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Gender, Work, and Space in an Information Society

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Over the past 20 years or so we've learned a lot about the crucially important role of gender in shaping travel activity patterns and—I'd argue—about the ways in which travel patterns mold gender relations. To recapitulate, in a pistachio-sized nutshell, what we've learned: we know that, first, despite their labor force participation, women continue to bear a disproportionate share of the domestic workload and that this uneven division of labor in the home is implicated in divisions of labor in the paid work force (primarily taking the form of gendered segregation). Second, we know that time-space plays a pivotal role in enabling people (particularly women) to combine waged work and domestic work; those with heavy domestic responsibilities, usually but not always women, trade off higher wages and better job opportunities for greater proximity, resulting in shorter journeys to work, lower overall travel distances, and smaller activity spaces than those with lighter domestic workloads (usually men). Third, we know that place-based networks of personal contacts (friends and acquaintances, relatives, neighbors, and co-workers) are important in connecting people to housing, jobs, child/elder care, shopping, and recreational opportunities. We know that the spatial nature and extent of the knowledge exchanged through these networks is instrumental in shaping the locational choices people make and consequently the size of their activity spaces. Finally, we know that all three of these processes are interlinked, and that they combine to shape gender and labor markets differently in different places.

I want to speculate here about how advanced information technology (IT)[1] might change all this. What we seem to have learned in the past 20 years is how very gendered the friction of distance is and how very real that friction is for most women. A bevy of books has appeared in the past year or two on the advent of cyberspace and the space-transcending, frictionless wonders of the information superhighway. Just a few among these are: The *Way Ahead*, by Microsoft CEO Bill Gates; *City of Bits,* by architect and urbanist William Mitchell; *Being Digital*, by the head of MIT's MultiMedia Lab, Nicholas Negroponte; *Nattering on the Net*, by feminist Dale Spender; and *Virtual Geography,* by cultural theorist McKenzie Wark. These authors and others herald the despatialization of interaction, the unmooring of community from place, and the end of the tyranny of distance. All are convinced that the Internet and associated information technology (IT) are profoundly and irrevocably reshaping society, much as the printing press ushered in a new era some 500 years ago. The essence of the IT revolution —what will make the future radically different from the past—is, according to them, nothing less than the death of geography. Place and location—where things are, where you are on the ground, how far away you are from other people, places, and things—do not matter in cyberspace and therefore, so the logic goes, won't matter in the information society.

What interests me more than these authors' extreme (and not entirely pleasurable) predictions of life lived in cyberspace is how the Internet and IT will intersect with and no doubt change—though not eliminate—the importance of location and place. And because I believe that at least in the short run—and contrary to some predictions—we shall continue to have gendered bodies and forms of paid and unpaid work, I want to speculate about how IT might alter what we've come to accept as received wisdom on location, place, gender, and work.

If, as several scholars have argued (e.g., Baron, 1991; Hanson and Pratt, 1995; Peck, 1996), gender and labor markets are mutually constituted in place, in large part through the differential effects of distance, might frictionless IT and the move toward an information society shift the contours of gender, work, and place? I want to consider three questions in particular. First, why might we expect IT to stimulate changes in the traditional gender divisions of labor rather than reinforce such divisions? Second, will the placeless networks of IT loosen the bonds of space and place in the networks that shape gender, work, and communities? Third, what are the transportation implications of the processes and the possible changes we are speculating on here?

LOCATION AND THE GENDERING (INTER ALIA) OF WORK

One major impact that IT is already having, and is projected increasingly to have, is to shift the location of paid work away from conventional offices and into homes, neighborhood telework centers, and "office hotels" (computer docking stations where itinerant workers can plug in before moving on). To some extent, particularly in places like Southern California, this locational shift is being driven by the need to reduce auto emissions in order to meet federal air pollution guidelines (and not coincidentally the need to reduce traffic congestion), but the high cost of office space, corporate "downsizing," and workers' desire for more flexibility and less time in their cars also contribute. We know that the *location* of paid work (home/factory/office; city/suburb; region/country) is related—and quite closely related—to other dimensions of work and life. In particular, the location of work is linked to *the type of work* (e.g., the type of technology used; the nature of the "skills" entailed), the *amount of work* (especially whether full time or part time), the *timing or scheduling of work* (how work is distributed over the day, week, month, and year), the *gendering of work* (whether the job is typed as female or male), the *work process* (how work is organized within firms and workplaces), the *stability of work (*permanent or temporary), the *remuneration from work,* and the *meaning of work.* Because the location of work is so closely linked to other aspects of work and life, it's fair to speculate on how a shift in location might stimulate changes in other areas such as the gendering, amount, and scheduling of work.

I am especially intrigued by the possibilities set in motion by a massive movement of paid work, particularly the paid work of men, "back" into the home. Much has been written about home and work as gendered domains (some of this is reviewed in Hanson 1992), which have contributed to the development and support of traditional conceptions of gender through the spatial separation of women and men into different places and different social worlds, complete with differential access to information and knowledge (Meyrowitz, 1985; Spain, 1992). Because large numbers of women have worked outside the home at least throughout this century, the idealization of work as purely masculine has long been one rooted in fiction, but the coding of domestic space as feminine seems to be an amazingly durable feature of our society, and one far more rooted in fact. Whereas women have joined the paid labor force in droves and are increasingly engaged in public life, men have, for the most part, resisted full participation in domestic life. Analysis of a large national survey conducted in the late 1980s in the U.S. shows that among married couples men spent less than half as much time in housework (an average of 18 hours per week) than did women (who spent an average of 37 hours per week in housework) (South and Spitze, 1994).[2] It has been far easier for women to move out of the domestic sphere and into the public world of work than it has been for men to tread the same path in the reverse direction.[3] Might IT be able to change all this by bringing men home? IT work at home poses the interesting hybrid of men working in a "feminine" space using masculine technology.

HOMEWORK

The close links between the location and the gendering of work are especially evident in the arena of homework. Historically, most homework in the U.S. has been industrial contracting out (e.g., sewing, knitting, making jewelry, cigar making), but significant pockets of clerical homework have existed since at least the 1950s. The very existence of paid work in the home challenges the home-work dualism (Boris, 1994, p.2), but, because even paid work at home is assumed to be women's work, home-based work has not challenged the gender division of labor. Indeed homework has been seen as the solution to the conflicts *women* face in their need to combine waged work and domestic work.[4]

Because homework is so strongly coded as female, debates over industrial homework in the U.S. have exposed its contradictory meanings. On the one hand, homework is seen as reinforcing patriarchal structures by maintaining the traditional gender division of labor,[5] while on the other it is seen as holding out the promise of an alternative, even innovative, non-dichotomous organization of home and work (Boris, 1994, p. 9). In an example from the 1980s, conflicting views over the right of women in Vermont to work as contracted knitters in their rural homes pitted women who argued in the name of equal opportunity that it was their right to choose home as the site of work (especially where few other opportunities for paid employment were accessible to them) against other women and feminists who have long argued, also in the name of equal opportunity, for the right to equal work outside the home. Conservatives see homework as supporting "family values" and as a means of keeping women off welfare; it is the way to provide waged work for women who live too far from job opportunities to have "real" jobs or who need to stay home to take care of their families. Opponents argue that homework is exploitative, is not the way to solve the child care problem, and perpetuates women's status as second-class citizens (Boris, 1994).[6]

Industrial homework has been heavily regulated in the U.S. ever since 1884, when the first laws proscribing such work were passed in New York. Boris (1994) has provided a meticulous and engaging documentation of how, in regulating homework, the state has been motivated by a certain ideology of womanhood and motherhood and by visions of what constitutes appropriate home life. Particularly in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, opponents of homework contended that, in addition to obviating fair labor standards, it undermined domesticity and proper home life.

My point here is that the discourse around homework, including that surrounding legislation outlawing it, has been framed entirely in terms of women and gender-appropriate behaviors. In 1986 Representative Barney Frank's Congressional Committee investigating homework in the context of fair labor practices "called for insuring that the cover of 'protective legislation' [for homeworkers] fell on 'those who choose or are compelled to give priority attention to family obligations by working at home" (cited in Boris, 1994, p. 336). Will the gendered meaning of home and of homework change if large numbers of men begin to work at home? Male homeworkers are most likely to be engaged in some form of IT-related work, as opposed to industrial homework.

ENTER IT

Despite numerous articles with doubting titles like "Resisting the call to telecommute" (Merl, 1995) and "Telework: An innovation where nobody is getting on the bandwagon?" (Ruppel and Harrington, 1995), telework—communicating with co-workers from remote locations—is still touted as the wave of the future. Perhaps because the difficulties in defining telework and telecommuting (terms that seem to be used interchangeably) are legion (Handy and Mokhtarian, 1995; Mokhtarian, Handy, and Salomon, 1995),

the number of current teleworkers reported in the U.S. fluctuates wildly, depending on the source. For example, Link Resources, Inc. estimated a total of 5.5 million U.S. telecommuters in 1991 (only 16 percent of whom telecommuted at least 35 hours per week) and 6.5 million in 1992, a one-year increase of 18 percent (Handy and Mokhtarian, 1995, p. 104); an American Information User survey pegs the number of part-time and full-time telecommuters in 1994 at 9.1 million, up 20 percent from 1993 (Merl, 1995); . Yet a sidebar in the March 18, 1996 issue of *Computerworld* (p.51) announces that "some 55 million U.S. workers will telecommute or work remotely by the year 2000, according to ...an analyst at Gartner Group, Inc." [7]

What is fascinating in light of the gender-infused, indeed gender-focused, discourse on industrial home-work has been the near total absence of gender in current discussions, descriptions, and predictions of telecommuting. When gender is mentioned at all, it is tucked unobtrusively into a table that, for example, lists characteristics of teleworkers. Gender has not framed the discourse on IT homework. Most studies of telecommuters in the U.S. have focussed on California, where public policy has encouraged telework, and they should therefore probably not be taken as representative of U.S. trends. Yet those studies (summarized in Mokhtarian, Handy, and Salomon, 1995) and others (e.g, Ruppel and Harrington, 1995; U.S. General Services Administration, 1995) that do record gender report a fairly even male/female division among teleworkers.

Using IT at home is clearly seen as being different from sewing in zippers or addressing envelopes. Many observers, noting the links between power and dominance on the one hand and the gendering of technology and skill definitions on the other, have traced out the gendered natures (and often shifting gendered natures) of various technologies (Hacker, 1989; Cockburn, 1985; Light, 1995). Although computer technology is coded as male, feminists have forcefully made the case that computers need not be a male-associated technology (Light, 1995; Spender, 1995).[8]

I would suggest that the current masculine coding of information technology has shifted the terms of discussion surrounding telework, such that, despite its being a form of homework, telework in general is not seen as feminine. In fact it is a form of homework in which millions of men are now engaged and, if predictions hold, in which tens of millions more soon will be.

And if tens of millions of men do indeed work at home, how might this shift the seemingly immutable contours of the gender division of labor? There is a tantalizing shred of evidence that indeed a more extended male presence at home—especially if he is home alone—might just do that. Analyzing the same national survey on housework I mentioned earlier (described in note 2), Harriett Presser (1994) focused not just on the number of hours that people were employed but on *when* during the 24-hour day people in married-couple households worked outside the home and whether spouses were employed during the same or different hours. She found that the greater the number of hours the husband is not employed (and therefore is presumably at home) while his wife *is* employed (and therefore presumably is not at home) the greater the share of the husband's housework and the greater the reduction in the number of hours contributed by the wife. This pattern was especially strong if the husband was home alone during the day, rather than at night.[9]

But will he be home alone doing the housework and possibly minding the kids along with his telecommuting? If he has a partner, where will she/he be? I have not yet seen any information on the number of telecommuters per household or on the employment status of partners of telecommuters. The assumption seems to be that it's one telecommuter per household (and, remember, half of these are women), but if Presser's analysis is right, men's involvement in the home in married-couple households anyway,

depends at least in part upon his spouse being elsewhere. (This actually makes sense to every woman I've discussed this with.) So—more speculations: will male presence at home and women's reduced involvement in housework lead to women working farther away from home? This possibility stems from the finding that one of the main reasons that white women now work closer to home than men do is their greater responsibility for child care and domestic work (Hanson and Pratt, 1995). The freedom to work farther from home is likely to change the type of work women do and may contribute further to eroding the gender divisions of labor. Clearly we need to know more about who telecommutes within the household and how that affects the distribution and location of paid and unpaid work.[10]

In sum, clearly I see geography at the heart of the reasons why IT might be a stimulus for change in the gender divisions of labor. The shift of paid work away from fixed work locations into the home, along with the advent of the Internet, potentially have implications also for the role of networks in shaping work and communities.

IT, NETWORKS, AND COMMUNITY

In our study of gender and work in Worcester, Massachusetts, Gerry Pratt and I have documented how the place-based and gendered personal contacts and social networks of employers, employees, and potential employees shape highly localized, distinctive, and gendered labor markets; we have also shown how these local labor market practices are interwoven into the fabric of the community (Hanson and Pratt, 1995). The very essence of IT, the Internet, and the information society is the removal of communication networks from spatial context, the deracination, as it were, of interaction. How might the placeless networks of IT alter the place-rooted processes that have shaped gender, work, and communities? How might the increased daytime presence of both women and men—but especially men—in residential neighborhoods and their decreased presence in "regular" workplaces alter the personal networks that have so shaped the labor market?

SOCIAL CAPITAL

At the same time that many people are gleefully announcing the advent of a location-free existence in cyberspace, others are busy demonstrating the importance of social capital, which is, or at least has been, deeply place dependent. Robert Putnam sees social capital as referring to "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (1993, p. 35-36). In her definition, Patricia Fernandez Kelly (1995, p. 216) emphasizes the importance of the group by noting that social capital "resides in the relations between members, not in the individuals who compose it." Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993, p. 1323), who are interested in social capital primarily as it intersects with the labor market, define it as "those expectations for action within a collectivity that affect the economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members, even if those expectations are not oriented toward the economic sphere."[11]

Social capital emerges from repeated social exchanges that are usually—and necessarily—face to face, exchanges infused with the expectation of ongoing interaction. Social capital requires, then, a certain level of residential rootedness in real places in order to develop; the nature of a person's social capital depends to a large extent on geographic and social location, a characteristic that Fernandez Kelly refers to as the *toponomical* aspect of social capital (1995, p. 218). It is interesting in this light to note that in 1995, the U.S. Census announced that inter-state residential mobility was as its lowest level since 1950 (Holmes, 1995).

A key question about the social capital of a person, group, or place is how much heterogeneity it embraces; to what extent do the interactions involved in creating social capital bridge people of different

interests, backgrounds, and experiences? To what extent do such interactions cut across established lines of social cleavage such as gender, race, class, ethnicity, language? In Putnam's view (1993), social capital is necessary for the health of civil society, and the civic virtue of social capital lies precisely in the degree to which it succeeds in spanning and encompassing difference; community-based groups such as bowling leagues, choruses, parent-teacher groups, or bicycling clubs are important because they all serve to connect people across lines of social, economic, and demographic difference. The heterogeneity encompassed in one's social capital is so crucial because it governs the diversity of information and norms one has access to. In addition to community organizations, the workplace is, especially for men, an important locus of personal contacts in which information about jobs is circulated.

By connecting people and jobs, social capital plays a crucially important role in the labor market outcomes of individuals and groups (Granovetter, 1974,1995; Wial, 1991; Fernandez Kelly 1994,1995; Hanson and Pratt, 1995). Not only does social capital take root and grow through largely place-based networks; the labor market information exchanged through these networks is primarily— though not necessarily wholly—local[12] and is often biased in terms of gender, race, and class. The very lack of heterogeneity contributes mightily to labor market segmentation, including gendered segregation. On the other hand, as Granovetter (1974;1995) has argued, it is social networks that incorporate others of higher occupational standing that enable people to get better jobs. Hanson and Pratt (1995) document, for example, that men (particularly male family members) play an important role in connecting women to jobs in male-dominated (and therefore better-paying) occupations. In sum, social capital both enables and constrains, depending upon how homogeneous and bounded it is.

ENTER IT

What happens to networks of interaction and the social capital they build in the information age? How might the placeless networks of the Internet and the Web affect the exchange of labor market information? Might IT, for example, promote more heterogeneous, less localized, less gendered social capital? Can social capital be built on the Internet? What happens to social capital when there is no longer a stable workplace away from home?

Because it disconnects interaction from location, the Internet has been touted as an exceptional democratizer: it supposedly will provide everyone with equal access to a wealth of information. The Internet and the Web do offer people the opening to break out of place-based networks and the chance, therefore, to interact with a far greater diversity of others. In short, the Internet holds out the opportunity to increase manyfold the diversity of one's social capital.

I wonder, however, about the extent to which the Internet will succeed in engaging people with more difference and diversity than they have encountered outside of cyberspace. One problem is that not everyone will have access to the information superhighway unless they live in a place that's been wired (as of 1995, about 20 percent of the U.S. population lived out of range of free local telephone access to the Internet; Datz, 1996), unless they can afford a terminal, and unless they have command of written English. A second concern is that the types of interactions fostered by the Internet cater to people's similarities and shared interests without simultaneously engaging them with difference, as would be the case in a bowling league or a community chorus. Because conversations on the Internet (e.g., in its chat rooms) are disembodied, people can split off and present only certain facets of their identities or even invent entirely new personas. These need not, therefore, be conversations between whole people, with all their many-sided identities, as is the case in face-to-face interactions, where a

connection through one shared facet (e.g., singing) necessarily engages the partners in other unshared (and perhaps ill-understood) facets. In this way, communication on the Internet may intensify narrowness rather than broadening horizons.[13]

Another way in which IT, the Web, and the Internet may in fact breed narrowness is through the use of intelligent agents. To save us from drowning in a sea of information each of us will have, according to the IT prophets, our own personalized reference librarian, or intelligent agent, programmed to search the Web and other media for items that match our specified interests. If it's tropical fish and Chaucer we want, it's tropical fish and Chaucer we'll get—and nothing more. What will happen to surprise encounters with unanticipated, unrequested, unwanted information? Will intelligent agents further pare down our abilities to handle difference, surprise, or conflict? With intelligent agents, the body may indeed become, as Virilio (1993) foresees, a communication node like the old city center, but it will be a city center devoid of the diversity and the unplanned encounters that have been the essence of city centers as we've known them. So, I worry that the freeing of interaction from location might not, in fact, lead to increased heterogeneity in social networks but have the obverse effect.

Despite the near universal access to TV in the U.S., networks of place-based personal interaction have continued to flourish and to shape social and economic life, contrary to Meyrowitz's thesis. Of course, this persistence is because people use and rely upon different information channels (e.g., face to face, TV, telephone, the Web) for obtaining and exchanging different types of information, a point that Meyrowitz does not seem to consider in his analysis. And access to certain kinds of information still tends to flow through informal personal contacts rather than through the newspaper or the World Wide Web. This is certainly the case for labor market information whose value depends on the personal experience of the source (e.g., which employers tolerate sexual harassment or racial discrimination; which employers welcome flexibility in the scheduling of work) and on the trust the recipient places in the source.

It seems to me that personal networks—largely rooted in place—will continue to play an important role. As Granovetter (1995) points out, with employment becoming more contingent and less secure (more layoffs, shorter job tenures), the importance of personal networks for connecting people to jobs is likely to grow. Personal networks may increasingly incorporate distant with proximate connections as they intersect with the Internet, but the weight of personal knowledge about the information source will continue to have an impress on labor market processes. With more people (and especially men) in residential neighborhoods during the day, perhaps certain place-based aspects of these networks will even be strengthened.

Clearly we have much to learn about how IT will intersect with place. If IT continues to shake workers loose from fixed work locations and if it leads to home-based work for tens of millions, including tens of millions of men, then I think there is a good chance that IT might help to redraw the gendered contours of home and work and might lead to a rethinking of the place of work in American life. Increased daytime presence in residential areas together with increased use of the Internet and the Web will no doubt affect social networks and the social capital that flows from them, but will IT will necessarily enrich social capital, expand horizons, and increase the diversity of the labor market information that people exchange?

TRANSPORTATION IMPLICATIONS AND RESEARCH AGENDA

All of this may seem far removed from the topic of women's travel, but I'd argue that it's not. If men begin to shoulder a larger share of the domestic workload, women's and men's work trip times and distances and their patterns of travel for other purposes may well converge. We know that women who have work that resembles men's (in terms of higher occupational status and wages), travel as far on average to work as do their male counterparts (Hanson and Pratt 1995, p. 101). There is the possibility that an equal gender division of domestic labor at home would help erase gendered segregation at work and lead to similar travel patterns and activity spaces.[14]

At present there is not much evidence to support the idea that IT will reduce travel demand. Insofar as people continue to value place-based, face-to-face social interaction as a trusted information source— including those interactions based in non-home workplaces—the travel demand generated by the need to sustain such contacts will not decline. Such travel is likely in fact to be central to maintaining or increasing the amount of difference embraced in people's social networks.

Trying to predict the transportation implications of IT highlights our ignorance on these issues and suggests a number of items for the research agenda.

There are many questions regarding the gendered nature of homework and the impacts of such work on gender relations at home and in the nonhome workplace.

- What are the impacts of the proportion of the work week (month) spent at home?
- What kinds of work do men and women do at home? Do they use IT or not?
- What impact does IT homework have on social/economic/political connections outside of home?
- How does men's homeworking affect the domestic division of labor? How does it affect the social life of neighborhoods?
- What is the impact on travel demand?

There are also many questions about IT and the formation of social capital.

- How does homework (with or without IT) affect social capital (especially the heterogeneity represented in social capital)?
- How does IT intersect with place-based social interactions at the workplace, neighborhood, recreation places, churches?
- How are these processes different for women and men?
- Can IT be used strategically to increase the diversification/heterogeneity in social capital of disadvantaged groups (e.g., women, visible minorities, inner-city youth)?

In addressing these questions scholars and policy makers will need to keep in mind that the heterogeneity embedded in the category "homework" (and even within the category "telework") will result in different impacts, notably different transportation impacts, that depend on the nature of the homework or telework involved. The processes I've been speculating on here will play out differently in different places and will therefore yield place-to-place variation at country, regional, metropolitan, and sub-metropolitan scales. Much will depend on how placeless IT intersects with place-entrenched practices to produce new geographies of gender, work, and community.

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NOTES

[1]Following the usage of IT in the recent Office of Technology Assessment report (OTA,1995), I use the term broadly to refer to the transformation of information into electronic form and the distribution and transmission of electronic information.

[2]The data come from the National Survey of Families and Households, collected in 1987-88; housework includes activities such as meal preparation and cleanup, housecleaning, and doing laundry. Child care was not included in "housework." South and Spitze show that marital status does not much affect the number of hours that men spend in housework; all groups of men averaged between 18 and 20 hours of housework per week. Marital status has a much greater effect on women's time spent in housework, with married women spending more time on domestic chores than cohabiting, divorced, widowed, or single women.

[3] This may be because, whereas women have been perceived as improving their status by pursuing paid work, the path from work to home for men is definitely perceived as involving a loss of status.

[4]Of course the meaning of homework and the opportunities it opens or forecloses depend upon the particular conjunction of class, gender, and ethnicity in specific locations. Peck (1996) points to contrasting examples from Los Angeles (where homework is the work of last resort for Mexicana immigrants) and Miami (where homework in the Cuban enclave economy is a means of economic improvement) to illustrate this point.

[5]Historians Thomas Dublin (1979) and Christine Stansell (1986) have argued that the location of women's work outside of the home in the early days of American industrialization was key to freeing young women from patriarchal authority. Stansell's study is set in New York City, and Dublin's in Lowell, Mass., both in the early to mid nineteenth century.

[6]What is so strange in these debates is that those who oppose homework, including feminists, find themselves arguing against what proponents of homework paint as innovative, grassroots, even anticapitalist activities (Boris, 1994).

[7]By my calculations (assuming the 1992 figure of 6.5 million) a 20 percent annual increase yields only 27.6 million by the year 2000, so a lot more people will have to stop resisting the call and start jumping on the bandwagon. Predictions of massive increases in telecommuting all seem to share an assumption of universal access to IT. Yet in the foreseeable future, at least, all places will not have equal access to the information superhighway; the "wiring of America" will follow the urban hierarchy, reinforcing and exacerbating existing spatial inequalities.

[8]In a study of an economic development scheme gone awry in Sweden, Sundin (1996) describes how elusive the gender-typing of technology can be. Wanting to shift the town's identity from heavy manufacturing and mining to "high-tech," town officials attracted what they saw as "high-tech" but what was actually clerical telework. Because such work was coded as female, and therefore seen by others as

decidedly not high-tech, their strategy failed to induce the high-tech boom they sought.

[9]Another interesting finding that Presser reports is that the wife's gender ideology (but not the husband's) can increase the husband's hours of housework, suggesting to me that in households consisting of homeworking husbands married to outworking feminists, the men would contribute an exceptionally large share of the housework.

[10]Because at present most teleworkers telecommute only one or two days a week and because longitudinal studies of telecommuting have been running only a couple of years, there is as yet no evidence to suggest that telecommuting induces change in residential location (Mokhtarian, Handy, and Salomon, 1995). It may turn out that the gender coding of IT homework may depend in part on whether IT homeworkers remain largely part time and whether they retain a "real," non-home workplace.

[11]They point to four sources of social capital: (1) value introjection (the socialization into consensually established beliefs); (2) reciprocity exchanges (the norm of reciprocity in face-to-face interaction; (3) bounded solidarity (common awareness); and (4) enforceable trust (rewards and sanctions linked to group membership) (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993, p.1323).

[12]The degree to which the information is local varies from place to place.

[13]In the "romance" chat rooms one would imagine a desire to know more than one facet of a potential romantic partner; in fact, I hear from a friend who visits these rooms that the first question posed is invariably and ironically, "where do you live?"

[14]The elimination of occupational segregation would also require significant changes in employers' behavior.