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MISSOURI DIVISION |
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PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEPTEMBER 2000 POST EARTHQUAKE HIGHWAY RESPONSE AND RECOVERY SEMINAR HELD IN ST. LOUIS MISSOURI
RESPONSE & RECOVERY -- AN OVERVIEW BY JERRY BAXTER
Our next speaker is Jerry Baxter who retired from CALTRANS not to long ago after 34 years. He´s actually a native of Hannibal, Missouri. He has an AA degree from Hannibal LaGrange College and a BS in civil engineering from the University of Southern California. He was the district director for Los Angeles and Fresno CALTRANS districts and one of his biggest accomplishments delivering the $2 billion I-105 project on schedule and within budget. CALTRANS has 12 districts and the budget for Los Angeles district is the size of Missouri DOT's budget for a whole year so it's an extremely large operation. Now, I would like to call Jerry up.
MR. BAXTER: Thank you, Al. Good morning, everybody. On January 17, 1994 a magnitude 6.7 earthquake struck Los Angeles at 4:30 in the morning. It resulted in 60 deaths, thousands of injuries and about $20 billion in damages. Nine freeway structures collapsed. Even though the damage was severe, it could have been a lot worse. There are about 4,800 structures in Los Angeles County alone. Also, because of the early hour of the earthquake and the low traffic volumes on the freeway systems at that time there was only one fatality on the freeway system.
What I would like to take you through our recovery process. Hopefully some of the things that we learned and did will be of value to you.
The earthquake epicenter was in Northridge in the north San Fernando Valley. We lost on Interstate 5; we lost Cabot Canyon. We lost four structures within the Route 5 and Route 14 interchange; the whole interchange was virtually wiped out.
Farther to the south, closer to the epicenter, actually, on Route 118, we lost two structures, on the 118 freeway. Interestingly enough, down farther south on the Santa Monica freeway, we lost two structures, a long way from the epicenter. As a matter of fact, there was severe danger to buildings in the Santa Monica Bay Area.
That phenomenon, of being a long way from the epicenter, triggered a research study at USC which Jim´s bridge department helped sponsor. It looked closer at the correlation between the underlying geology and some of the earthquake forces.
This slide shows a Gavin Canyon structure on Interstate 5 that we lost. We lost both of the approach slabs. That 18-wheeler, the motor home, and that car had to be lifted off by crane. I never talked to those people but I can imagine what they went through in the aftershocks before they got off that structure.
This is a southbound connector in the 5/14 freeway interchange. Southbound 14 fell right across both lanes of the Route 5 freeway shutting it down. The Route 5 freeway, of course, is a major arterial in California, north and south, actually the whole west coast, so we were without connection to northern California.
This is the only location where we had a fatality. A motorcycle officer going to work in the morning went off that bridge and was killed. Obviously, the northbound connector at 5/14 also went down. We lost all four of the connections in that interchange between the two.
On the Mission Bow Creek under crossing on Route 118, we lost two structures, one right after the other, very close together, and very similar failures modes.
For the Fairfax La Sienna structures on Interstate 10, we lost them through column failure. While we lost nine structures, we also had 39 structure with major damage, 194 structures with moderate damage requiring repair, and 46 hinges requiring repair or replacement.
As a result of the previous earthquakes in California in 1971, 1987 and 1989, CALTRANS had launched a retrofit program to strengthen the structures. The phase one program that provided restrainers at the abutments and deck hinges had been for the most part completed and no doubt saved an awful lot of structures. This is typical of the steel cables that Jim's bridge department put in to tie the bridge decks to the columns and also tie the hinges together.
This is some of the hinge damage that we had. Actually, a lot of these hinges are only about nine inches wide. I believe the new standard now is 30 inches. So the restrainer cables kept these together in many cases. There was some damage to some of the hinges without restrainer cables but hinges with restrainer cables stayed in place.
The phase-two retrofit program consisted of circular steel jackets on the columns, but unfortunately, we had not completed them when the Northridge earthquake hit. Seven of the lost structures of the nine were scheduled for retrofit. This phase-two program where they actually went in and applied steel jackets to those columns probably would have saved every one of those bridges had we had them in place at the time. CALTRANS had made a commitment to both phases of the retrofit program. The phase one project was scheduled first because it was easiest to complete and phase two was underway when the Northridge earthquake hit.
This is one of the bridges in Los Angeles where steel jackets are being applied. This is the work that was done to increase the size of the footings in conjunction with the steel jackets. This program has been completed statewide. Now we have the phase two program done and hopefully will not have any more damage like we had in Northridge.
This is a short column shear failure that was typical of almost all the bridges, certainly on Route 118, in Mission, and Santa Monica. We had almost identical types of failures, and of course, the steel jackets are designed to prevent this kind of a problem.
There was damage to other facilities besides the bridge structures. There was considerable damage to approach slabs and underground drainage structures. While we were able to ascertain the extent of damage on the surface facilities, it took several months before we were able to complete an assessment of the underground drainage structures. In some instances these required the use of robotic cameras. The initial assessment of the damage began immediately after the earthquake. CALTRANS maintains numerous maintenance facilities throughout the county. The maintenance staff is responsible for a specific geographical area and they provided the first inspections. If they thought it was necessary, they would call the bridge engineers to assist. Starting the second day we had the support of additional bridge engineers from headquarters in Sacramento to assist our local structure engineers. On the first day we inspected 59 structures and by the tenth day, we had inspected 1,500 structures in the district. These reports as well as those of the highway patrol were funneled into the newly established command center.
The greatest initial problem was communication and Jim spoke a little bit about this. CALTRANS uses microwave radio transmission and the shocks misaligned most of the repeaters, so they didn't work very well. Luckily, we were in the process of securing cell phones as backup based on similar experiences in northern California in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. As usual in disasters of that magnitude, there is much confusion and false reports and frankly it was late in the first day before we were able to have a reliable damage assessment. I think the hardest challenge initially was to be patient and develop a reliable assessment of the damage. Our office building was severely damaged, but we were able to establish a command center in the building with radio and telephone communications. We also had a traffic control center that was operational. The California Highway Patrol also staffed the traffic control center, so we had continuous communications with them.
Another initial problem was the loss of key staff. Many of our staff were located in the heavily damaged areas and they were victims of the earthquake. They were occupied with the safety of their families. We were fortunate in having people step forward and take charge when necessary. We had some staff sleeping on cots in the office. CALTRANS maintains a call-out plan so all we had to do was put in information to find out who was not available and who was available for backup. That took a matter of hours.
By evening the first day we had a fairly good estimate of the damage and were able to start recovery programs. It was obvious that the nine structures were lost and many more were in need of temporary shoring before traffic could be allowed on them. The construction industry response was outstanding. They offered and provided construction equipment and shoring material immediately. During the first day, we were able to issue emergency force account contracts for the start of demolition on the lost structures and shoring on several of the structures that were damaged. Maintenance personnel initiated many of the first contracts because they first ones on site. Later our construction branch took over the awarding of contracts which was their normal
Function. With excellent communications between the two, we really had no problems with overlapping, duplicating, or confusion between the two.
Many people have asked me how we were able to respond so quickly and the answer is unbelievably simple. All we did was empower people to do their jobs. I can't tell you how many people have asked me that and how many people don't believe the answer is that simple, but it is. We empowered people to do their job. Our focus as management was to provide some overall direction and coordination to help our staff.
The demolition of the Route 5 freeway and Route 118 freeway structures, were really unique inasmuch as they were in a residential community. We worked 24 hours a day, around the clock and, believe me, tearing down a bridge deck is not an easy task and very noisy. We were real concerned for the community so we sent an outreach team to talk to the people in the area and offered them the opportunity to be relocated to a hotel or motel during this demolition. Very few took us up on it. As a matter of fact, I went out there one day and the local residents in the community were serving coffee and doughnuts to the workers. So they really got caught up in the process. They were anxious to see it done.
This is the Gavin Canyon structure that is unique in and of itself. We had to bring that dynamite into that central section to get it down, and there were an awful lot of utilities in that underlying roadway. There were high-pressure gas lines, extensive communications lines, and fiber optics communications for the LA international airport. We were real concerned about bringing that deck down and damaging one of these utilities. The contractor brought in about 20 feet of dirt fill to cushion the fall of that deck when it was dynamited. We didn't have any problems at all, the dynamite going off and column coming down.
We had a lot of structures that were damaged. Even though we may not have lost a structure, we had to provide temporary shoring while we did the repairs. So there was a lot of this around Los Angeles. This included the temporary shoring on hinges that required repair. We used an awful lot of materials and had a lot of help from the construction industry. We probably used everything from all of the lumberyards in Los Angeles. Luckily we had enough to do the job.
One major problem with the Route 10 freeway demolition occurred with the public storage units underneath. The state had leased the space under the freeway for storage units. We were able to allow some people in to some of the storage units, but a lot of them couldn't because of concern that the deck would come down in some of the aftershocks. So we had no choice but to actually demolish the bridge deck on top of the storage units. Even though the leases limited the value of storage items, we had claims for much more. It was amazing. You wouldn't believe the valuables people said they trusted to a storage unit underneath the freeway. One lady told us she had all of her shares in Tyler Award Group in that storage unit.
Ironically, both of the structures on Route 10 had been scheduled for phase two retrofit. The work had been delayed for prolonged negotiations with the storage unit lessee. The column retrofit could not be completed without removing some of the storage units. I later recommended that CALTRANS no longer lease space underneath the freeway for storage units.
The Director of CALTRANS was extremely helpful. He delegated his authority to approve emergency contracts to the districts, which allowed us to be underway immediately. I believe we benefited immensely from the fact that Jim Rosenfeld, the Director of CALTRANS, had disaster recovery experience on Mount St. Helens. He knew the value of delegation to the district and he also provided total support throughout the state. At no time did the director attempt to direct the recovery effort from Sacramento. He and I were in constant contact day-to-day. He allowed the local people to direct the recovery effort.
By the end of the second day, we were able to concentrate on detours around the damaged structures. We worked closely with the City of Los Angeles transportation department in designing the detours because many of them were on city facilities.
The governor declared an emergency and exempted CALTRANS from any requirement that would cause a delay in getting contracts underway. This meant we did not have to have environmental documents. We did not have to have permits from anybody: a dream come true for us engineers.
The role of the Federal Highway Administration cannot be overstated. Starting the second day, we had FHWA representatives with us every step of the way. Their staff set up permanent residence in Los Angeles until restoration was complete. We did not lose a single day waiting for an approval from FHWA.
We also had visits from the President, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Federal Highway Administrator. Some of these were a distraction as we had a Republican governor and a Democratic Federal Administration that caused some conflicts. This is a photo of my office. If I look perturbed in the background, it's because Secretary Pena and Administrator Rodney Slater had taken over my office to phone the President and I thought I had work to do.
We were fortunate that both CALTRANS and the City of Los Angeles had fairly sophisticated traffic control centers through that time. CALTRANS had traffic sensors in all the freeways and about 50 changeable message signs and the ability to call highway advisory radio almost anywhere.
The city had much of their automatic signal system in place and could control signal timing from their central control center. They quickly established communication between our two traffic control centers to coordinate traffic management. The city also had some remote cameras monitoring traffic. They monitored traffic constantly on the freeways. The center also directed the roadway service patrols that were the freeway. They also controlled their traffic signal system and monitored traffic constantly from their command center.
We really had three command centers throughout the restoration process. The first command center was CALTRANS' internal center. At eight a.m. each day, we went over the latest reports from the structure inspection staff, went over the status of contracts, and traffic conditions. We also finalized our plans that we took to the interagency coordinating board. We kept this up every day at eight o'clock for several months to make sure that we were coordinated internally with our various departments within CALTRANS.
Our project managers were responsible for developing an inventory of damage, preparing cost estimates and roadway plans. We were constantly asked to update cost estimates to be used for federal funds allocation, so that took an awful lot of time. Other project managers were responsible for tracking all the contracts and insuring that we minimize conflicts and were on schedule with openings. We had an awful lot of contracts going on each individual route; some major, some minor, but we had to be sure they were all scheduled towards an opening date and were properly coordinated.
Another project manager was a structures engineer and he was totally invaluable. We had an outstanding senior maintenance engineer in our district and he kept us apprised every day of the latest developments on their inspections.
The second command center was the governor's interagency coordinating board that met at nine a.m. each day during the early part of the recovery. After a month or two, we started meeting once a week. The governor announced that he was the chair.
The agency staff would work day and night before the meeting and prepared plans. Each morning we would give a staff report on the status. The governor´s board consisted of CALTRANS, the Highway Patrol, Federal Highways, City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, Metropolitan Transportation Authority who operates the bus system, the Metrolink that operates the commuter rail system, the regional ride share agency, and the sheriff´s department. This was our way to keep coordinated.
Each day, each agency explained what their plans were, what they thought they were going to be doing, and we made sure that we were all on the same page, coordinated, and supported each other.
I cannot over emphasize the cooperation we have received from regional and commuter rail staff. We were in a lot of trouble in serving the north county residents. We lost the only freeway link to them, that is the Route 14 freeway. So we had no connection to all of north county, San Fernando Valley, Palmdale, and the Lancaster area...none at all.
They had planned to initiate commuter rail service to the north county area but had not done so up to this time. We were actually in negotiations with the railroad to start service on the railroad line. What they did was construct, virtually overnight, temporary stations on a rail route, and put equipment into service. They actually built two new stations and started service within seven days after the earthquake. Within one month they had added four more stations. This commuter rail line carried an awful lot of commuters out of that valley into Los Angeles.
The regional ride share agency also came to our aid in serving north county by establishing numerous vanpools, many of which stayed in service after the restoration process. We gave preference to car pools and vanpools on all of our detours.
The third command center was the daily press conference where we maintained liaison with the media. Immediately after the board meeting each day, we held a press conference in our building in a location designed specifically for press conferences. CALTRANS usually chaired the briefings and other agencies participated in the programs. Transit operators provided special services that were also outlined in these briefings. We spent considerable time to make sure that the media and the public knew exactly what the situation was each day and what they could expect in the future.
Working with the media was extremely important. Most of the television stations, major newspapers, and radio stations attended our press conferences each day. It would not have been possible to communicate adequately with the public without the help of the press. CALTRANS was fortunate to have an exceptional graphics art department that prepared exhibits rapidly for the press conference every morning.
We were faced with the closure of Interstate 5 that connects Los Angeles to all of northern California, Oregon and Washington. We were also faced with the closure of Interstate 10:the most heavily traveled freeway in the nation. On the day after the earthquake, our maintenance forces cut a lane through the freeway fence on Interstate 5 and connected it with the old road. CALTRANS assumed control of the old highway, which actually belonged to the county. We paved the detour and had two lanes of traffic in each direction operating in twelve days. This meant we also had to clear the fallen structure from Interstate 5 before we could start.
Throughout our press conferences, we encouraged traffic to use both highway 101 along the coast and 395 farther inland. This photo shows the detour route and that's the Gavin Canyon structure as it winds through there. That went for about three miles through the mountains.
This was actually a two-lane highway. We paved every inch we could find and were able to squeeze four lanes in and no shoulders. We had roving service patrols constantly out there to make sure any incident was cleared as fast as possible.
The contractor had to put up this is a detour and Gavin Canyon under construction. He had a real job rebuilding the freeway with traffic underneath it.
Detours on Interstate 10 were also complicated. We utilized surface streets with the cooperation of the City of Los Angeles. They assisted with signing the detours and adjusting the signal times along the detour routes to accommodate more traffic. Because we had limited capacity on the detours, we decided to give reference to car pools and encourage ride sharing. The car pools actually had a much shorter detour.
The mixed flow traffic had to get off and wind around the city streets and get back to the freeway beyond the damaged structures. We took the car pools off and got them back on much sooner, so they had a much shorter route. We just didn't have capacity for everyone along the shorter route.
We lost two structures on the Santa Monica Freeway. We set up winding detours around the bridge construction. The detours on 118 were less complicated and traffic lines were less. There were few alternate freeways and city streets available.
We decided to reconstruct the structures in two phases. Constructing one side of the freeway at a time allowed us to use the completed side for a detour while we completed the other side.
Some of the techniques we utilized to assist in traffic management were roadside highway flashers, radios, issuing real time information to the traveling public, large temporary signing along the detours, on-site television cameras to observe the actual traffic situation from the command center, and the liberal use of observation personnel who had the authority to make immediate changes in the detours. In some cases, we actually shifted lanes from one direction to another depending on the demand. We put up some new changeable message signs and installed new highway advisory radio. This was done in virtually a matter of days.
Highway advisory radio messages were easy to put up so we installed them throughout most of the detours. Changeable message signs were more complicated because they were not as flexible.
Probably the most unique aspect of our restoration program was the contracting process. Most all of the demolition and temporary shoring was done by emergency force account contracts because it had to be done manually and immediately. Between January and March we processed about 54 force account contracts worth about $20 million.
The contracts on the nine lost structures involved a process that had not been utilized in Los Angeles and perhaps nowhere in the state. We prepared a list of what we thought to be the most qualified bridge building contractors and invited them to bid on the first bridge. And the winner was dropped from the list for the remaining structures. We repeated this process until all the contracts for the nine bridges had been awarded.
The design was completed by our structures department in Sacramento. A retrofit design contract for the Route 10 structures was completed by private consultants. The consultant with their knowledge could complete the plans sooner than CALTRANS staff. Contractors actually bid and accepted contracts without completed plans. Our department committed to a delivery schedule and shipped plans as they were completed. In most cases, all they had to start construction was the foundation plans. The first bridge replacement contract was awarded January 29, just 12 days after the earthquake.
The contract award process for structures on some of the smaller contracts was unique. The customary process for CALTRANS was for the contracts to be advertised and awarded in Sacramento. In this case the Sacramento staff came and stayed in Los Angeles and awarded these contracts throughout the recovery process. Since we were relieved from many of the contracting requirements by the governor, the process was much simpler. The assistance of our Sacramento staff was outstanding. The contracting people came down and stayed with us throughout the recovery process.
CALTRANS had not used the bonus incentives to speed contracts before, but the situation certainly called for it. The daily incentive/penalty for each contract was determined as one half the daily delay cost to the traveling public at each site. The daily bonus/penalty for each contract varied from $200,000 a day on the Santa Monica Freeway where we had extremely heavy volumes, to $50,000 a day on the Route 118 freeway. The time clock started on the day of the award, that was the date of the bid opening, and there were no rain days. We opened the bids and awarded the contract and that contract's clock started at midnight that night.
Contractors were paid twice a month instead of monthly because they were working two shifts, 24 hours a day. Checks were issued in Los Angeles instead of Sacramento. That saved 60 to 90 days in issuing payments. We had special handling of force account contracts that were out in two or three days instead of two or three months. These were used to encourage people to respond.
On April 11, C.C. Meyers completed a $14.9 million dollar contract for the structures on the Santa Monica Freeway in just 66 days, 74 days ahead of schedule, earning a bonus of $14.8 million. Bridges were open to traffic on April 11. Although all the contractors' performance was outstanding, Clint Meyers was unique. He brought his own special train all the way from Texas at an additional cost of $125,000 to deliver shoring materials to the site. And he paid for both backup drivers and backup trucks to bring the bridge piece all the way from the manufacturer in New York to make sure he didn't have any breakdowns or delays.
The Gavin Canyon Structure, on May the 7th, EL Yeager completed this $14.8 million contract 33 days early with a bonus of $5 million. I think the Gavin Canyon structure is one of the nicest structures that was rebuilt during the restoration process. On May 13 Vertico completed a $9.7 million contract for the bridge on the eastbound bridge on 118. He did that on schedule with no bonus. The remaining structures in the 5-14 interchange were also completed on schedule.
When bonus amounts were announced, there was some discussion. The public and media were in support of a bonus process to accelerate project completion. When I was asked about the large amounts, especially that of CC Meyers, I responded that I was glad to see the contractors receive as much as possible. You should not utilize the bonus/penalty option unless you believed it was justified and saving taxpayers' money.
CALTRANS and the contractors had a close working relationship throughout this process. A commitment was made to resolve any dispute in a timely manner. In fact, we agreed if it could not be resolved on site within 24 hours, it would come to me personally and the contractor himself. This only happened once on the Yeager contract. All other disputes were resolved within 24 hours.
We had no problems with press coverage for opening ceremonies because we had the press with us from the start. They showed up en mass at every opening we had and did a great job of covering it. We even had FHWA Administrator Rodney Slater there several times to cover some of the opening ceremonies.
Now, the lessons learned. In terms of communication, we had some initial problems but I think we learned from early experiences in northern California. We had three communications modes. We had radios, we had cell phones, and we had normal phone systems. I would strongly recommend that you have at least three communications systems available to you. You'll use them all.
We were fortunate that our office was still workable so we were able to use it as a command center. I don't know what we would have done if it hadn't been. We had no backup and I believe was a big mistake. I strongly suggest you have a backup available to you at the command center because you never know where that earthquake is going to hit.
In terms of local control, again we were blessed with a director who understood local control and the value of it. I believe it would be a great mistake to try to coordinate a recovery effort from afar. People on site know exactly what's going on and they're best equipped to deal with it. I'm a strong believer in local control.
In terms of assistance, we had an opportunity to call for help from the other 11 districts and our Sacramento office but we were selective. We did not want have to accommodate a lot of people because we were pretty busy. We were very selective in asking for people who were experts to fill key slots. This was very helpful.
I know Los Angeles had a fairly sophisticated traffic control center. Certainly any major metropolitan area should have one because you're going to need it. If any state doesn't have one, I think it's a big mistake. It's a great way to coordinate your traffic response.
Good media relations were extremely important to us. There is no way we could have communicated up-to-date information to the public without the media. I cannot make that point any stronger. You need to make that effort to keep them comfortable and apprised. They're going to do an awful lot of good for you.
The Federal Highway Administration was with us all the time and I think their role cannot be overstated. We had a great staff immediately on site and throughout the recovery process from FHWA. We didn´t lose a single day waiting for any FHWA approvals on any of our actions. I'm not aware of standard emergency procedure for FHWA but I strongly suggest that they duplicate the Los Angeles experience anytime there is a major disaster. There was a gentleman in FHWA named Jim Bednar who unfortunately for us is no longer with FHWA. Jim was the most helpful person that I've ever been acquainted with. I think FHWA should have punted before they let him get away.
From the political standpoint, I'm not sure what to say. It's a pain but you have to deal with it. We try to make the best of it because it´s always going to be there.
In closing I would like to say that I'm extremely proud of CALTRANS and what they did. It was a rewarding experience for me as part of my engineering career. However, it's one that I don't want to repeat. As a matter of fact, I retired before the bridges could fall down again. Thank you.
MR. MASUDA: Any questions for either Jim or Jerry?
FROM THE AUDIENCE: Did you have any environmental issues come back at you on what I call 20/20 hindsight issues? In North Carolina we repaired underground structures and things like that. Later on, somebody came back and put them under a microscope and asked about that.
MR. BAXTER: Initially, we concentrated on the bridge structures and the roadway itself. The underground structures were second until we got traffic flowing again. I suspect it was quite a while before any of that damage fault was ever located. We tried to cover it all but, you know, in a city the size of Los Angeles, all that infrastructure, it was virtually impossible to assess all the damage. I don't recall any second-guessing on any of the repairs we did.
FROM THE AUDIENCE: Jerry, on the outreach teams you mentioned earlier in your presentation, was that a CALTRANS effort or was that coordinated through the American Red Cross and other people?
MR. BAXTER: It was a CALTRANS effort. We hired a local firm to come in and help us. It was part of the recovery cost. It was a private consulting firm with experience in dealing with communities and they really did the job.
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