknown how they could affect the project. For example, the probability of some risks occurring, such as changes in material costs and even natural disasters, can be calculated based on historical information. Unknown risks are totally unknown and therefore not possible to prevent or manage. Examples are certain unprecedented events, such as terrorist attacks, civil unrest, or natural disasters uncommon to a region. A challenge during the risk-identification process is to reduce the presence of unknown risks during the project life cycle. Known-unknown and unknown risks cannot be managed proactively and thus most often are addressed by allocating an acceptable level of general contingency against the project as a whole, which is adequate to manage a reasonable level of unknown risk.
Risk identification is an important component in the development of a P3 framework. The focus of P3s is on known risks that can be mitigated by allocation to one of the involved parties as well as by other methods, such as insurance and quality control. The most common risks of highway projects are listed in table 2. They are grouped by project phase and are detailed in the following sections.
The environmental review required under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) provisions is a time-consuming and costly effort, and environmental issues raised during the review process can threaten the viability of the project. Project alternatives that are considered during the NEPA process should be viable and financeable as a P3, taking into consideration the availability of public funds. NEPA is often a major constraint on a private entity's ability to offer Alternative Technical Concepts (ATCs), because any significant change can invalidate NEPA approvals. When a project is considered for procurement as a P3, there are various best practices that can ensure that the NEPA process is conducted in a way that allows efficiency for a future P3, for example, by avoiding over-specification of the project at the NEPA stage in a way that would restrict future innovation.
Although the role that the private sector can legally play in the NEPA process is severely restricted, the cost of the NEPA review can be shared between public and private partners. In addition to the NEPA requirements, certain States, such as California, have specific environmental requirements. One way to mitigate NEPA risks is for the public sector to have the environmental process near completion before releasing a P3 solicitation.
| Phase | Type of Risk |
|---|---|
| Development phase |
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| Construction phase |
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| Operation phase |
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Detailed description of Table 2
Key types of project risks to public or private partners. The table lists the most common risks of highway projects by project phase. On the left three phases are listed as follows: Development, Construction, and Operation. In the development phase, the types of risk involved are: planning and environmental process, political will, regulatory, site, permitting, procurement, and financing. During the construction phase, the risks are engineering and construction, and changes in market conditions. Finally, during the operation phase, the types of risk are: traffic, competing facilities, operations and maintenance, appropriation, financial default risk to public agency, refinancing, political, regulatory, and handback.
To be successful, P3 projects must be supported by strong political will at all levels of government. This includes support from the legislative and executive branches as well as from the general public. A lack of political commitment is one of the critical risks during the project development phase. It can lead potential private partners to withdraw from the project if concerns arise surrounding the certainty of investment terms. Manifestations of political risk include the outright cancellation of projects by the public agency, the inability to reach an agreement between the public and private partners on the project structure, and the failure to appropriate funds necessary for the proposed project.
Cancellation of a project or failure to reach an agreement between the private and public partners due to lack of political commitment can make it more difficult to attract the private sector in future P3 projects that may be proposed by the public agency.
Political risk is heightened if State P3 legislation allows for a veto of the project by a State or local assembly. The uncertainty surrounding final approval of the project and the inclusion of local political pressures in the decisionmaking process are powerful deterrents to private sector investment.
A clear prerequisite to the development of P3 projects is the existence of P3-enabling legislation. Regulatory risk exists when an inadequate P3 framework is in place. State and local P3 legislation must contain certain provisions to ensure that the P3 program can be attractive to the private sector while protecting the public interest. P3 regulations should provide sufficient guidance, striking the right balance between flexibility and certainty. This will encourage private sector interest.
Desirable provisions in P3 legislation include a requirement for clear procurement guidelines and decision criteria, flexible project eligibility criteria, and the ability to revise toll rates over the project's life (Hedlund & Chase, 2005). Overall, restrictive P3 statutes (e.g., restricting P3s to a pilot program or requiring multiple legislative approvals for a project) are less likely to attract private sector interest than are more flexible legislative provisions. Other regulatory restrictions may include limits on the type of procurement that is authorized, limitations on leasing, limitations on use of financing instruments (including mixing public and private funds on a given project), and restrictions on which public agencies are allowed to enter into P3 agreements (e.g., State departments of transportation but not local authorities). Restrictions on the type of projects and pilot program provisions are likely to be perceived by private sector entities as indicating a lack of long-term political commitment to P3s.
During the development phase, greenfield or hybrid P3 projects are exposed to a variety of risks related to the project site's ground conditions. Issues can arise with regard to the suitability of the site, including environmental contamination, poor geological conditions, and archeological remains. Community relations can also lead to site risks if there is a significant amount of local hostility toward a project. In these cases, site risk becomes closely tied to political risk, as local opposition to a project can jeopardize its political support.
Community relations issues can also lead to or worsen right-of-way acquisition risk. In some cases, the public agency will take responsibility for the acquisition of the required land, or the land will be Federal or State-owned land. On occasion, however, the private sector entity must acquire land (e.g., Dulles Greenway in Virginia) that not only allows for the possibility of a real-estate-related upside, but also increases the risk to the private sector. The State may need to use their condemnation rights in extreme cases.
The successful development of P3 projects is tied to the ability of the private sector entity to receive the required Federal, State, and local permits. Permitting issues that stem from a lack of preparedness or from difficulties caused by the project's design can cause considerable delays and additional costs. As with site-related issues, public agencies and the private sector partner can share the responsibility for permitting to varying degrees.
Procurement risk refers to the risk of failed or flawed procurements. This includes fewer proposers than anticipated, affordability threshold exceeded by lowest bid, procurement award successfully challenged, or noncompliant or low-quality bids submitted. Procurement issues can be caused by general market conditions, but they most often stem from flaws in the design of the procurement process or unsuitable project structures/risk transfer expectations. It is important that public agencies not be constrained in their procurement practices by regulations that require that they award contracts to the lowest price bidder rather than to the bidder presenting the best value. There are often valid reasons for conducting a lowest price competition with a quality threshold, and many proposers prefer this arrangement. In best value procurements, technical or financial quality plays a significant role in the award decision. The public owner needs to understand the value associated with the quality factors (Scott, Molenaar, Gransberg, & Smith, 2006).
P3 legislation or guidelines often include procurement procedures for P3s that specify evaluation criteria for P3 proposals, including technical, financial, and innovation criteria; however, procurement issues can arise from a lack of clarity in response requirements, excessive financial commitment requirements, insufficient protection of design and proprietary information, or a lack of transparency in the selection criteria. The procuring agency's track record with P3s and other procurements also influences bidders' perception of procurement risk. Procurement risk for private entities seeking to bid on a project can be significant, because it is very expensive to prepare a proposal.
Risks associated with financing for P3 projects can result in the inability to reach financial close or can lead to default on project debt during the operating period. Inaccurate or overly optimistic traffic projections and underestimated project costs can lead to the development of pro forma financials that appear to justify the investment decision but that do not reflect the project's actual ability to repay debt or to meet equity investors' return requirements. On project cost estimates, both equity investors and commercial lenders will look to achieve realism in the estimates and will subject them to similar stress tests. Lenders may, however, take a more conservative view of traffic volume projections, and their conclusion on the viability of the project might differ from the more aggressive outlook of the private sector entity. This could make financing difficult to obtain on reasonable terms.
Both commercial and public lenders make their decisions based not only on the intrinsic risk of project default, but also on external factors. Transportation projects have high capital costs and long-term revenue streams and are therefore generally financed over 20 or 30 years. With constrained financial markets since 2007, however, banks have become reluctant to have outstanding repayments for such lengthy periods of time. Commercial lenders have demanded more stringent terms, including higher minimum debt service coverage ratios and shorter loan life terms, tighter dividend distribution covenants, higher margins, mandatory refinancing and cash sweep provisions, and requirements for multiple reserve accounts (e.g., for debt service, O&M, and capital improvements).
Many P3 projects today achieve a significantly reduced cost of capital through government loan programs, such as the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, to provide long-term subordinate debt. The availability of TIFIA financing depends on the project's eligibility, the amount of budgetary authority available to TIFIA, and the successful mitigation of project risks. Financing risk exists even for projects with strong economics due to the limited amount of credit available from private and public sources.
Financing risks can also be related to regulatory risks. For example, if the tax treatment is not clearly outlined by the P3 regulations or the concession agreement, private lenders are likely to be unwilling to accept the risks. This reinforces the importance of transparency and predictability in P3 legislation, policies, and guidelines.
Engineering risk encompasses several sub-risks, including design risk, construction cost risk, and latent defect risk. Design risk refers to the potentially negative effects to the project resulting from flaws in the design work. Design flaws can lead to delays and cost increases, as well as produce environmental and safety issues, both during the construction and during the operations period of a project.
Construction costs are an important risk area for P3 projects, because they can be affected by increases in labor and material costs, as well as by delays and the cost of performance bonds. Construction costs are estimated during the design phase and can be locked in through lump-sum turnkey contracts (DB), which allow for fixed costs and penalties in case of completion delays. Performance bonds and completion guarantees can also be written into the construction contract to further incentivize the construction contractor to complete work on time and to reduce risk, although this practice can result in a higher contract price.
Latent defect risk is a form of risk linked to a project's construction that is present after the completion of construction. It is the risk of flaws in the infrastructure that are not apparent until operation of the facility begins. Most construction contracts make the DB contractor liable for such defects, and they include penalties and damages to compensate the owner and operator against lost revenue caused by the underperformance or lack of availability of the facility. It is only possible to lock the DB contractor into a relatively short warranty of the work following final acceptance. Major defects that arise several years after the DB contractor has finished will not generally be resolved through recourse to warranty provisions within the original DB contract. This is the reason why a P3 DBFOM provides an effective long-term hedge against latent defects in a way that a DB cannot; however, in hybrid greenfield-brownfield projects, in which the concessionaire takes responsibility for existing assets, latent defects are a very contentious issue.
It is important to note that construction cost risk is the only risk that is typically transferred under conventional procurement, although not always successfully. It is typical that under conventional procurement with DBB, the designer cannot consider all of the contractor's construction methods. The design is therefore not optimized to suit a specific contractor's sequencing, methods, equipment, and preferences. The DBB process requires the public owner to manage design and construction interfaces, which often results in claims and inefficiencies compared with DB, which has a single point of responsibility. The desire to control cost overruns is a key motivator for the public sector, but for the private sector, managing construction costs is a key risk, which the concessionaire usually handles through a DB contract with another private firm.
Once the final investment decision has been made by the public agency and private sector entities and the P3 agreements have been signed, significant costs are incurred for the permitting, financing, design, and construction of a project. Although it is possible to lock in engineering costs, other market conditions can change during the construction period and negatively affect the project. Changes in macroeconomic conditions can affect inflation rates, as well as projected material and labor costs. A public agency can protect itself from construction cost increases by requiring the concessionaire to submit a fixed price contract. The private sector entity will normally add an inflation factor into its final bid, which "expires" after a certain time period to protect against changes in market conditions. As an alternative, indexing approaches may be used to address inflationary cost increases.
Traffic risk (for toll-based concessions) refers to the risk that, over the life of a project, actual traffic levels do not reach projected levels. This would negatively affect the project's cash flows and the ability of the concessionaire to repay debt and generate sufficient equity returns. Traffic risk is often the core component of toll-based concessions, and its allocation defines the project and determines the remainder of the contractual arrangements. Traffic risk is present in any revenue-generating facility. It is borne either by the public agency (in the case of availability payments), by the private sector entity (in the case of toll-based or shadow toll-based concessions), or may be shared by both.
Traffic risk can be influenced by several factors, including the quality of the initial traffic projections, changes in the macroeconomic environment, the existence of alternative routes, and the level of user fees. Initial traffic projections are subject to a thorough vetting by lenders. This vetting can include requiring a review of the initial projections by an independent expert, lowering the risks associated with the quality of the projections.
Competing facilities present revenue risk for toll-based P3 projects. Existing or planned competing facilities can be integrated into traffic and revenue projections, and diversion from the proposed toll facility can be modeled; however, calculating the risk of new (i.e., not previously planned) competing facilities built during the operation phase of a P3 project is less straightforward. Some P3 agreements include a non-compete clause whereby the public agency agrees not to grant permits to a competing facility or to compensate the concessionaire if a new competing facility is constructed that negatively affects revenue from the existing P3 facility. The burden of proof typically lies on the private party to demonstrate harm. The public sector may identify planned facilities that are exempt from qualifying as "relief events" or cause for compensation.
Additional risks in the operations phase include technology risk, toll violation and toll collection enforcement risks, and risks related to toll escalation with policy caps. Positive impacts from facilities built by the public sector must also be taken into account. In Texas, the concession agreements specify that construction of facilities that induce traffic on the P3 facility and the net effect must be considered.
O&M risk may result from actual physical issues with facilities or by an increase in O&M costs. O&M risk can also translate into loss of revenue if the facility needs to be closed for an extensive overhaul or if its capacity is reduced during maintenance activities.
O&M costs forecasted at the time of the project's development generally include cost increases based on inflation or other predetermined factors. Costs can, however, increase beyond the anticipated level, for example, in cases in which labor costs increase above expectations.
Insufficient maintenance can lead to a deterioration of the condition of a project and can ultimately lead to closures, which in turn will cause a loss in revenue (either from tolls or from availability payments) and damage the public's perception of the project. Loss of availability due to natural disasters and similar events is, however, generally considered to be caused by force majeure events and may be insured or designated as a risk to be shared by the public and private partners. For hybrid greenfield-brownfield projects in which the concessionaire takes responsibility for existing assets, latent defects represent a significant risk that can raise contentious issues.
Appropriations risk is the risk that the public agency is incapable of meeting its financial obligations to the project, because funds for the project fail to be obligated to its budget. Appropriations risk can affect P3 projects in which the public agency is expected to make payments, either as lump sum payments during the construction period or as availability payments during the life of the project. This risk can be caused by political issues (if there is strong local opposition to the project) or by a change in economic conditions affecting public sector revenues.
Financial default risk is the risk borne by the public entity that the private sector entity will have financial difficulties that will prevent it from performing its duties according to the P3 contract's terms. Unless there are flaws with the project itself, projects for which a private partner is in financial difficulty can generally be sold to another private sector entity or to a government entity, which allows for continuity of operations. An example is the South Bay Expressway P3 project in San Diego, CA, which went into bankruptcy and was sold to the San Diego Association of Governments, a government entity. In normal circumstances, a P3 agreement would be set up to allow for lender step-in rights prior to the private sector entity's default. The lenders would then be able to manage the project while ensuring that the public agency is fully involved in the process.
Financing risk remains present during the operating life of a project. Depending on the initial financing terms, P3 projects can be exposed to interest rate risks, especially if the concessionaire has entered into a floating rate loan and has opted not to hedge. Loan agreements can also carry mandatory refinancing provisions; this provision exposes a project to financing risk when it seeks to refinance its existing loan. To maintain similar debt service coverage ratios - and therefore the same level of default risk - private partners must be able to secure a loan of the same amount as the outstanding principal at the time of refinancing for a sufficient loan repayment period and at an equally or more favorable interest rate.
The availability of debt at the time of the mandatory refinancing (associated with bullet maturities) cannot be known to the concessionaire at the time of the initial financing, making refinancing risk difficult to estimate accurately. In the past, the private entity has benefited from refinancing, though less so recently. Many recent P3 contracts have provisions that require that the private party share any gains from refinancing with the public agency.
During the operations phase, relevant Federal or State statutes may change. For example, laws governing high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes may be revised, such as vehicle occupancy requirements for toll-free service or minimum speed requirements. The public and private partners will need to address these risks in the P3 agreement by stating that discriminatory changes in law qualify as relief events.
There are also risks associated with how contract performance standards are interpreted and overseen by the public agency. One risk considered by the private sector is that a new political administration will come in that is hostile to the deal and will seek a more stringent interpretation or enforcement of certain standards to undermine the private partners' credibility. There are also regular changes to State Department of Transportation (DOT) policies regarding technology, asset management, and maintenance practices with which the private sector may be expected to conform.
Handback risk or residual value risk is the risk that facility conditions are worse than anticipated at the end of the project. Handback provisions include the terms, conditions, requirements, and procedures governing the condition in which a private partner is to deliver an asset to the public sector upon expiration or earlier termination of the P3 agreement, as set forth in the contract. Contracts need to be structured so that there are financial incentives at the end of a contract to encourage the private partner to make the investments necessary to hand back the facility to the public agency in suitable condition.
