Office of Planning, Environment, & Realty (HEP)
January 30-31, 2008
Federal Highway Administration
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Association of MPOs (AMPO) and Resource Systems Group, Inc. (RSG) gratefully acknowledge the assistance and support of the Florida Metropolitan Planning Organization Advisory Council (MPOAC) with the administration and logistics of this peer workshop.
During 2007 and 2008, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), through its Transportation Planning Capacity Building program, is conducting a series of metropolitan planning organization (MPO) peer exchange workshops in partnership with the Association of MPOs (AMPO). Each workshop focuses on a specific topic of current or emerging relevance to MPOs, each of which was identified through a national panel process. The workshops seek to engage participants from MPOs representing a diversity of urban area sizes, MPO structures and expertise/experience in the topic area.
This report summarizes the results of the workshop held in Orlando, Florida on January 30 and 31, 2008, on addressing security planning for natural and manmade disasters. Representatives from nine MPOs shared their experiences, success stories and challenges in this area. The ultimate goal of the workshop was to allow senior staff from a variety of MPOs to come together to share information and learn from each other in a facilitated open discussion setting. FHWA developed this report to summarize the workshop discussions and results for the use and benefit of MPOs and their planning partners across the country.
The workshop kicked off with opening comments from Peter Plumeau of Resource Systems Group, Inc. Peter, the lead facilitator for the workshop, established that the purpose of the event was to gather together representatives from MPOs around the country, representing small, mid-size, and large metropolitan areas, to share experiences and collaborate on approaches to addressing the issues of security planning and natural and manmade disasters. The workshop would begin with a presentation from a representative from the Fargo-Moorhead (ND/MN) Metropolitan Council of Governments regarding their experience related to these topics. With this presentation "setting the stage" for the remainder of the workshop, Peter would then move all participants into a facilitated discussion on experiences, issues and options. He noted that Spencer Stevens of the FHWA Office of Planning Oversight & Stewardship Team was present to provide additional insights from the federal perspective as well as to obtain information from the participants that can help FHWA more effectively provide assistance and support to MPOs.
Spencer Stevens of the FHWA Office of Planning Oversight & Stewardship Team provided a background discussion on the workshop topics. The following summarizes the FHWA introduction:
SAFETEA-LU breaks out safety and security of the transportation system as separate factors in the planning process. USDOT included language within the planning regulations to clarify that there are differences across regions and disasters to encourage development of an approach that fits locally specific needs. "Consideration of the planning factors…shall be reflected, as appropriate, in the metropolitan transportation planning process. The degree of consideration and analysis of the [planning] factors should be based on the scale and complexity of many issues…" [23 CFR 450.306(b)]
In response to the separate security planning factor, FHWA published a draft document entitled "Consideration of Security in the Planning Process: Resource Materials" that summarizes various approaches that some MPOs have taken in response to the regulations.
It is important for MPOs to generate an "all-hazards approach" to safety and security planning. The concept behind this is that if the MPO is prepared for the "expected," they should be well prepared for the unexpected.
Spencer provided the following graphic as an illustration of the relationship between the scale of a security incident and the level of public preparedness and consequent planning and coordination needs:
The Fargo-Moorhead Metropolitan Council of Governments (FM Metro COG) is a bi-state MPO (North Dakota and Minnesota) with 160,000 residents in the urbanized area. There are seven members of the MPO staff. They support four cities and two counties and operate with an approximate annual planning budget of $1 million.
The FM Metro COG contracted with a consultant from the Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute at the end of 2007 to facilitate a survey of key emergency management officials in the community. The purpose of this survey was to learn what role these officials believed the MPO should have in emergency response and planning. In addition, a roundtable discussion was held with representatives from the FM Metro COG and the key emergency management officials to initiate the collaborative dialogue that would be needed for future planning purposes.
The responses from the survey were varied and interesting. The most prominent point that came across was that the MPO could serve as a forum for regional assessment. The MPO meetings were the first opportunity for representatives from the transportation department to get together with transit and emergency response representatives, and the groups were pleased to have the opportunity to collaborate.
The second role that was identified was that of creating and maintaining databases, which is a particular strength of this MPO. For instance, one agency had identified staging areas throughout the region for emergency response situations. This spurred the MPO to ask the question, "Should we consider this information when we are completing corridor and other planning studies?" As a result, the MPO is collaborating with various agencies to gather information and record it in a relevant manner.
The viewpoint of the FM Metro COG is that they are a non-political, non-affiliated, open and non-judgmental party with an open conference room. As a result, they feel that they are ideal to play the coordination and collaboration role between other operating agencies.
Appendix B includes a report on the FM Metro COG's experience with security planning.
One participant noted that his MPO had experienced resistance when trying to obtain security-related planning information, specifically with regard to transit agency emergency response plans that were funded through the region's Unified Planning Work Program (UPWP). The concern expressed by the transit agency was that if emergency response information is documented, it could potentially make the security system vulnerable to outside threat. Most MPO representatives in the room, however, agreed that the nature of the information that the MPOs would be documenting for security planning was generally not highly sensitive and therefore would not threaten the security of the system. Furthermore, since the transit agency's emergency response plan was funded through the UPWP, the MPO should at least be able to receive a progress report from its member agency.
Participants also discussed the range and types of agencies and organizations that should be involved in MPO security planning efforts. Because it encompasses a very broad range of assets, needs and issues, there was general agreement that implementing a security planning effort should involve casting as wide a net as possible. Some of the agencies and organizations important to have represented in security planning efforts at the MPO include:
Schools and Colleges/Universities
Fire Training Centers
Major Tourist Attractions
Nuclear Power Plants
Border Security Agencies
Representatives of Other Key Assets
The First Coast MPO works with five local authorities, including two port authorities and one each aviation, transit, and airport authority. The MPO learns of most security events through traditional public forums, including the newspaper. It is generally felt that these agencies do not need to consult with the MPO on the topic of security planning, as they are well versed and fully competent to be self-sufficient and independent.
The primary concern for this MPO is the security of Jacksonville's ports. There is a new federal Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) process that everyone who enters or exits the port must undergo. In addition, there is a state credential process that serves essentially the same purpose. Now that the federal credential is in place, this MPO feels it would be pertinent to eliminate the state credential because it is placing undue strain on the system and puts Florida ports at a disadvantage due to cost and time loss.
Another concern for this MPO is identifying partners in the planning process. Generally, it is felt that if the MPO is not invited, how can they contribute? Future emphasis will be placed on answering this question and finding alternative approaches.
The principal question that this MPO struggles with is, "Have you tested it?" with regard to the Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) that has been in place for the last two years.
Walt Disney World is a large attraction and employment center for the region, and thus is a key security asset. During recent emergency scenarios such as 9/11 and hurricanes, METROPLAN Orlando had the opportunity to test its security plan because Walt Disney World shut down during these events. The security of this facility is a key concern for this MPO.
Additionally, this MPO is concerned with examining how Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) can be used in safety and security planning. Recently, cameras have been installed along key corridors to aid in responding to security threats. These cameras were unexpectedly useful in responding to hurricanes and the aftermath, with regard to evacuation and creating one-direction roads (and then reversing them). As a result, the MPO has learned that it is beneficial to collaborate with various security planning entities to maximize the benefit of plans and infrastructure development.
The Lake-Sumter MPO is relatively new, having only been established two years ago. Currently they have a staff of five people.
In response to the topic of security planning, this MPO has developed a COOP. Additionally; they are working on engaging the school board, transit providers, airports, rail providers, and others to become active members of the MPO Board. The MPO believes it is the best candidate to bring all relevant local parties together in the security planning process. Although not all agencies work well with each other, they individually trust the MPO. The MPO will depend on this trust to build a collaborative process and thus benefit all parties.
Currently, the MPO is particularly interested in enhancing the role of transit in the security plan. The greatest obstacle in achieving this goal is identifying the appropriate direction to take and finding the necessary guidance to get there.
The Tri-County Regional Planning Commission, with 13 MPO staff members, covers three counties and four municipalities. Transit, airport, and port authorities are all represented on the MPO technical committee. Although the MPO does not conduct planning specifically for these authorities, each authority sits on one or more MPO committees, which provides opportunities for collaboration.
Recently the Tri-County RPC worked with the State Farm Insurance Company, who is performing a pro-bono safety analysis for the MPO. As a result, the MPO has gained closer connections with local emergency response agencies, including the police and fire departments.
This MPO has very good relationships with its local emergency service representatives. Locally, the Emergency Service Disaster Agency (ESDA, a part of the Illinois State Emergency Management Agency) designates a representative to each county and city. These representatives are responsible for creating safety plans, flood plans, and other emergency documents and have connections with federal homeland security representatives. The MPO coordinates all regional activity with regard to safety and security, including the mayor, city engineers, and other key stakeholders through the MPO/ESDA/Homeland Security network, which facilitates a great deal of reciprocal assistance. One benefit of this is that the MPO will learn in advance of security-related events (such as a visit from the President) through other agencies because of the strength of existing network relationships.
The Tri-County RPC believes its most valuable role in security planning is to facilitate the communication between agencies by gathering representatives together. The agency provides specific definitions for both "safety" and "security" in its Long Range Transportation Plan (LRTP) and identifies the key agencies from the region involved in each area, which facilitates an understanding among key players of how institutional coordination may be achieved.
For the Durham-Chapel Hill-Carrboro MPO, the biggest question with regard to security planning is, "How do you do this?" This MPO began by performing simple internet searches to learn what other MPOs were doing and seek out "best practices." After completing their initial research, they decided to start the process by defining what "security" means in the MPO context.
The MPO found that they had several tasks underway that generally included security aspects; however, they decided to expand these projects to be more comprehensive. For instance, they modified their existing travel forecast model to allow creation of an evacuation simulation. The focus of their security planning process has been to "work with what you've got."
The MPO also identified major assets such as local universities and technology clusters and set up a monthly ITS stakeholder meeting, including representatives from various agencies across the region. MPO-stakeholder collaboration was facilitated using existing MPO tools and methods to help strengthen these stakeholders' emergency planning. For example, one agency had identified an emergency evacuation route for certain situations. When the MPO used its traffic simulation model to estimate potential impacts of using this route, the results helped leverage stakeholder interest in understanding concepts such as "Level of Service" and its implications for an evacuation procedure. From this initial foundation of mutual interest, the MPO worked to identify roads that would be shut down by loss of capacity after a certain period during an emergency. In the future, ITS will be their means of identifying security issues and creating contingency plans.
The MPO is using its website as the main means of communication on security planning with other agencies and the public. At this time, interns are conducting most of the day-to-day MPO work on security planning. The MPO is currently establishing two positions that will help with inter-agency coordination, safety and security.
The Bryan/College Station MPO is located nearly equidistant from Dallas-Ft. Worth, Houston and Austin, Texas, and covers a planning area of about 160,000 people. The MPO area includes several valuable assets, including Texas A&M University (TAMU), Bryan Campus of Blinn College, and the George Bush Presidential Library and Conference Center. Many world leaders speak at this facility, thus security is an ongoing issue. Additionally, football games held at TAMU, on average, attract about 80,000 attendees, which has a profound effect on the surrounding transportation system. Finally, Brazos County became a destination location during the evacuation of Hurricane Katrina.
For this MPO, security planning is a matter of integrating itself into the existing community, communicating data, and coordinating with partners. During the update of the long range plan, the MPO held an initial meeting to discuss future growth patterns and other issues, such as security planning. The first meeting included representatives from the core members of the MPO's Technical and Policy Committees, including - the City of Bryan, City of College Station, Brazos County, Texas Department of (TxDOT), The District (local transit provider), and TAMU. Other related groups, such as the local Council of Governments, Blinn College, local developers, and area utility agencies attended the first meeting. However, maintaining a high level of participation with these ancillary groups is an ongoing challenge.
Special event traffic planning is coordinated through a monthly group, organized by TxDOT. Participants at the table, including the MPO, not only discuss, coordinating signals, providing park and rides, but also security and emergency response scenarios. During Hurricane Katrina, many local emergency agencies were able to test their contingency plans. At the time, the MPO called TxDOT, the Independent School Districts, TAMU and other groups, asking how they could help. Generally, the answer was that everything was under control, but the MPO found that they could act as a coordination liaison. The Hurricane response made clear that that evacuation plans were needed. Specifically, the ability to change highway traffic to flow in only one direction and a plan for keeping gas stations open will be critical to a successful evacuation plan. A unified emergency response center has also been organized and includes better communication tools.
Several participants noted that it would be very helpful to MPOs and others to have a document that described the security planning "lessons learned" from the Hurricane Katrina experience.
The Capital Region Transportation Planning Agency covers four counties, including rural and urban environments, and has recently expanded its planning boundaries. The planning region is the center of state government and includes two universities and a state college. However, the area includes no port, major airport nor military bases.
The emergency management system in the state of Florida is very sophisticated, with detailed coordination frameworks and systems in every county. A mock emergency is activated at least once per year to test the system. In Tallahassee, the MPO is helping to identify funds for building a transportation management center that could assist in security operations. They are also seeking to identify priority areas for emergency management and understanding the community impacts of their plans. At this time, the MPO believes the best impact for the community is for it to facilitate coordination of communication between agencies.
There were some questions from other MPO representatives surrounding the effectiveness of the DOT in emergency management. In Florida, the central DOT office sets policy and the local districts implement that policy through their local operations, each with their own assessment teams. Other MPO representatives felt that there was too much control at the state level, particularly with regard to funding. Ultimately, collaboration with the DOT seemed to be an essential piece in security planning.
There are about 60,000 residents in the Bangor Area Comprehensive Transportation Study region. The greatest challenges that this MPO face include balancing Federal planning requirements, as well as balancing resources (specifically with time rather than with money). Security is very different in this region compared to the bigger metropolitan areas, because the numbers of people are relatively small and the complexity of the transportation system is minimal. Thus, in an evacuation situation, the MPO would not anticipate major bottlenecks on the regional transportation network. About a decade ago, the Bangor region experienced an ice storm that turned into a statewide emergency. One-third of the state lost power for as much as three weeks. At that time, few plans were in place for how to coordinate emergency responses among disparate entities such as power companies and fire departments with transportation providers, including the state DOT. For example, there was confusion and inconsistencies between the DOT and emergency responders regarding which roads should be top priorities for re-opening after the storm.
The confusion during this event highlighted the need for better planning and facilitated the start of efforts to have these different agencies and organizations come together and develop communication plans for future emergencies. While the Bangor MPO was not part of that initial planning process a decade ago, it is now working to make sure the emergency plans have no gaps and ascertaining what its appropriate role is in the emergency planning process.
A recurring question during the workshop was, "What is the role of the MPO in security planning?" Finding the MPO niche within an already well-established security network was a recurring topic of conversation. Many felt that the role of the MPO is to create a forum for collaboration between agencies, but not to impose itself on already well-established security planning functions. Still, there was a great deal of apprehension regarding well-established plans and systems, and the ability to approach these groups with confidence and a sense of contribution. To counter this, it was suggested that the best place for an MPO to start was by documenting the existing infrastructure and the roles that other agencies are filling, and determining the "gaps" in the network. These gaps would then serve as a starting place for defining the role of the MPO.
The conversation centered generally around the MPO serving as a coordination entity, which would enable information gathering and the opportunity to grow from this constricted definition. In addition, several participants believed that the role of the MPO was to educate the public and other local agencies about what security planning is and why it is necessary. Furthermore, they felt that in the process of educating, they would also create a cooperative and supportive environment for various community members to discuss and contribute existing and potential future plans.
It was generally agreed that it is not advisable to re-invent what is already well-functioning. The FHWA has found that the MPO can typically be a good non-political forum for gathering together key representatives in the field. If the MPO is already serving as a forum for conversation, then it is important simply to make sure the MPO is aware of other agencies' roles and facilitating coordination between them.
Participants concurred that there is tremendous variation among MPOs in their security planning roles, and that it is critical for each MPO to determine its own value-added niche. For example, some MPOs might take on a data gathering and analysis role on behalf of the region's emergency response agencies, while others might take more of a leadership role by organizing meetings or discussions to facilitate better institutional coordination. For most participants, the security planning requirement seemed to be an opportunity for MPOs to define new and non-traditional roles for themselves. There was general agreement that MPOs, rather than waiting for others to approach them, need to be proactive and build support for their security planning mission by demonstrating how their work adds value to the region's emergency response and recovery capacity.
Participants generally concurred that there are already many well-established groups and agencies in metropolitan areas that are tackling security planning from various perspectives. These groups include emergency responders, state agencies, and local task forces. The FHWA representatives encouraged the MPOs to reach out to these groups by attending their local meetings to create a sense of mutual support and benefit. As partnerships are established, the MPO may gain access to the planning-related assets of these groups and begin collaborating with them on various initiatives.
In addition, the FHWA representative encouraged MPOs to consult with private entities that may have an impact on the security planning process. For example, the freight and manufacturing industries can be significant potential contributors to the success of emergency plans, based on recent history (e.g., the roles of UPS and Wal-Mart in Hurricane Katrina's emergency relief efforts). The Department of Defense is another potential partner related to managing transportation and distribution in emergency situations.
Participants agreed that the success of certain MPO priorities could hinge on having policy-level "champions." Because security planning is unfamiliar territory for most MPOs, and potentially raises "turf issues," engaging community leaders, state officials and other key figures in the security planning process was considered key to making progress and having successful efforts.
During the course of the workshop, it was challenging to find a common definition of "security" in the MPO planning context. Some MPOs sought a clear description of what "security planning" means, while others were comfortable with a vague definition. The FHWA generally defines "security planning" as that related to an event that is beyond the ability of local authorities to handle and respond to, and that outside resources will be necessary to assist. One MPO representative suggested that safety pertained to the "unintentional," whereas security related to the "intentional." After much deliberation, it became evident that explicit definitions of safety and security would be helpful.
The FHWA representatives noted that no checklist exists that defines "security" in the context of MPO planning. Rather, each MPO is encouraged to create a local definition that both fits local needs and addresses the SAFETEA-LU planning factor.
Participants agreed that finding a way to prioritize security projects on the TIP or LRTP was a challenge. The security factor cannot simply be a checkbox on a project application, but instead would require a more thorough approach. The ultimate dilemma was that it seemed nearly every project would support a security objective to some extent. Further, participants generally agreed that determining how to prioritize security-related projects will require a clear local definition of "security."
Some suggested identifying a list of priority routes (e.g., evacuation routes and alternate routes) to identify which projects should be prioritized. Others believed that, depending on the emergency scenario, nearly every road could be listed as a priority route. To this end, it was suggested that an MPO could assign a probability to various emergency events, which would then allow the security impact of each project to be evaluated with credible criteria.
Another suggested approach was to create a point range for various security priorities and apply these points to each project. The criteria were typically measureable, such as level-of-service, so that the same criteria could be applied universally. In addition, assets of regional significance (e.g., an airport) would need to be differentiated through such a scoring process since their impact is on a different level than a local road.
Most participants were concerned about the limited availability of security planning resources. Some offered anecdotes about requesting security planning data or information from other agencies and being refused. Participants concluded that the MPO's most valuable role could be as a collaboration forum. Thus, the actual availability of data or documents, in fact, may be of less importance than it had seemed earlier
Using a grant from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, the Tri-County RPC in Peoria, IL hired a consultant to conduct stakeholder interviews, facilitate discussions, perform an exhaustive review of literature, and summarize this information in a presentation.2 The MPO used the consultant as a "neutral party" to engage in a first discussion about security planning with potential stakeholders.
For many, the security planning process involved a thorough reexamination of existing MPO documents. Some MPOs found that there was already a great deal of data available that could be reformatted to address security planning. For instance, a map that previously documented paratransit users or low-income populations could now also be considered a "vulnerable population" map.
Participants also discussed addressing the needs of transit-dependent people in security planning. One MPO built a model to simulate an evacuation procedure for this population to better prepare the emergency service agencies during an emergency evacuation. In an effort to gain support from other agencies for this approach, the MPO focused on the shared priority of mobility.
There was also concern about getting emergency information to residents who do not have access to the internet or telephone, or those who frequently move and have old data in the address database system. Some MPOs found success by reaching these individuals through churches and other public forums.
One MPO addressed the transit-dependent populations issue by convening coordination meetings of key local entities to share information. For example, one emergency response agency was working to get senior citizens to provide the agency with their local addresses, while another agency was gathering information on emergency personnel and transit resources. Through the coordination meeting, the MPO facilitated development of a stronger security plan for the region by bringing these two agencies together.
In some metropolitan areas, tourists and foreign visitors and officials provide an additional challenge in security planning because of their lack of local ties. FHWA suggested reviewing the security planning for tourism conducted by the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments.3
A recurring theme throughout the workshop was the difficulty associated with communicating and coordinating with other agencies. Some participants found that their transit agencies had clauses in their charters or other rules that would not allow the sharing of buses during an emergency. Others found that local universities would contribute significantly during an emergency without being asked or told. Conversely, others found that some institutions would contribute, but only after being mandated by law or executive order. It became clear that outside agencies frequently operated on their own terms, and that the lack of formal coordination between them was a critical gap.
Many participants felt that their MPOs did not have sufficient credibility or "clout" (in the eyes of local authorities) to positively affect security planning. In the case of a significant disaster, typically the federal or state government assumes the majority of responsibility and control for response. Participants spoke of having insufficient ability to substantively assist in these scenarios. Some MPOs argued that they had control through the TIP, because the MPO could manage the progress and prioritization of local projects. Others felt that influence could be gained by getting the face of the MPO out to the public, meeting people, and making connections. Still others felt that strength could be gained by having important elected officials on the Policy Board. Regardless of the means, it became clear that the MPO would need to partner with the public, elected officials, and emergency response agencies to facilitate the security planning process.
Participants concurred that to achieve effective coordination with other agencies involved in security planning and management, MPOs need to be proactive and reach out to them through phone calls, meeting attendance and other activities. For those MPOs that have already reached out to other agencies, the MPO has frequently been welcomed and the connections led to further collaboration down the road. Many underestimated how much other agencies knew about the role of the MPO, and it turned into an educational experience for all involved.
Several participants pointed to intelligent transportation systems (ITS) planning as an avenue by which MPOs can have an important role in security planning. Most had established an ITS-supportive task in their UPWPs and were pursuing some level of ITS planning and analysis. However, some participants noted that an impediment to MPO involvement in regional security planning was the prevalence of proprietary and/or incompatible emergency management and response information technology systems and software within a region. Participants generally thought that system incompatibility resulted from individual agencies involved in security planning and response assuming a very narrow perspective rather than considering the greater regional picture. Several participants suggested that some version of universal system architecture could significantly enhance security planning efforts. One participant suggested that if security planning and response agencies would coordinate more proactively to build compatible technological architectures, they could potentially lower the cost of individual equipment and software purchases, thus stretching security-related funds further.
Understanding and addressing distinction between planning for disaster response and planning for disaster recovery was a theme throughout the workshop. Many believed that the MPO process held great potential for facilitating disaster recovery efforts. For example, if a bridge were to be destroyed in a natural or man-made disaster, federal recovery funds typically would be subject to "limits of eligibility" and thus be allocated for the sole purpose of replacing that bridge. However, if the MPO had already identified this bridge as a potential route for transit expansion, it would be an ideal time to reconstruct the bridge with this capacity. Thus, if the MPO and others had the flexibility to allocate recovery funds for such enhanced reconstruction, the long-term benefits would almost certainly outweigh the short-term costs. Most participants agreed that the security planning process would be enhanced if the MPO could be directly involved in the recovery planning process so that recovery-related funding was allocated in the most cost-effective way. Furthermore, participants concurred that the MPO needs to undertake a process-oriented approach to security planning focusing on mobility, rather than capacity.
Participants discussed another dimension of both disaster response and disaster recovery - transportation system redundancy. Most agreed that the security planning process needs to identify multiple routing options for evacuation and emergency response situations. One participant noted that there had recently been a major vehicle accident in their MPO region on a key arterial. Traffic was routed to the adjacent side road, which could not handle the additional demand and immediately became gridlocked. The MPO believed that planning that addressed network redundancy would have facilitated a much more fluid response and ultimately, a more timely recovery from the incident.
Over the course of the workshop, the MPO participants made several suggestions for areas and efforts that FHWA could assist with in the security planning process. An overall theme was that FHWA should ensure the security planning requirement is applied with as much flexibility as possible to accommodate the range of planning environments within which the nation's MPOs function. Additional specific suggestions included:
Training and education
Security planning grant opportunities
Providing a specific definition of "security" in the context of the MPO planning process
Examples of successful practices, including
MPOs of various sizes
Various situations and settings
1 A second presentation, from Ms. Elaine Wilkinson of the Gulf Regional Planning Commission in Gulfport, MS, was originally scheduled but cancelled due to illness. A copy of Ms. Wilkinson's presentation document is included in Appendix B.