Chapter 4: State and Local Evacuation Plan Assessment

This chapter describes the results of the U.S. DOT's evaluation and assessment of the current State and local evacuation plans and operations in the Gulf Coast region. The U.S. DOT reviewed evacuation plans from each of the 5 Gulf Coast States (Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas) and 58 of the counties and parishes in these States. The assessment used a systematic, structured process to review the plans based on 20 questions concerning seven key elements of mass evacuation planning and operations. These elements are major types of activities or functions that Federal, State, and local emergency management agencies would conduct to plan and execute a mass evacuation. The development of the questions is discussed in Chapter III of this report.

The U.S. DOT's assessment identified the overall strengths and weaknesses of evacuation plans in the Gulf Coast region. The assessment provides a basis for Federal, State, and local governments to focus program enhancements in those areas most in need of improvements. The purpose of the assessment was not to rank plans for individual State and local jurisdictions, but to assess the overall status of evacuation planning in the region.

Figure 4-1 illustrates the overall status of evacuation plans in the Gulf Coast region, with respect to the seven key elements and the 20 questions that were assessed as part of this evaluation. The total scores for each question are averaged among the 63 State, county, and parish plans that were reviewed by the U.S. DOT. The purpose is to identify the areas where the plans are strongest and weakest. The assessment scores provide a benchmark for emergency managers and highlight areas that need to be enhanced and areas that are highly effective.

It is important to remember that this assessment of plans is a "snapshot in time." With each hurricane or other catastrophic incident, new challenges arise and lessons are learned. These lessons are then folded into the next update of Federal, State, and local plans, and the planning cycle continues--as it should. This assessment is based upon questions that are predicated on Federal planning guidance in place prior to the 2005 hurricane season, and the plans reviewed were generally in compliance with that guidance. This guidance addresses evacuation, but not mass evacuation from a catastrophic incident. Our experiences during the 2005 hurricane season are evidence that the guidance needs to be revised to reflect the demands of a mass evacuation, and that State and local plans must be updated to comply with that new guidance.

Additionally, this assessment focused on the written contents of the evacuation plans and not on the effectiveness of their execution during catastrophic incidents. Therefore, it is important to recognize that findings from this assessment may not reflect results from other studies that were conducted to assess the response to past catastrophic incidents, particularly to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

This assessment focused solely on one aspect of emergency management--evacuations, particularly in the Gulf Coast region. Again, it is therefore important to recognize that the assessment findings may differ slightly from those of other studies that looked at emergency preparedness in whole, such as the companion DHS report, or other studies such as the U.S. NRC report that presented case studies on 50 specific evacuations from across the nation that occurred before July 2003.

Figure 4-1: Status of Evacuation Plans in the Gulf Coast Region

The three areas in which the plans, as a group, were judged to be very effective are:

1.      Standard Operating Procedures (Planning): More than three-quarters of the plans were found to be very effective in terms of requiring organizations to prepare standard operations procedures that contain the detailed instructions that responsible individuals need to follow to accomplish assigned tasks.

2.      Exercises, After-Action Reports, Plan Updates (Training): More than three-quarters of the evacuation plans were found to be very effective in terms of requiring periodic reviews and updates of the plan, exercises, and after-action reports as part of the planning process.

3.      Direction and Control (Decision Making and Management): Three-quarters of the evacuation plans described direction and control procedures that were judged to be very effective with respect to mass evacuation requirements.

1.      Information during Evacuations (Public Communications): Nearly two-thirds of the evacuation plans reviewed were judged to be either marginally or partially effective regarding measures to keep evacuees informed during evacuation.

2.      Evacuating Groups with Various Special Needs (Special Needs): A significant majority of the evacuation plans were judged to be either marginally or partially effective regarding provisions for evacuating persons with various special needs.

3.      Returning Evacuees to Their Homes (Planning): A significant majority of the evacuation plans were judged to be either marginally or partially effective regarding provisions for returning evacuees to their homes.

4.      Contraflow (Operations): More than three-quarters of the evacuation plans were judged to be only marginally or partially effective regarding the use of contraflow operations.

5.      Care and Protection of Animals (Sheltering): Almost three-quarters of the evacuation plans were judged to be either marginally or partially effective regarding provisions to care for and protect animals.

Table 4-1 shows the assessment results for the 7 key elements and 20 questions.

Table 4-1: Questions and Assessment Results

Decision Making and Management
Assessment	Question
	D1				Does the plan describe direction and control with respect to mass evacuation?
	D2				Does the plan describe the provisions needed to execute a large-scale evacuation?
Planning
Assessment	Criteria
	P1	Does the plan address evacuation planning considerations (i.e., decision making, communications, available transportation modes, special needs, and sheltering) with regard to catastrophic events?
	P2	Does the plan require organizations to prepare standard operating procedures that contain the detailed instructions that responsible individuals need to follow to accomplish assigned tasks?
	P3	Does the plan include provisions for returning evacuees to their homes?
Public Communications and Preparedness
Assessment	Question
	C1			Does the plan describe the provisions and methods for alerting citizens that evacuation may be necessary?
	C2			Does the plan identify what will be done to keep evacuees informed during evacuation to reduce their level of mental and physical stress?
	C3			Does the plan describe the means the government will use to keep evacuees and the public informed on the specific actions they should take after evacuation has started?
Evacuation of People with Special Needs
Assessment	Question
	N1				Does the plan describe provisions for evacuating special needs populations including those in assisted living facilities, hospitals, and those living independently (e.g., people with physical, mental, cognitive, and developmental disabilities)?
	N2				Does the plan describe provisions for evacuating other special needs populations (e.g., people in schools, day centers, mobile home parks, prisons and detention centers as well as, people that do not speak English or who are tourists, seasonal workers, or homeless)?
Operations
Assessment	Question
	O1				Does the plan include provisions to ensure availability of public and commercial transport modes and necessary transport operators?
	O2				Does the plan describe the safe and practical transportation modes that will be used to move evacuees that cannot transport themselves (other than special needs populations)?
	O3				Does the plan identify evacuation routes?
	O4				Does the plan address the use of contraflow measures?
Sheltering Considerations
Assessment	Question
	S1	Does the plan require the establishment of mutual aid agreements with other jurisdictions to formalize access to and use of shelters?
	S2	Does the plan include provisions for informing shelter operations and evacuees about the locations of public shelters outside of the evacuation area and their status (i.e., full, accepting evacuees, accepting evacuees with pets, special needs shelters, etc.)?
	S3	Does the plan address strategies and responsibilities for shelter operations?
	S4	Does the plan include provisions for the care and protection of animals?
Mass Evacuation Training & Exercises
Assessment	Question
	T1		Does the plan include provisions for training a volunteer cadre to support shelter management operations, transport of evacuees, and first aid stations along the evacuation routes, etc.?
	T2		Does the plan require periodic reviews and updates of the plan, exercises, and after action reports as part of the planning process?

Very Effective

Effective

Partially Effective

Marginally Effective

Figure 4-2 shows how the plan assessment ratings stack up for each question within the seven key elements.

Figure 4-2: Evacuation Plans Assessment Ratings

Decision Making and Management

Decision making and management capabilities are critical to developing and implementing a successful emergency response plan. Managing the response to a catastrophic incident requires timely, effective decision making and a systematic management approach that applies sound, tested principles. SLG 101 highlights the significance of successful decision making and management throughout the life cycle of a disaster--"the manner in which the situation is managed will determine the effectiveness of the overall operation."

The NRP indicates that when major catastrophic incidents overwhelm State and local resources, governments at all levels are encouraged to implement decision making and management plans in support of evacuation efforts. And while local and State governments and their emergency response organizations (e.g., law enforcement, fire, and emergency management) have plans and SOPs necessary to conduct emergency operations decision making and management, SLG 101 points out that catastrophic situations can easily overwhelm normal emergency operations since problems often arise in trying to manage operations involving disciplines, organizations, and agencies that are not accustomed to working together on a day-to-day basis.

The benefits of having plans and procedures in place for effective decision making and management include:

• Lines of authority and decision paths are clearly understood and readily applied
• Individuals and organizations know the essential information required for decisions and key management actions, and the procedures to share the information
• Information and analysis provide situational awareness for emergency managers, which facilitates timely and effective decisions
• Cross jurisdictional and cross organizational efforts are coordinated and synergized
• Resources are applied more efficiently and effectively.

Current Guidelines and Practices

Decision making and management for a mass evacuation involves Federal, State, and local authorities. Under the NRP, a catastrophic incident triggers a comprehensive and integrated Federal, State, and local response. Numerous agencies from each level of government may be involved. The NRP describes the command structures and coordination processes for all of these agencies to work together. This decision making and management structure was discussed in Chapter II on the Federal, State, and local roles in evacuation planning and implementation.

Assessment of Current Plans

Two primary questions were used to evaluate how well the plans covered decision making and management requirements. The questions and results of the assessment are shown in Table 4-2. The evacuation plans in the Gulf Coast region generally were found to be effective or very effective in their treatment of decision making and management requirements under the current guidelines.

Table 4-2: Decision Making and Management Questions and Assessment Results

Decision Making and Management
Assessment	Question
	D1	Does the plan describe direction and control with respect to mass evacuation?
	D2	Does the plan describe the provisions needed to execute a large-scale evacuation?

Figure 4-3 shows the assessment ratings for the decision making key element, with breakouts provided for the two questions--management control and scalable plans.

Figure 4-3: Decision Making and Management Assessment Ratings

The first question assessed whether data are gathered, analyzed and provided to decision makers; how resources are assigned; how specific responsibilities are delegated to agencies and individuals; how coordination across agencies and levels of government is to occur; and how decision making and management responses will adjust to changing situations.

The second question concerns whether the plans describe provisions necessary to manage a large-scale evacuation. Considerations include whether procedures are in place to allow emergency managers to base decisions on changing risks, changing resources, and changing capabilities throughout the course of an evacuation; whether processes for issuing and revising evacuation orders are established; whether evacuation plans are time-phased to permit prioritized and tailored responses; and whether strategies are implemented to address securing evacuated areas as well as those with special needs.

The review found the plans generally include decision making frameworks necessary to implement large-scale evacuations, including requirements that agencies have SOPs. Most of the base plans and their annexes provide a significant amount of detail in terms of who, what, when, where, and how emergency tasks and responsibilities will be conducted. Tasks are identified and delegated to specific organizations. The plans also address the process for issuing and communicating evacuation orders.

In general, plans with high scores for the decision making and management key element identified each responsible position by name with a primary and back-up position. They also efficiently laid out communication channels and which agency to contact, depending on the issue at hand. Additionally, they provided a comprehensive and logical approach to managing the identification, acquisition, and distribution of necessary resources--to include involvement of legal and financial authorities to comply with applicable accounting obligations. Lastly, they provided detailed checklists of actions throughout the evacuation process. For example, the State of Florida provides an evacuation decision worksheet that can be updated. The worksheet helps emergency managers and other officials go through a consistent decision making process.

On the other hand, plans with partial to marginal effectiveness scores generally lacked the specific detail of which agency and position would carry out the necessary actions involved. Many of the plans discussed evacuation procedures in very general terms and did not address the specific coordination at the field level that is necessary. Plans in this range did not effectively identify or link the roles and responsibilities of Federal, State, and local authorities.

As illustrated above, discussion of intra-governmental direction and control often articulated specific responsibilities, lines of authority, and means of coordination among the agencies within a jurisdiction. However, some plans lacked the same details for inter-governmental coordination--lines of authority, means of coordination, and specific responsibilities between agencies were often unclear.

The plans generally discuss the need to phase the execution of evacuations and provide some decision making information that emergency managers would need to make those decisions including numbers of people and vehicles and roadway throughput capacity. Some plans included checklists of various actions that should be taken based on the number of hours to landfall for different categories of hurricanes.

Law enforcement agencies are heavily tasked throughout each of the plans. They are typically responsible for managing the evacuation, providing traffic control, securing the evacuated area, controlling access, assisting with route clearance, providing shelter security, moving prisoners from jails, assisting in emergency public information dissemination, and conducting general law and order operations. The SOPs from the law enforcement agencies are generally not included as part of the evacuation plans, and were not available for this review.

Most plans provide estimates of the number of citizens that would evacuate in privately owned vehicles. However, the majority of plans do not contain estimates of the number of people requiring transportation assistance, including people who do not have access to a privately owned vehicle and people with special needs who rely on public transportation to evacuate. This information is needed for decision makers to effectively coordinate public transportation resources for an evacuation and to ensure transportation assets will be sufficient to evacuate special needs populations in time.

There were several other areas where plans could be strengthened. Many plans do not include contingency plans, strategies, or processes to change activities based on changing factors in the disaster. In addition, many of the plans do not contain procedures for revising or amending evacuation orders, nor do they contain pre-approved drafts of executive orders for evacuation. Having draft orders and documents helps clarify authorities and may facilitate more timely evacuation decisions in the turmoil of a catastrophic incident. The Palm Beach County, Florida plan includes such a draft evacuation order. The appropriate official may quickly fill in the blanks to issue the order.

Lessons Learned from Recent Evacuations

Decision to Initiate Contraflow Operations: While some officials indicated that regular highway operations should be continued as long as possible to minimize disruption, the general consensus is that contraflow operations on major highways work well and facilitate evacuations. Still, recent experiences indicate that implementing contraflow operations was less than optimal because, in some jurisdictions, decision makers did not know how long it would take to deploy resources necessary to initiate contraflow operations. Contraflow is a relatively new strategy, and continued analysis and investigation is needed.

Flexibility: There were several instances when communication networks were out of service and local, State, and Federal agencies could not reach each other, despite efforts to utilize all available methods. When in this situation, officials and emergency managers must balance adhering to the plan, which may require coordination with unreachable colleagues, with serving the needs of their jurisdiction in an information vacuum. Effective plans anticipate this issue with contingency plans and flexibility to adjust to dynamic situations.

Best Practices

The Texas Task Force on Evacuation, Transportation and Logistics was created in 2005, in direct response to the evacuation concerns brought upon by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. With the increased attention on the Gulf Coast States, events took place that defined the lessons learned and recommendations to better address evacuations and all things included like transportation and logistics. The Texas Task Force focused on five key areas in the final report including command, control, and communication; evacuation of people with special needs; fuel availability; traffic flow; and public awareness. These areas were identified most often during a series of public hearings. The final report was released on February 14, 2006, and just recently Texas Governor Rick Perry announced the Executive Order RP57. This executive order has led to the implementation of some of the Texas Task Force recommendations, and is an early step in the process to clarify the decision making and management structure and processes in Texas.

Planning

State and local EOPs for mass evacuation are the "roadmaps" for how the emergency management agencies will help people in their community leave an unsafe area. The plans evaluate the risks for the community, describe the information emergency managers need to execute an evacuation, determine what actions will be taken and who will carry out those actions, and discuss strategies and alternatives if events do not go as anticipated. Plans are updated periodically to reflect new hazards, address changes in the community, and incorporate improvements learned from exercises and real events.

An evacuation plan is much more than a written document; it is the outcome of a planning process. A plan for a mass evacuation from a catastrophic incident cannot be created by one agency. Plans for a complex, multi-jurisdictional disaster require coordination and integration of plans with partner Federal, State, and local agencies as well as NGOs and the private sector. Evacuation plans that are integrally linked with the plans of supporting agencies must be updated regularly to reflect changes in capabilities and resources of the partners. The process of working with partner agencies to assess risks, develop strategies and contingencies, and exercise and test plans is a very important part of the process. It builds effective working relationships among agencies and managers and shares the knowledge and expertise across many disciplines. With the Federal, State, and local emergency management agencies adopting the ICS and following similar planning guidelines, this coordination becomes easier because the agencies "speak the same language."

Current Guidelines and Practices

SLG 101 is used by many State and local jurisdictions to help develop their EOPs, including evacuation planning. SLG 101 recommends a planning process that builds on the jurisdictions' existing plans; includes a hazard and risk analysis to establish priorities; and includes a broad range of public, private sector, and volunteer organizations that will be involved in a mass evacuation. SLG 101 includes a Functional Annex that specifically addresses evacuation planning and a Hazard-Unique Planning Considerations Annex that addresses hurricanes.

Both SLG 101 and the NRP promote collaborative planning processes across jurisdictions, with different levels of government, and among agencies. SLG 101 notes that many jurisdictions mirror the Federal plans including establishing the same ESFs for State agencies. The NRP provides information that will help States and local jurisdictions ensure their plans link up easily with Federal resources in a catastrophic incident.

Another important source of planning information for State and local jurisdictions are HES conducted by the USACE, FEMA, and the NWS. These studies provide survey and analysis of surge and evacuation zones, behavioral studies, shelter analysis, and transportation analysis. This information is used by local emergency management officials to update and improve their evacuation plans. These agencies, and others, have also developed a number of models that assist in evacuation planning and decision making. These models are described in the following section, and more detail is provided in Appendix F.

Hurricane Evacuation Models. Over the past four decades, and especially since 9/11, researchers and emergency management personnel have sought to better understand and predict the characteristics of evacuations. This research has led to the development of models, which have contributed to planning for and executing evacuations. Information from these models provided to decision makers and managers of evacuations are highlighted below. The first five hurricane models or applications are operational tools, while the last three models or applications are analytical tools geared specifically for transportation modeling and analysis.

Operational Modeling Tools

SLOSH Model (Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes): For a given set of storm conditions, this model from the NWS predicts storm surge and is used to help plan evacuation routes and locate emergency shelters based on estimates of the extent of flooding.

HURREVAC (Hurricane EVACuation): Developed by USACE for FEMA, this model tracks and projects the course of an approaching hurricane and projects the anticipated course once it makes landfall. It draws on SLOSH model information and other sources and is used to help determine when to commence evacuation of an area.

HAZUS-MH (Multi-Hazards U.S. Software): Developed by FEMA, this tool predicts the impacts of disasters to buildings and structures from various hazards. Managers can use this model to gauge the physical safety of shelters in different categories of hurricanes and estimate the number of people that may need shelter.

CATS (Consequence Assessment Tool Set/Joint Assessment of Catastrophic Events (JACE): Developed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency with guidance from FEMA, CATS integrates an array of information to provide disaster analysis in real time. CATS helps estimate damage and assists emergency managers to develop mitigation strategies.

ETIS (Evacuation Traffic Information System): Developed by the U.S. DOT in collaboration with FEMA, ETIS combines behavioral studies, data from past occurrences, and real-time data such as traffic incidents, weather information, evacuation percentages, and tourist occupancy rates to monitor highway evacuation processes.

Analytical Modeling Tools

NETVAC (NETwork emergency eVACuation): This model provides limited analysis for evacuations to analyze route selection, intersection controls, and lane management.

MASSVAC (MASS eVACuation): This is a simulation model of highway networks to identify routes to the nearest shelters and to calculate evacuation time.

OREMS (Oak Ridge Evacuation Modeling System): OREMS is a probabilistic model that uses large amounts of highway network information combined with local data for a systems approach to evacuation operations.

Of the eight models reviewed, no one model or application is designed to meet all planning and emergency evacuation requirements. However, many of the models have common functionality, data input requirements, and the ability to modify a "baseline" or default model run setting or scenario. A significant difference in model applications is the distinction between planning for an event (e.g., hurricane) versus responding to an incident (e.g., earthquake or man-made disaster), with the variable of time for planning and response. Depending on the type of evacuation requirement, different models and their data inputs, functionality, and resulting decisions may vary significantly. However, many communities are faced with both requirements for planning for community safety and continuity of government operations. Therefore, many government organizations will need access to or the results of these different models for both planning and response.

Costs of Evacuation Plans: One of the factors Congress requested this study to assess is the cost of evacuation plans. The U.S. DOT attempted to collect cost information for the Gulf Coast States, but specific cost information was generally not available. The limited cost information received for this study was incomplete and of limited value for analysis.

State officials reported that determining the amount of funding allocated and spent for evacuation planning and implementation would be difficult since funding comes from many sources at the Federal, State, and local level, and many agencies within the various levels of government have agencies involved. The States do not budget specific amounts for evacuation planning, but include these costs within broader emergency management programs. While State officials reported evacuation planning is done within current funding, they felt that funding was constrained. However, they did not identify specific activities that were limited by lack of funding.

Assessment of Current Plans

The three questions used to assess general planning elements of State and local evacuation plans in the Gulf Coast region are shown in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3: Planning Questions and Assessment Results

Planning
Assessment	Question
	P1	Does the plan address evacuation planning considerations (i.e., decision making, communications, available transportation modes, special needs, and sheltering) with regard to catastrophic events?
	P2	Does the plan require organizations to prepare standard operating procedures that contain the detailed instructions that responsible individuals need to follow to accomplish assigned tasks?
	P3	Does the plan include provisions for returning evacuees to their homes?

Figure 4-4 shows the assessment ratings for the planning key element, with breakouts provided for its three questions--basic plan, SOPs, and re-entry.

Figure 4-4: Planning Assessment Ratings

The first question includes a broad range of planning considerations that should be addressed in an evacuation plan. These planning considerations include prioritizing communities for evacuation based on risks; estimating the number of people and vehicles to be evacuated, including people with special needs and those without their own transportation; identifying decision points for implementing an evacuation based on different hazards; estimating the time needed to complete evacuations of different types and scales; estimating how far evacuees will have to travel to safety; and coordinating with other agencies and jurisdictions that may be involved in the evacuation including those that will shelter evacuees.

The second question concerns whether participating organizations are required to develop standard operating procedures with detailed instructions on how the plan will be implemented and who is responsible for specific tasks. Standard operating procedures tell agency staff how to implement various parts of the evacuation plan and help to ensure that important details are not overlooked.

The third question concerns whether evacuation plans include provisions for returning evacuees to their homes and connecting family members separated during the evacuation process. These aspects of evacuations can be among the most stressful; having procedures in place to address these issues can help reduce the stress and tensions associated with these troublesome aspects of evacuations.

Overall, the plans in the region were generally found to be effective in addressing the broad range of planning considerations associated with evacuations in current guidelines. In general, plans with high scores for this key element included a very proactive approach to the evacuation process. This would include identification of evacuation zones by zip code, pre-scripting evacuation time lines to identify key decision points, and conducting mitigation hazard assessments to identify the most vulnerable areas in varying jurisdictions. These plans also establish a Missing Persons Unit immediately after the plan activates, and contain pre-scripted re-entry messages to assist the coordination of citizens returning.

The strongest part of plans is their recognition of the importance of SOPs to implement the evacuation plan and assign specific tasks to individuals. Some of the plans, however, do not include sufficient details such as estimates of the numbers of evacuees and vehicles, distance and travel time to designated shelters, capacity of evacuation routes and modes of transportation, contingency plans, and sufficient provisions for returning evacuees to their homes. Some local governments in low-lying areas at higher risk for flooding do not include decision points or criteria for when to implement an evacuation. Others do not specify the organizations tasked to prepare and maintain the plans and procedures for mass evacuation.

Although the majority of State and local plans have provisions for contraflow operations, some do not identify a system in their plans for communicating and coordinating contraflow operations with neighboring jurisdictions or demonstrate that the contraflow plans have been tested in an exercise or in a real evacuation.

Most attributes associated with planning for re-entry of the population after a disaster are not adequately addressed, and plans generally were judged to be only partially effective with respect to this question. In a few cases, the re-entry section of the plans state that it must be conducted with the same level of care as the evacuation, but the plans did not provide information or procedures, or assign responsibilities to agencies to accomplish this task. Processes and procedures to help reunite evacuees with family members separated during the evacuation have also not been adequately addressed.

The decision to re-enter an area that has been impacted by a hurricane is based on public safety factors. Decision makers must be assured that the impacted area is safe for residents and business owners to return. That requires State and local agencies to inspect the areas and aid any victims of the storm, move debris to open roadways, handle downed power lines, and other such actions. These activities take time, and this has an impact on how long people need to remain in shelters or in the location in which they sought refuge.

Some of these factors are particularly critical for special needs evacuees who may need power to run medical equipment on which they depend or the elderly who may need air conditioning to avoid heat-related medical problems. Mississippi Department of Health Officials noted that this is something that they are working to address during the revision of their mass care plans. The Florida Legislature has taken up legislation to allow for reimbursement for the purchase of generators by nursing homes that may end up sheltering evacuees from another location.

It is likely that an area impacted by a hurricane will have zones with varying degrees of impact. That means the re-entry process may happen in phases as each geographic area is deemed safe for evacuees' return. After Hurricane Rita, Texas implemented a phased re-entry plan that was very successful. Officials determined which geographic areas could return and set a timetable during which each area could be re-entered. The phases were well reported by the media. This phased approach worked well in avoiding the major traffic jams that occurred during the evacuation for the same hurricane.

Lessons Learned from Recent Evacuations

Current evacuation plans are not sufficient for mass evacuations from catastrophic incidents. The plans assessment revealed that, in general, the States followed the Federal guidance in preparing their evacuation plans to address all hazards, including natural, technological, and/or national security emergencies or disaster situations. However, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were catastrophic incidents that involved extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, and disruption, and overwhelmed the Federal, State and local responders. The results of the evacuations for these two hurricanes clearly demonstrated the need for more detailed planning for evacuation management and control, contingency plans, better estimates of transportation needs, and planning processes to ensure coordination and integration of resources and capabilities of government agencies at all levels. Therefore, this study established the fact that there is a huge gap between the current evacuation plans, and the execution of these plans to carry out mass evacuations in response to catastrophic incidents.

Evacuation plans are fragmented. Evacuation plans for a region are spread among a "family of plans." These include plans, supplements, and annexes from various agencies and jurisdictions that contain different levels of specificity and different organization of topics. It was challenging for the U.S. DOT to assemble all of the evacuation plans for this study because components of the evacuation plans were in many different agencies' plans. It is also difficult for State and local emergency planners to assemble all of the important evacuation elements from the various agencies. In addition, it is difficult for planners and operational staff to assess whether all of the pieces of the plans work together and are in coordination with the plans of other jurisdictions.

No national evacuees database. Re-entry planning should be done well before a disaster to avoid trying to develop the plan as emergency response operations are still ongoing. During Hurricane Katrina's landfall, Mississippi's EOC phone systems jammed due to thousands of phone calls by people trying to locate family members and friends. In the days following Katrina, additional phone lines were added to handle the call volume. Volunteers staffed the phone lines and began a missing persons database system. According to the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) Executive Director's Congressional Testimony relating to Katrina response, the missing persons hotline took more than 10,000 calls from 35 different countries. There was no national system in place to identify people in shelters, missing people, or people who have been located and are safe. This was a national problem because this was a multi-State event and disaster victims were displaced in many States.

Best Practices

Coordination between Local, State, and Federal Agencies. The planning processes of State and local agencies usually include coordination and integration of State and local jurisdiction plans. In a mass evacuation from a catastrophic incident, Federal resources and capabilities will be an important part of the States' emergency response. There was very little discussion in the plans of how the States should coordinate with appropriate Federal agencies and resources. The State of Mississippi has a very comprehensive emergency management law that outlines roles and responsibilities of State and local jurisdictions for implementation of the Governor's authorities during emergencies and disasters. This law makes MEMA responsible for the emergency operations plan and tasks the agency with oversight of all emergency plans at the State and local level. Under this law, MEMA is given the responsibility and accountability to work with agencies at the State and local level involved in emergency management to work toward compliance with the state CEMP and the NRP. The law also requires that plans include an evacuation and shelter component, a disaster response and recovery component, use of the National Guard, communication and warning, training and exercises, and urban search and rescue. County emergency management offices are required to establish a communication capability at the local level to ensure adequate flow of information during times of emergency. The framework of this law is an important step; similar coordinated planning processes are needed between the States and the appropriate Federal agencies for mass evacuations.

The Mississippi and North Carolina Departments of Health (DOHs) have been working together in support of response to disasters for years. Following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the two DOHs decided to take this relationship to the next level--representatives from North Carolina are conducting the after-action report for the Mississippi DOH for ESF-8 (Health and Medical Services). The findings from the after-action report will be incorporated into its plans as the report is available.  This example of peer review also demonstrates the mutual aid that has continued since Katrina as the States directly affected and the States who have assisted all want to identify and plan how they will operate more effectively during future disasters.

Public Communication and Preparedness

Even the most comprehensive evacuation plans are only as good as their ability to help inform public agencies of when and what to communicate to the public. In general, the evacuation plans should contain provisions relating to public communications before evacuations and during evacuations, ensuring people evacuate safely. Plans that successfully accomplish this goal are able to develop targeted messages geared towards specific audience(s) that impart information to that group in a manner that allows them to receive and apply the message(s) or information. Moreover, when the message(s) being communicated contains information that will protect and prepare people for a significant event, such as a hurricane evacuation, it is that much more critical to provide citizens with the tools and access to information that will make them and their families safer and more secure.

Current Guidelines and Practices

The NRP addresses the types of public communication that are essential during all phases of an evacuation. The NRP discusses the need to educate the public before an event about evacuations, sheltering, preparedness kits, public health, and safety issues. The NRP also speaks to public information during an evacuation, such as evacuation routes, estimated travel times for an evacuation, public transportation options, location of staging areas, location of shelters, evacuating family pets, and informing those with special needs. The NRP additionally addresses recovery communications, informing the public on transportation infrastructure and access to the impacted area, security initiatives in place to protect their evacuated property, and the status and timing of plans to return home, as well as the importance of coordinating with local media outlets to disseminate evacuation information.

Additionally, the Emergency Public Information (EPI) Attachment to SLG 101 contains guidance on providing the public with accurate, timely, and useful information instructions throughout the emergency period and recommends that EPI organizations develop close ties with local media to ensure message dissemination to the public.

State and local evacuation plans were evaluated against three main questions associated with Public Communications and Preparedness. The questions and the results of the assessment of the plans are summarized in Table 4-4.

Table 4-4: Public Communications and Preparedness Criteria and Assessment Results

Public Communications and Preparedness
Assessment	Question
	C1	Does the plan describe the provisions and methods for alerting citizens that evacuation may be necessary?
	C2	Does the plan identify what will be done to keep evacuees informed during evacuation to reduce their level of mental and physical stress?
	C3	Does the plan describe the means the government will use to keep evacuees and the public informed on the specific actions they should take after evacuation has started?

Figure 4-5 shows the assessment ratings for the communication key element, with breakouts provided for its three questions--public preparedness, evacuation information, and evacuation status.

Figure 4-5: Public Communications and Preparedness Assessment Ratings

The first question concerns how well plans describe provisions and methods for alerting citizens that an evacuation may be necessary. Specific factors that plans should address in connection with this question are when and how the public should be informed that evacuations may be necessary; contingency plans in the event that standard means of communications are unavailable; communication plans to inform those with limited English language proficiency; communications with various special needs populations; and transportation-specific information such as estimated travel times, alternate evacuation routes, and modes of transportation.

The second question concerns how well plans address needs for communications during a hurricane evacuation. Specific factors considered include communications with evacuees concerning traffic conditions; the availability of food, water, restrooms, and other services along evacuation routes; and the location and availability of shelters along evacuation routes including shelters that accept pets and persons with special needs. Factors also include the extent to which those on public transportation are kept adequately informed of their destination, arrival time, the availability of shelters, and other vital information they need to know.

The final question concerns the extent to which plans describe specific methods that public agencies use to communicate information to the public during an evacuation. Without this detail, it is difficult to assess whether communication plans are likely to be successful and whether information will be up to date and thus useful in a very dynamic environment. Among the methods that would be most effective are variable message signs along the highway, highway advisory radio, and 511 service.

Assessment of Current Plans

Overall, evacuation plans in the Gulf Coast region are inconsistent in terms of communications with the public before and during an evacuation. Generally, plans are strongest in providing pre-evacuation information to residents about evacuation routes, sheltering locations, and other essential information households need to know before they evacuate. Plans are weakest in what information will be communicated to the public during an evacuation and how that information will be communicated. To some extent this was to be expected, as circumstances are prone to change while an evacuation is underway and traditional methods of communication are often unavailable.

Public Communications and Preparedness Before an Evacuation: Assessment of this question showed that the majority of the plans included provisions, such as pre-written media messages, for timely communication of evacuation instructions to prepare citizens in advance of the order to evacuate. For example, the Collier County Florida plan states that the county maintains a listing of camera-ready public service announcements to keep evacuees informed.

More than half the plans reviewed also identified the use of alternate means for communicating with the public, such as reverse 911 systems that automatically call certain people to notify them of an emergency. Nearly half of the plans included provisions for communicating with people that have limited English proficiency. Some of the means identified are specialized phone services such as the pre-recorded audio and video tapes, publications in Spanish, media, bilingual outlets, and door-to-door public addressing.

The majority of the plans identified provisions for communicating with evacuees that have special needs (people that are hearing, vision, physically impaired, etc.). For example, the Indian River County, Florida plan calls for the use of a Telecommunications Device for the Deaf (TDD) by the County during an evacuation. Plans should address the need for providing current information that is tailored to the specific needs of various groups having special transportation, sheltering, and evacuation needs.

The assessment also highlighted some weak areas within this area. Only a very limited number of plans contained sample public information messages for use in times of evacuations. The majority of plans did not address informing the public about alternate transportation modes, alternative evacuation routes, and estimated travel times. Previous evacuation experiences indicate that residents are often under-informed about the best evacuation routes, are unaware of alternate routes, and face added frustration by being misinformed about the amount of time that an evacuation might take. The U.S. DOT found that most of the Gulf Coast States and counties provide information about evacuation routes on their public Web sites. While this method of public information is very useful for pre-evacuation preparedness, it is not the ideal method for providing public information during evacuation since a majority of evacuees would not necessarily have Internet access while en route.

Public Communication During an Evacuation:Within the key element of Public Communication and Preparedness, plans were judged to be weakest with respect to the second question providing evacuees with information during an evacuation. Nearly all of the plans lacked consistency in the type of information provided to the public during an evacuation.

Overall, many of the plans did not address details pertaining to informing evacuees of available transportation modes, access to these modes, and any restrictions on what evacuees may carry with them when traveling on these modes. The plans also did not include provisions for informing evacuees about when transportation assistance will begin and end and the frequency of departure at designated pick-up locations. In addition, the plans did not establish times for public officials to provide updates, and about informing the public on when to expect such updates. The plans did not address provisions for communicating security measures to the public. The plans did not address provisions for one of the critical attributes informing evacuees of their destination before boarding public transportation.

Most plans did not address details pertaining to providing the public with information about available services along evacuation routes and at shelters. One exception is the Hillsborough County, Florida Host County Shelter Plan. It describes how the county is a potential destination for large numbers of evacuees from disaster situations in other parts of Florida. Under such a scenario, Information Centers for incoming evacuees would be set up along, or near, highways at the approach ends of the county. The Florida Department of Transportation's dynamic message signs (DMS) would be placed at key places on the inbound highways directing evacuees to the Information Centers. Lodging information, provided by the Tampa Convention & Visitors Association, and shelter information will be provided at the Information Centers. Public shelters sufficient to meet the demand will be opened as needed as close as possible to the Information Centers. Communicating essential information to those evacuating, including alternative evacuation routes, changes in weather conditions, upcoming service areas, and availability status of shelters, can help avoid problems associated with motorists running out of fuel; being unable to find food, water, restrooms, and other services; wasting time and fuel going to shelters that are already full; and many other issues associated with a lack of information.

Past experiences tell us that not having information on any of the above factors can easily manifest itself in the form of mental and physical difficulties among evacuees. The plans should recognize that evacuations can be extremely stressful and that information on the above factors known to be of concern to different groups of evacuees can help reduce stress. One way that the government is responding to the development of depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome among victims and first responders is through the HHS' Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) and the Ad Council's Hurricane Mental Health Awareness Campaign. This campaign provides both radio and television public service announcements encouraging the treatment of these issues.

Means of Communicating with Evacuees: The primary finding under this question was that nearly all of the plans lacked details on the means of communicating real-time evacuation status information to the public. While a few plans indicated the use of emergency radio announcements for reporting highway conditions to the evacuees, most plans did not address the use of ITS to support emergency transportation information. Some of the ITS tools for this purpose include the nationwide 511 travel information phone number, DMS along evacuation routes, highway advisory radio (HAR) announcements, and travel information Web sites. Each of these tools, if implemented properly, could significantly improve evacuation-related communication to the public, both before and during evacuations.

Lessons Learned from Recent Evacuations

Better Public Information on Risks and Responsibilities: The public is often confused by evacuation information and unable to make informed decisions on evacuations. Different terms are used to order an evacuation (i.e., mandatory, voluntary, recommended, partial, and full), and the public may not know when to properly respond to the order. People often do not understand storm surge. They are focused on the category of the hurricane and the wind speed, but not the storm surge. People often do not know if they are located in storm surge areas and are at higher risk for flooding and should evacuate. Others may evacuate unnecessarily and cause additional congestion. Similarly, some local meteorologists may make different predictions on the level and path for a hurricane than the National Hurricane Center. This information will be more critical in future hurricane seasons with large numbers of people still housed in FEMA trailers that are more vulnerable to high winds.

Coordinated, Frequent and Accurate Information to the Public: During an evacuation, the government must recognize that the media can be both a partner or a constraint. One New Orleanian with whom the evaluation team spoke described the impact of local radio stations on his contraflow experiences last summer. As he made his way from New Orleans to Houston before Katrina's landfall, he praised the Baton Rouge radio stations that provided rush hour traffic updates even though it was the weekend. Although he was moving slowly, he and his family knew what was happening in terms of traffic flow.[36]

However, when he attempted to leave Houston for Rita, the local radio stations reported on the problems but did not provide much usable information. He eventually returned to his temporary home in Houston to ride out the storm. While this is only one experience out of millions, it does show that even when local, State, and Federal officials do everything within their means to provide information to the public, the government is also reliant on outside sources, such as the media, to act responsibly.

Cultural Differences: Effective communication is not limited to ensuring people receive the information. Disseminators of public information must also be aware of different cultural groups in a community and their norms for responding to emergencies. For example, when it comes to evacuation, many people who are from an island, like those in the Caribbean, are used to seeking higher ground when a big storm comes--there simply is no where else to go. However, once they move to the mainland, this evacuation strategy may not fall into line with what is the best course of action for their new community or home.

Best Practices

The Terrebonne Parish Readiness and Assistance Coalition (TRAC) was born out of a call to action in response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992. As this community pulled together to help rebuild and raise homes for those in need, the founders of TRAC, 28 community organizations including emergency management, religious groups and hospitals, partnered to prepare and educate area residents. Ninety percent of the Parish is wetlands or covered by open water. Many of the people in the area live in poverty and have language barriers. Today, TRAC serves 21 parishes throughout southern Louisiana through a comprehensive public education campaign that includes print, television, radio, Web, and personal education and outreach. Updated in 2005 (prior to Hurricane Katrina), each part of the campaign reminds Louisiana residents that they must be prepared for hurricanes and corresponding evacuations. Much of the information that TRAC provides it residents could be used as baseline information for other disasters and by people who live in other parts of the country. It does not differ significantly from publications like FEMA's Are You Ready? What TRAC does is convey the risk associated with hurricanes in the context of Louisianans' geography and attitudes. This includes describing the long history of devastation and destruction of hurricanes in the State, including the storm Chenier Caminanda of October 1893 and Betsy in September 1965. TRAC also recognizes the geographic changes of Louisiana in recent years, explaining to residents that the Gulf is much closer to them and their homes than it was in the past. The combination of these elements into TRAC's campaign drives home the message that many of the things that make Louisiana unique in a positive way, also put it at increased risk.

To educate residents on hurricane preparation, public and private entities have developed information materials. As an example, Louisiana's "Make a Plan Campaign" denotes personal responsibility and education. In addition, DHS' Ready.gov tells people how to make emergency plans and kits, and local Red Cross chapters administer education campaigns to educate the public. During a storm, information is conveyed through various sources of media. Louisiana communicates hurricane information differently depending on the parish in which one resides. Some notification will occur over radio, television, an Emergency Information Line, and on roadside messaging machines. Additionally, some parishes go street to street with megaphones announcing evacuation information to its residents. Printed information is currently available in English, and the State and parishes are working on additional translated information and classes in Spanish and Vietnamese.

Local and State governments are also utilizing existing resources, like 311, 211, and 511 information systems, to provide information to residents before, during, and after disasters. Miami-Dade County 311 service operators are trained to provide up-to-date information on a wide variety of issues ranging from standing evacuations to the areas that are under boil water orders. While waiting to speak to an operator, residents listen to a recording informing them about preparedness information and joining the local Citizen Corps and Community Emergency Response Team (CERT). The State of Texas is launching a new 211 service on May 1, 2006, that will allow residents and visitors to call in if they need a ride or other assistance with an evacuation. Florida's 511 travel information telephone service allows the State DOT to provide information about current traffic and travel conditions to callers. In addition, the 511 system can be used to provide area-wide alerts, warnings or emergency information to all callers.

During the 2005 Hurricane Season, the affected States coordinated messages across State boundaries so that motorists would know about closures, other travel restrictions, and detours where reasonable alternatives were available. For example, signs in Texas alerted motorists to closures in Louisiana. Alabama deployed portable dynamic message signs near Mobile, Montgomery, and Birmingham to alert motorists to closures and restrictions along the Gulf Coast highways into Mississippi.

Evacuation of People with Special Needs

A key population to address in evacuation planning and implementation is people with special needs. In Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, people with special needs often were overlooked during the evacuation process. Special needs populations should be clearly defined to ensure that these populations are included and addressed in the plans. For this report, people with special needs are defined as people who are elderly, people with disabilities and other medical conditions, people with limited English proficiency, people with hearing and sight impairments, people who are in institutions, and people without access to private vehicles. Appropriate planning, coordination, and resources should be included in evacuation planning because the special needs population may need accessible transportation, medical equipment and medicine, and other accommodations that will allow for a smooth evacuation process.

Current Guidelines and Practices

The NRP addresses people with special needs throughout the plan. Under ESF-6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services, the American Red Cross and FEMA are to assist evacuees and people with special needs. For example, the American Red Cross and FEMA are to coordinate and identify individuals with special needs within the impacted area including the elderly, people with disabilities, and people communicating in languages other than English including sign language.[37] Also, the NRP refers to the use of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), which can be activated by the DHS to assist in medical response and patient evacuations beyond the care provided under ESF-6 for Mass Care. NDMS is a partnership among the DOD, the DHS, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The DHS is responsible for the medical response, DOD is responsible for patient evacuation from the air fields to participating NDMS Federal Coordination Centers and Medical Treatment Facilities, and VA is responsible for leading the definitive care. The VA set up facilities to prepare for Hurricane Rita in September 2005. Community clinics were secured in Galveston and Texas City and the VA sent staff to weather out the storm and assist in providing care for critically ill patients in selected hospitals.[38]

In addition, the current American Red Cross policy is that only service animals to assist people with disabilities such as seeing eye dogs are accepted in American Red Cross shelters. Pets are not currently accepted due to hygiene and sanitation concerns. The American Red Cross is working with the Humane Society to develop facilities close to human shelters to shelter pets.

The SLG 101 provides detail on requirements to accommodate special needs populations in State and local emergency operations plans. Chapter 2 in the SLG 101 on planning, specifies that emergency managers' operations plans should identify the special needs groups (e.g., people with limited English proficiency, the elderly, or people with disabilities) and where they are concentrated (especially in facilities such as nursing homes).

There are both public and private requirements that hospitals and nursing homes have emergency operations plans. The recent GAO report on nursing home and hospital evacuations during Hurricane Katrina notes that, "The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid require hospitals and nursing homes that receive Medicare and Medicaid payments to maintain emergency operations plans."  In addition, the GAO report noted that "the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations requires that hospitals and nursing homes it accredits to maintain emergency operations plans that include processes for evacuations."

State and local corrections facilities are responsible for the health and safety of their populations. Under State and local requirements, these facilities establish emergency evacuation plans and procedures. These plans usually focus on localized emergencies such as fire, rather than mass evacuations in which the entire facility must be evacuated.

Assessment of Current Plans

The evaluation questions developed and used for the review of the evacuation plans focused on how well these plans addressed the special needs population. These criteria are shown in Table 4-5.

Table 4-5: Evacuation of People with Special Needs Questions and Assessment Results

Evacuation of People with Special Needs
Assessment	Question
	N1	Does the plan describe provisions for evacuating special needs populations including those in assisted living facilities, hospitals, and those living independently (e.g., people with physical, mental, cognitive, and developmental disabilities)?
	N2	Does the plan describe provisions for evacuating other special needs populations (e.g., people in schools, day centers, mobile home parks, prisons and detention centers as well as, people that do not speak English or who are tourists, seasonal workers, or homeless)?

Figure 4-6 shows the assessment ratings for the special needs key element, with breakouts provided for its two questions--identify requirements and distinct populations.

Figure 4-6: Evacuation of People with Special Needs Assessment Ratings

The first question was used to examine whether the plans describe the means to evacuate people with disabilities. This includes plans that address people with disabilities that are in residential facilities or institutions such as nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and hospitals, as well as people with disabilities who live independently. People with special needs in an evacuation under this question include people who have physical, mental, cognitive, and developmental disabilities.

The second question was to identify whether the plans describe provisions for people with special needs other than disabilities that may need additional assistance in an evacuation. This includes people in schools, day care centers, prisons and detention centers, and drug treatment centers. It also includes people with limited English proficiency and people who are transient such as tourists, seasonal workers, and the homeless.

Overall for the first question, plans were rated as effective. Nursing homes, hospitals, and other institutions caring for disabled persons generally have evacuation plans that account for the unique needs of persons in those institutions. They have arrangements with transportation providers to evacuate residents and have plans for caring for those persons until they can be returned to the institution. Coordination of evacuation plans among the various hospitals, nursing home, and other institutions needs to be improved to assure that sufficient transportation and sheltering resources are available in the case of a mass evacuation. Coordination also needs to be improved between these plans and overall State and local evacuation plans. State and local officials should be aware of the hospital and nursing home evacuation plans to allow for coordination of supplies and other needs.

The GAO report on nursing homes also found that hospital and nursing home administrators are the key decision makers on patient evacuation. Although State and local governments can order evacuations, health care facilities are exempt and evacuate only if necessary. Issues such as the availability of a receiving facility; trained staff; and resources including food, water, electricity, and medicine; transportation; and communication systems are deciding factors for administrators on whether or not to evacuate. In addition, the nursing home must assess the risks of subjecting a medically frail person to the stress of an evacuation. During Hurricane Katrina, the destruction of communications systems left hospital and nursing home administrators unable to receive basic information, such as when assistance would arrive.[39]

While basic plans for evacuating sick and disabled persons in hospitals, nursing homes, and other institutions are generally effective, plans for evacuating disabled persons who are living independently are not as good. Identifying where these persons live is a challenge, and most plans are not specific on how they will meet the unique transportation and sheltering needs of these individuals.

Special needs registries were mentioned in many of the State and local plans. One county mentioned a special needs registry, but did not include relevant documents or information to support the registry. The Alachua County, Florida plan reports that 450 special needs clients have pre-registered with the Emergency Management Office in order to ensure they will be evacuated during a catastrophic emergency. However, there are thousands of other people with special needs who are not registered. Their plan also includes three facilities that are already designated to serve as special needs shelters. In a recent presentation, Louisiana officials provided a plan to provide phone line registry for people with special needs. The presentation defined people with special needs as people with medical (including physical and mental) disabilities, people with no transportation, and transients. People can call a 311 information hotline giving their contact information, number of individuals needing to evacuate, and the special needs category (if applicable). Operators create a case file for the registrant and forward it for input into the database, which is updated weekly. Afterwards, a postcard is sent to the registrant including how and where to access transportation, procedures for calling back with information updates, and a supply list on what they can bring and what is prohibited. This database informs city planners with population information for the registered people with special needs[40].

For the second question on evacuating populations with other special needs, plans were rated as only partially effective. State plans reviewed have similar ways of addressing people with special needs. The plans generally address the issue of evacuating special needs groups, but most do not have detailed information on how to evacuate them, the different requirements of various special needs groups, or the additional resources that would be needed. Also, State plans have various definitions of the special needs population; some plans include one group and leave out other groups. A clear definition of the special needs population should be developed and used at the Federal, State, and local level, so that all populations will be included in evacuation plans. Mississippi and Florida have developed such systems, although they have differences in the groups they include. The needs of people with low English proficiency generally are not adequately addressed in most plans. Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita showed that language barriers in the evacuation messages were a problem, the Gulf States are revising and/or expanding their plans and procedures to address communicating evacuation information in multiple languages to meet the needs of a growing diverse population.

The Jefferson Davis Parish plan in Louisiana details the role of the transportation coordinator as a person who ensures incarcerated people have transportation. The plan also delineates law enforcement to assist in evacuating incarcerated inmates and dictates that the Parish agency responsible for emergency preparedness will coordinate the identification of non-English speaking persons. The plan for LaFourche Parish in Louisiana states that the school board is responsible for developing and exercising a student evacuation plan and the transportation officer is responsible for coordinating transport for school students and for children in day care centers. The school services officer evacuates and closes schools, and coordinates the use of school buses and drivers to support the overall evacuation effort.

Lessons Learned from Recent Evacuations

People with Low English Proficiency: The article from the Gulfport, Mississippi, Sun Herald Newspaper, "Latinos Hope Next Warning Comes in Spanish,"[41] describes the minimal disaster response efforts to help evacuate the Spanish-speaking community.  A recent report from the National Council of La Raza cited many difficulties and delays in finding Red Cross volunteers who could speak Spanish. In response, the American Red Cross launched its first Spanish-language web site, and is actively hiring Latino volunteers and board members. "The disaster response--both public and private-- was a disaster for Latinos and other communities of color,' said Janet Murgulia, president of the National Council of Raza…" For two days as Hurricane Katrina's landfall loomed, Victoria Cintra, Director of the Mississippi Immigrants Rights Alliance, begged the television stations in the Gulfport area to let her broadcast evacuation messages in Spanish. The station broadcast Cintra's message only hours before landfall--perhaps too late for those within the broadcast area to evacuate to safety.

People without Private Vehicles or Other Means of Transportation: This group is not addressed in plans as frequently as other special needs populations. During evacuations most people without personal vehicles carpool with neighbors, family or friends or, if possible, find other means of transportation. During Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana churches implemented Operation Brother's Keeper, a program to help evacuate those who lacked transportation. The program is a pilot initiative that encourages faith-based congregations in the New Orleans area to match "empty seats" among their parishioners who own vehicles with those who do not. The long-term goal of the program is to alleviate some of the pressures on local public transit services during an evacuation. Although only a pilot program, Operation Brother's Keeper evacuated 60 percent of Jefferson Parish's population that fell into this group.[42]

Operations

The operations element in evacuation is the mobilization of resources to support the evacuation and implementation of the plan once an evacuation order is given. Coordination of the activities that agencies and organizations are responsible for during the evacuation is complex. The plans to manage the evacuation once it is underway must ensure the availability of public and private transport modes as well as the vehicles, drivers or operators, maintenance, fuel, security, and clear safe routes. The role of operations is to monitor the evacuation, manage the resources, and make adjustments in the application of those resources as the needs and conditions change.

Managing traffic along evacuation routes involves monitoring conditions in real time and having the capabilities and resources to adjust traffic operational strategies to optimize throughput of evacuees. Traffic control strategies may entail traffic signal control timings that maximize traffic flow along evacuation corridors or using traveler information systems to allow evacuees to choose the best available routes or modes.

Responsibility for operations during evacuation ranges from the local parish or county to the State and Federal levels, depending on the scale of the evacuation. Often initiated at the local parish or county level, operations can be escalated to the State and Federal levels if the magnitude of an evacuation overwhelms the local capabilities and resources available.

Current Guidelines and Practices

In the NRP, the command structure, ESF-1 responsibilities, and ICS provide the operational structure for Federal participation in a mass evacuation. SLG 101 provides guidance to State and local emergency managers on operational factors in the evacuation annex and the hazard-unique annex on hurricanes. For example, SLG 101 calls for emergency managers to prepare an inventory of vehicle resources (public and private buses, public works trucks, commercial bus companies, trucking companies, truck rental companies, rail services, marine/ferry, air services, and ambulance services). It also recognizes the importance of directing and controlling traffic during emergency operations; assisting in the evacuation of people at risk in and around the emergency scene; and controlling access to the scene of the emergency or area that has been evacuated. Both the NRP and SLG 101 recommend training and exercises to test and improve plans; exercises are an important tool to find and fill gaps and shortcomings in written plans before an actual event.

Assessment of Current Plans

The assessment of the operational elements of evacuation plans for the Gulf Coast states is based on four questions. These criteria and rankings for the plans that were reviewed are summarized in Table 4-6.

Table 4-6: Operations Questions and Assessment Results

Operations
Assessment	Question
	O1	Does the plan include provisions to ensure availability of public and commercial transport modes and necessary transport operators?
	O2	Does the plan describe the safe and practical transportation modes that will be used to move evacuees that cannot transport themselves (other than special needs populations)?
	O3	Does the plan identify evacuation routes?
	O4	Does the plan address the use of contraflow measures?

Figure 4-7 shows the assessment ratings for the operations key element, with breakouts provided for its four questions--all modes, transportation alternatives, evacuation routes, and contraflow.

Figure 4-7: Operations Assessment Ratings

The first question assessed whether the plans included provisions to monitor evacuation operations of motorized transport, rail, air, water, and other modes of transportation to determine the adequacy of available resources. It also assessed whether the plans addressed contingency plans for obtaining additional evacuee transport vehicles, as needed. Another aspect assessed is how well the plans provided for coordination among jurisdictions to prevent over-tasking of transportation resources, particularly where neighboring jurisdictions also require support from the same resource provider. This question also looked at whether the plans addressed coordination with the next higher level of government (local to State, and State to Federal) to help fulfill unmet transportation resource needs to support evacuations. Lastly, this question evaluated how effectively the plans addressed the use of standby contracts with motor coach companies, paratransit providers, ambulance companies, railroads, air carriers, etc. to obtain drivers and vehicles to fill identified transportation shortfalls.

The second question focused on assessing how well the plans addressed coordination with the agencies and organizations that are tasked to provide transportation resources. Specifically, it looked at whether the plans provisioned for the use of public transit vehicles, school buses, paratransit vehicles, non-government agency vehicles such as church buses, and volunteer group vehicles as alternative transportation options. In addition, the question examined whether the plans included provisions for identifying accommodations for the transport of luggage, etc., and how evacuees are informed about any restrictions or limitations for transportation. Lastly, this question reviewed whether the plans addressed provisions for transporting evacuees to pick-up points and staging areas.

The third question assessed whether the plans required evacuation routes to be designated, marked, and communicated to the public. It also looked at whether the plans addressed the safety of evacuation routes (roads, bridges, railways, waterways, airstrips, etc.). Another important aspect focused on whether the plans identified any provisions to monitor traffic conditions on the evacuation routes and to make operational adjustments as appropriate to maximize evacuation throughput. The assessment also checked if the plans required that critical operational changes be communicated to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the public. This question also considered whether the plans identified provisions to control access to evacuation routes and manage traffic flow. In this context, the question evaluated how well the plans addressed strategies and responsibilities for maintaining evacuation route capacity, especially with regard to work zones, toll collection, and accidents/incidents. This question also checked whether the plans identified a system for notifying and coordinating with neighboring jurisdictions about what routes will be used and when. Another important aspect is whether the plans addressed strategies and responsibilities for providing food, water, restrooms, fueling stations, and rest stations along the evacuation routes. Lastly, the assessment checked whether the plans included any lists of resources that would support the evacuation routes.

The fourth and final question within this key element focused on contraflow-related aspects. Specifically, the assessment first looked for any specific contraflow plans that have been developed and coordinated with all affected parties. The evaluation examined whether the contraflow plans addressed any strategies for emergency responders, transit vehicles, and other essential equipment to move inbound against the predominant outbound flow. The review assessed how well the plans addressed communicating information to the public about the contraflow measures and the beginning and ending times for contraflow operations. The review also looked to see whether the plans identified a system for communicating and coordinating contraflow operations with neighboring jurisdictions. Lastly, the assessment checked whether the plans indicated that the contraflow plans have been tested in an exercise, drill, or a real evacuation.

With regards to ensuring availability of public and private transport modes and necessary transport operators, overall, the plans were rated as effective. Nearly two-thirds of the plans reviewed fared well with respect to addressing provisions for monitoring the various modes of transportation to be used during an evacuation, as well as contingency arrangements necessary for obtaining transportation vehicles to help evacuate people that need transportation assistance. While most plans provide enough details about coordination with the next higher level of government, most did not cover the aspect of coordination with neighboring jurisdictions that may compete for common resources. In addition, limited information is provided in the plans addressing the use of standby contracts with private motor coach companies, paratransit providers, ambulance companies, railroads, and air carriers.

The majority of the plans effectively addressed coordination with transportation resource providers. While most plans for urban areas included transit buses, many local plans rely on school buses to provide transportation for those without personal vehicles. A few plans mentioned the use of school buses only in the context of identifying or helping the special needs population at hospitals and nursing homes. While some plans did address the use of non-government agency vehicles such as church buses, many plans did not since community and faith-based organizations may be utilizing their limited resources to transport their membership to safety during evacuations or they may not have access to those resources. Most plans did not identify any restrictions or limitations on what evacuees can bring aboard the public transportation vehicles. Nearly two-thirds of the plans addressed the designation of pick-up points or staging areas for transportation-dependent evacuees, but most did not address provisions for transporting evacuees to the designated pick-up points or staging areas.

Overall, the plans were rated effective with respect to evacuation routes. The evacuation routes are generally identified and illustrated within the plans and often posted on agencies' Web sites, and most jurisdictions provide a pamphlet or flyer for public distribution. However, the plans did not explicitly require evacuation routes to be marked. Some of the plans address the safety of routes (roads and bridges) but not other modes of transportation. Nearly two-thirds of the plans referred to the aspect of monitoring traffic conditions on the evacuation routes, but most did not include any provisions for making operational adjustments (based on monitored traffic conditions) as appropriate to maximize throughput. Nearly two-thirds of the plans require that critical operational changes be communicated to the EOC and the public. The majority of the plans addressed evacuation routes access control, but many of them did not include provisions to enhance traffic flow on designated routes. The responsibilities to ensure that evacuation routes function at maximum capacity are generally addressed in the plans, but no details on specific strategies to achieve this are included. The plans generally addressed coordination with neighboring jurisdictions with regard to the usage of routes for evacuation. However, sustained inter-jurisdictional coordination between at-risk and "host" jurisdictions along or near the evacuation corridors was not addressed in any detail. Although the plans generally identified the need to provide food, water, restroom facilities, and fuel along evacuation routes, they did not address strategies and responsibilities for providing these services. Also, plans generally did not identify other service needs that may apply specifically to special needs populations, such as meeting the needs of service animals. Finally, most plans did not address a region-wide approach to evacuation and did not identify any listing of resources to provide support to evacuees along the evacuation routes.

With respect to contraflow, Alabama uses a detailed contraflow plan with itemized checklists, alternate routes, and detailed charts laying out operational strategies. Florida's contraflow plan, which is the responsibility of the Florida Highway Patrol, addresses seven major highways and suspends toll collections during evacuations. Unlike Alabama's contraflow plan, Florida has never implemented its plan. The other Gulf Coast States also have developed and executed contraflow plans. Most local plans did not refer to these State-level contraflow plans. Although contraflow operations are implemented and managed at the State level, it is important for local plans to incorporate information pertaining to contraflow operations in their plans, since contraflow route access begins, passes through, and terminates in local jurisdictions, affecting local transportation operations. Therefore, it is not evident from the plan reviews whether the contraflow strategies were developed and coordinated with the local jurisdictions. In addition, most contraflow plans did not address strategies for inbound emergency services traffic, communicating contraflow operations information to the public, and coordinating contraflow operations with neighboring jurisdictions, as well as their verification and validation. So even though the states had contraflow plans, this question is rated overall as marginally effective.

Lessons Learned from Recent Evacuations

Evacuation of People without Personal Vehicles: Most states and local plans did well in assigning responsibilities within the agencies and organizations responsible for operations. However, alternate modes of transport in evacuation operations other than private vehicles were poorly addressed in some jurisdictions. Tens of thousands of people were stranded after Hurricane Katrina. Because some local jurisdictions had not made plans for other modes, trained their staff, designated staging areas, or prepared the public ahead of time, they were sometimes unable to effectively use the buses or trains provided through the ESF-1 program. There will be more people on the Gulf Coast who do not have transportation, which means that jurisdictions will need to use more buses, perhaps from more school systems or private providers farther away, and thus will have to put the plans in motion earlier.

Effective Contracting of Transportation Resources: Following Hurricane Katrina, Clay County, Florida, reviewed the nursing home emergency plans and discovered that they all had the same transportation vendor. Realizing the potential for a shortage, a directive was issued to require each nursing home to identify a secondary transportation provider. Pinellas County, Florida, solves the potential problem of too much demand for transportation resources by providing transit and school buses as well as ambulances to its facilities.

As part of its preparations for the 2006 hurricane season, the State of Texas has signed agreements with out-of-state bus companies to ensure that 1,100 additional buses are available to the State to supplement the resources already procured at the State and local level. State officials selected bus companies that were not already contracted to provide emergency transportation for other States in the Gulf Coast region to ensure that the buses would be available for use in Texas.

En Route Services During Evacuation: During the 2005 hurricane season evacuations in Florida and Texas, the need for services along evacuation routes became more evident. One of the primary resources needed by evacuees was fuel. In Florida, the Road Ranger service patrol used to assist motorists with daily incidents along major roadways was overwhelmed by evacuees seeking fuel from the limited supplies that they carry on their trucks. During Hurricane Rita, so many people evacuated in Texas that not only did they need fuel, but also water, ice, restrooms and medical services due to the long time people were in traffic during the evacuation.

As a result of these experiences, both Florida and Texas are updating their plans to provide better en route services to evacuees. Specifically, in Governor Perry's Executive Order RP57 in Texas, he directed "the Texas Department of Transportation to coordinate with the Texas Oil and Gas Association and other industry partners to develop a plan to address fuel availability along major evacuation routes and establish a fuel operations function in the State Operations Center to coordinate the distribution of fuel prior to and during evacuations" (see Appendix G for the full text).

In addition, during the meeting with State officials in Texas as part of this project, they indicated that they are also working on a plan for "aid stations" on evacuation routes to provide not only fuel but also other essential services such as water, ice, restrooms, and emergency medical services along primary evacuation routes.

Filling Up Before the Storm Applies to Government Assets as Well: Throughout the Gulf States, governments learned that in the presence of market disruptions to the fuel supply, the need to conserve and protect fuel assets for government vehicles and generators is important. Texas State officials met with industry representatives, and they agreed to form a fuel operations group as part of the private sector response. The private sector has taken on the responsibility to get the fuel storage tanks at gasoline stations filled up 92 hours before the storm to ensure an adequate supply.[43] During Katrina, one Mississippi county Emergency Manager had the foresight to coordinate with his colleagues in the school system to top off the tanks at the school bus farm, and to locate a generator at the farm for the exclusive use of emergency vehicles.[44]

Best Practices

Behind every successful evacuation is a continual improvement process through which plans are modified based on lessons learned in exercises and experiences in prior evacuations. The State of Alabama's Department of Transportation (ALDOT) developed its contraflow plan for Interstate 65 (I-65) several years ago, including a step-by-step checklist that ALDOT, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (ADPS), Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA), and other stakeholders utilize to implement the plan. Each year, ALDOT, ADPS, and AEMA exercise this plan prior to hurricane season to test its systems and serve as a refresher for those who have responsibilities if and when the plan is implemented.  In addition, Alabama officials have worked to incorporate the lessons learned and identify additional gaps that need to be addressed from implementing the plan in advance of the landfalls of Hurricanes Ivan and Dennis.

Sheltering

Sheltering evacuees is a major concern of government officials and emergency responders prior to, during, and after a catastrophe. Although the majority of evacuees will stay with family, friends, or at hotels/motels rather than at public shelters, the availability of public shelters is critical to the success of an evacuation. Even those who have other places to stay often find that they must spend the night in shelters while en route to their final destinations because hotels/motels along evacuation routes are full and they must rest during their trip. Public shelters are particularly important for some special needs groups including low income households that cannot afford alternative temporary housing. Just as various special needs groups have different transportation requirements, they also have different sheltering requirements that must be anticipated and planned for in advance of an evacuation.

An important issue that came to light during evacuations associated with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is the need for public transportation operators to know where they are going to take evacuees and for officials in these locations to be prepared to accept the evacuees. Transportation operators cannot assume that evacuees can be dropped off anywhere, especially railroads that carry many more passengers than individual buses.

This analysis assessed sheltering plans in the Gulf Coast region, as well as plans in the neighboring States of Oklahoma, Georgia, and Tennessee. In addition, Arkansas provided its response to the Nationwide Plan Review for DHS. These States are among those that can expect to receive large numbers of evacuees when a catastrophic incident requires evacuation from the Gulf Coast States.

Current Guidelines and Practices

Numerous provisions in SLG 101 directly relate to sheltering. SLG 101 recommends mutual-aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions for mass care staff and for facilities to shelter evacuees. This guidance also addresses the need to notify evacuees, emergency managers, and shelter operators about alternate shelter locations and to provide updates on the availability of space at each shelter. The goal is to ensure that emergency managers and evacuees know the location and availability of shelters outside the risk area. SLG 101 also addresses provisions for the care of animals and recommends specific responsibilities that evacuation coordinators, public information officers, the Animal Care and Control Agency, and mass care coordinators have for ensuring the evacuation, sheltering, care, and protection of all animals.

Assessment of Current Plans

A comprehensive evacuation plan not only identifies locations of designated shelters, but also addresses transportation of evacuees to shelter locations, attending to the special needs of evacuees, establishment of mutual aid agreements across local governments and States to maximize shelter capacity, and care and protection of animals. In order to achieve greater community response to and compliance with evacuations, it is important that sheltering needs be adequately addressed. Four main questions were used to assess the extent to which State and local evacuation plans address essential sheltering considerations. The results of the plan assessments are summarized in Table 4-7. Some discussion of host State shelter plans is included at the end of this section.

Table 4-7: Sheltering Questions and Assessment Results

Sheltering Considerations
Assessment	Question
	S1	Does the plan require the establishment of mutual aid agreements with other jurisdictions to formalize access to and use of shelters?
	S2	Does the plan include provisions for informing shelter operations and evacuees about the locations of public shelters outside of the evacuation area and their status (i.e., full, accepting evacuees, accepting evacuees with pets, special needs shelters, etc.)?
	S3	Does the plan address strategies and responsibilities for shelter operations?
	S4	Does the plan include provisions for the care and protection of animals?

Figure 4-8 shows the assessment ratings for the sheltering key element, with breakouts provided for its four questions--mutual aid, availability and status, accountability, and animals.

Figure 4-8: Sheltering Assessment Ratings

The first question assessed whether plans include mutual-aid agreements with other jurisdictions to formalize access to and use of shelters. The plans were further analyzed to determine whether they include the capacity of available space at various shelters and a process for notification and coordination with external entities for shelter activation and operations.

The second question assessed how the location and status of shelters outside the evacuation area is communicated to shelter operators and evacuees. Plans were evaluated to see whether they addressed how frequently shelter information should be updated, how information on the status of public and non-public shelters would be collected and communicated to evacuees, how shelter operators would be informed about the location and status of alternate shelter sites, and how shelter locations would be marked.

The third question judged plans on the extent to which they addressed strategies and responsibilities for shelter operations. Plans were examined to see whether they contained specific requirements that shelters provide food, water, sanitation, first aid and mental support, sufficient security, disaster welfare information, and resources for special needs populations.

The fourth question assessed whether plans contained provisions for the care and protection of animals. Such provisions include policies for sheltering pets, a communication process to inform the public of locations of shelters accepting pets, and measures to identify and evacuate other animals, including those on farms and in kennels or zoos.

Analysis of the Gulf Coast region's plans indicates that they address sheltering issues in general, but many provide little specific information on issues included in the evaluation questions. Overall, the plans were rated as effective or partially effective on each of the four questions reviewed. Some jurisdictions only identify locations of public shelters that may provide housing to evacuees, but do not address other factors such as transportation to shelters and the services at the shelters for people with special needs.

The majority of plans have established mutual-aid agreements with other jurisdictions, but it is often challenging to obtain information, including shelter locations and status updates, from other jurisdictions or agencies once an evacuation is underway. Therefore, while mutual-aid agreements have been established, the efficacy of such agreements may be tenuous during mass evacuations.

While most plans account for sufficient sheltering space to house large numbers of evacuees, they did not provide a worst-case scenario estimate of the number of evacuees who might require shelter, nor did they specify the capacities of public shelter spaces. Furthermore, the few plans that did provide shelter capacities, provided estimates that accounted for less than 10 percent of the area's vulnerable population. Clearly, it is critical for plans to be revised to reflect estimates that take worst-case evacuation scenarios into account.

The sheltering plans generally do not specifically include plans for catastrophic incidents and do not have contingency plans and strategies to adjust their plans when shelter needs change. State and local plans generally rely on local chapters of the American Red Cross, the lead organization responsible for ESF-6 functions (Mass Care), and other volunteer groups to identify and staff emergency shelters. However, some note coordination and communication problems with these volunteer groups and that shelter locations, capacity, and capabilities may be changed by a volunteer group without notifying the State's EOC. Volunteer organizations are relied upon to identify and manage shelter resources. Greater coordination and communication with the sheltering organizations must be fostered to ensure that shelters are adequately equipped to manage all types of evacuation populations. Recently, Governor Riley requested direct reimbursement for equipping shelters that will be run by the State of Alabama to help fill the gaps that volunteer organizations, including the American Red Cross, may have.

Most of the plans included provisions for keeping shelter operators informed on the location and status of alternate shelters. However, most plans lacked specific provisions for communicating timely status updates and locations of public shelters outside the evacuation area to evacuees. Some plans indicate that such information will be communicated, but do not describe how the information will be communicated. Where the means of communications are noted, they typically include radio, television, and/or Web sites. Television and Internet access generally would not be available to evacuees who are on the road. Contingency plans are needed to manage information sharing in a major disaster. Mississippi reported that after Hurricane Katrina, there were widespread and prolonged power outages that required emergency operations staff to pass out brochures at public gathering places on the locations and status of shelters as other traditional means to communicate were unavailable.

Few of the plans address how to acquire updates on or inform the public about the availability of space in non-public shelters, such as hotels. Additionally, few of the plans address marking shelters. While some plans require that evacuation routes be marked, shelters often are not located along those evacuation routes. Overall, plans need to include provisions for communicating shelter availability status updates and shelter locations to the public and for marking the routes and physical locations of shelters.

Sheltering provisions for special needs populations are discussed in the majority of plans. Several jurisdictions have taken the lead in including such provisions, and some are in the process of rewriting plans to broaden the definition of special needs to include other groups, such as those who are economically disadvantaged. Other plans identify the need to have large generators in special need shelters, since medical equipment and essential climate control systems require power. While many plans discuss special needs populations and are in the process of broadening the definition, provisions for sheltering of special needs populations were not discussed in any of the plans. Refuges of last resort are mentioned in nearly half the plans, but without any detail.

Plans generally do not include provisions for sheltering pets and service animals. The American Red Cross reports that it cannot accept pets in shelters because of State health and safety regulations. They do allow service animals that assist people with disabilities in American Red Cross shelters. Those plans that do mention care of pets, only provide broad guidance for accommodating them. They do not provide specific guidance for service animals that aid people who are visually and hearing impaired. In Collier County, Florida, the evacuation plan contains extensive details on caring for pets and farm and wild animals prior to, during, and after evacuations. Specifically, the plan contains an annex that addresses pets and animals by providing information to the general public about hotels that accept pets within the County as well as throughout the State, and picking up animals from emergency shelters. It also identifies multiple mutual-aid agreements for the sheltering of pets.

There were thousands of household pets that were sheltered during Hurricane Rita as part of the evacuation. The significant number of animals requiring shelter and the number of evacuees who are pet owners emphasizes the need for plans to include provisions for animals and eliminate situations where owners must choose between evacuating to safety and staying with their pets in hazardous conditions. Some jurisdictions are considering options such as opening pet shelters near or adjacent to human shelters, space for animal cages on evacuation buses when feasible, and a standardized tracking and identification system for pets.

In addition to the five Gulf Coast states, four other neighboring host states were evaluated against questions that focused on the sheltering of evacuees. Georgia, Oklahoma, and Tennessee provided complete plans, and Arkansas provided their DHS National Plan Review response.

The questions used to assess the host states' sheltering plans are derived from questions for the Gulf State evaluations. The factors of greatest concern are keeping shelter information current during the evacuation, and coordination and communication with the impacted States on the timing and status of the evacuation including how long evacuees will require shelter and transportation of evacuees from train, bus, and airports to host shelters.

Several supporting host State attributes are needed for the implementation of a host sheltering plan. Those host State attributes require a plan to provide resource listing and capabilities to support shelter operations (e.g., food, water, sanitation, housing, security, welfare information, first aid and mental health) and trained personnel to support shelter management operations, and the plan must address special needs populations.

In addition, the host State factor attributes require a plan to provide an estimate of the number of evacuees that can be sheltered, the availability of non-public shelter such as hotels, a policy with respect to bringing service animals and pets to shelters and routes to the shelters, and that the shelters are marked.

Generally, the plans do not anticipate supporting evacuations as a host. In fact, one of the plans has several statements such as evacuations "within the boundaries of the State." Furthermore, the plans do not address coordination and communication with the impacted States. The plans do, however, provide for a national response at the direction of the President of the United States, that could include the implementation of sheltering plans and initiatives to support an impacted State. Many of the Gulf Coast State plans evaluated, identified their States as possible hosts for sheltering other communities, counties, and States.

The host State plans did address special needs populations and strategies and responsibilities for shelter operations, including food, water, sanitation, housing, security, welfare information, first aid, and mental health care at their respective shelters.

Lessons Learned from Recent Evacuations

Provisions for Pets: During Hurricane Katrina, many residents did not evacuate because people wanted to take care of their pets and refused to evacuate without them. Plans for evacuating and sheltering people were labeled inadequate because provisions for pets were largely not taken into consideration. However, extra provisions were taken during Hurricane Rita, where pets were allowed to evacuate with their owners and provided with special guidance. Shelter operators in other States are reexamining their policies with respect to accommodating pets.

Sister Cities. Cities throughout Texas are piloting a Sister Cities Program that would designate Austin as Galveston's host, San Antonio's as Corpus Christi's, etc. While these destinations would not be mandatory, it will help strengthen the planning and operations of shelters in these host communities.[46]

Planning Beyond 72 Hours. During most evacuations, shelters are designed to be open 72 hours. In the case of a catastrophe like Katrina, people may need to stay longer because they cannot go home. This poses a challenge for already stretched resources--staff, many of whom are volunteers, need to be relieved, supplies replenished, and services expanded so that evacuees can begin to deal with longer dislocations.[47]

Volunteers: Tens of thousands of volunteers from the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and many religious organizations mobilized volunteers to provide critical sheltering services in the Gulf Coast region and to evacuees across the country. For example, Citizen Corps coordinated volunteer efforts throughout the country, with more than 14,000 Citizen Corps volunteers from all 50 States and the District of Columbia actively involved in response and recovery efforts across America. The Harris County, Texas, Citizen Corps Council brought together an enormous number of volunteers to support the American Red Cross, and staffed evacuation centers throughout Houston. The Council processed over 8,000 volunteers in one day, and an average of 3,500 per day overall. These volunteers allowed for the creation of an actual city (with its own zip code) for nearly 25,000 Louisiana evacuees sheltering in the Houston Reliant Astrodome. They were successful because they had coordinated ahead of time with local businesses and volunteer groups, and because they were familiar with and implemented elements of the ICS.[48] Additionally, more than 300 Arkansas Citizen Corps volunteers assisted over 9,000 evacuees being housed at Fort Chaffee, the National Guard/U.S. Army Reserves Training Center in Sebastian County, in providing care at a medical center where 2,200 evacuees received medical attention in the first 48 hours and managing dining facilities and an off-site donations collection center.[49]

Best Practices

A key component of Florida's State Emergency Response Team (SERT) is its use of GIS technology. One way that SERT uses GIS is to collect and provide information about open and closed shelters throughout the State to responders, government officials, and the public.

The Florida State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) Mapper Program allows the SERT staff to use the GIS to remain current on events as they unfold and obtain information about locations of shelters, logistics areas, and command posts. This program is unique in that it provides for one-site storage and dissemination of emergency management and law-enforcement data to the State and county EOCs, responders in the field who can share this information with the public via variable message boards and other communications channels, as well as to the public website. This allows staff at all levels to make decisions based on the same set of data and the public to be kept well-informed of the evacuation process, including danger areas and evacuation zones and routes.

At the present time, one can access the SEOC Mapper database via http://www.eoconline.org/EM_Live/shelter.nsf to view a list of open and closed shelters, the availability of space at special needs shelters, and other relevant details. The longitude and latitude coordinates of shelters are pre-populated to allow for quicker updating. County officials may choose to input updated data about shelter availability via the Web or by calling the SEOC where the GIS team can enter information directly into the database. This information is updated frequently during a disaster, assisting emergency managers, first responders, and the public in receiving the important information they need about the availability of shelters. The SERT GIS team is working now to implement improvements to the SEOC Mapper database to make the program more user-friendly for emergency managers, first responders, and the public.

Mass Evacuation Training and Exercises

A well-developed training and exercise program is a critical element of overall readiness and preparedness for mass evacuations. Training ensures personnel are prepared for their roles. Exercises test the capabilities and resources of the agencies, and when a number of cooperating agencies and jurisdictions are included, they also test and strengthen working relationships. Training and exercises to test and improve plans for an evacuation from a catastrophic incident are especially important because of the large number of agencies and jurisdictions involved in such an evacuation.

Emergency management agencies need trained people, who have experience working together with colleagues and counterparts in other levels of government prior to a disaster, as a part of emergency response teams. Emergency responders should not meet each other for the first time immediately before, during, or after a major catastrophe. The coordination of the multiple agencies involved is not simple, and the integration of multiple jurisdictions, agencies, States and NGOs is very difficult to practice. Tabletop exercises, seminars and other exercises can be done to help agencies delineate and coordinate responsibilities, and a coordinated exercise program can help prepare planners, responders, and agencies at all levels of government to respond to a disaster of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina. This creates a need to rely on well-trained, capable people that adapt and adjust to the situation in order to get the job done. An effective, integrated exercise and training program enables better preparation and response to large-scale disasters.

NIMS defines the preparedness cycle as "planning, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking action to correct and mitigate." Exercises play an important role in this broad preparedness cycle. Exercises provide opportunities for Federal, State, and local leaders; homeland security officials; and emergency responders to practice and test capabilities that have been built up through an overlapping structure of planning, training, and equipment purchases. Exercises inform preparedness priorities by highlighting potential preparedness shortfalls prior to real incidents. These priorities then become the basis for future funding, training, and equipment purchases, which become the basis for future exercises.

Current Guidelines and Practices

The NRP recognizes the critical importance of training and requires training throughout the plan. The NRP calls for training and exercises for individual managers and staff, as well as for government agencies, the private sector, and the NGOs involved in emergency response. Training is also a function of the ongoing management and maintenance of emergency management plans. The NRP requires training for key positions. The Federal government participates with State and local jurisdictions in exercises that include mass evacuation response.

SLG 101 addresses training in detail and recommends training and exercises that model the planning and operations of an emergency management plan to prepare management and staff to meet their responsibilities. Training helps emergency response personnel to learn their responsibilities and to acquire the skills necessary to perform assigned tasks. Exercising provides a means to validate plans, checklists, and response procedures and to evaluate the skills of response personnel.

A broad range of training and exercise programs are available nationwide from government agencies, associations, and private trainers, and includes much more than just classroom training. Figure 4-8 defines some of the types of training and terms used by the emergency management community. Training and exercises that specifically address catastrophic or mass evacuations are limited. Few of these courses include mass evacuation as an element except for courses directed toward response to incidents near nuclear reactor sites. Many jurisdictions conduct disaster response exercises without including key transportation agencies such as State and local highway departments and/or police departments that would be managing the flow of traffic or setting up contraflow operations. Transit agencies and school bus operators are not often included in the exercises, even though some of the plans of local jurisdictions include these vehicles as resources for an evacuation.

Assessment of Current Plans

In examining State and local plans for training and exercises, plan reviewers looked for evidence of a training and exercise program, and how that was integrated in that jurisdiction. Additionally, reviewers looked for how the plans were updated and improved based upon lessons learned through exercises or after-action reports from actual events. The questions used for the assessment and overall ranking of the State and local plans in the gulf coast region reviewed for this study are listed in Table 4-8.

Table 4-8: Training and Exercises Questions and Assessment Ratings

Mass Evacuation Training and Exercises
Assessment	Question
	T1	Does the plan include provisions for training a volunteer cadre to support shelter management operations, transport of evacuees, and first aid stations along the evacuation routes, etc.?
	T2	Does the plan require periodic reviews and updates of the plan, exercises, and after action reports as part of the planning process?

Figure 4-9 shows the assessment ratings for the training key element, with breakouts provided for its two questions--volunteers and continual improvement.

Figure 4-9: Training and Exercises Assessment Ratings

In a catastrophic incident, emergency response agencies rely on assistance from a range of volunteer groups such as the American Red Cross, public service organizations, and church groups. Volunteer groups provide essential "surge capacity" for emergency response agencies in a catastrophic incident. The assessment also examined whether the plans included provisions for training a volunteer cadre to support shelter management operations, transport of evacuees, and first aid stations along the evacuation routes, and other functions.

State and local jurisdictions in the Gulf Coast region that were reviewed for this study had training and exercise programs for their first responders including police, fire, and emergency medical services, and they were rated as very effective. Most of this training is focused on meeting day-to-day missions for emergency and disaster response in their communities. Very few jurisdictions had training that focused on mass evacuation or on issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries.

All of the States examined for this report indicate a commitment to an exercise, drill, and training program. Alabama conducts or participates in approximately 50 training exercises each year ranging from "table-top," classroom-like discussions to full-scale exercises involving all members of the emergency management community, including Federal, State, and local officials.[50] It is not feasible to test mass evacuation plans through full-scale drills because they would be too disruptive to the public. Several of the States, however, regularly include table-top exercises to test their procedures and processes and include representatives from transportation agencies. Orange County, Florida, has a detailed exercise program, with a system for incorporating lessons learned as needed, which is discussed later in this section.

In addition, there is a critical need to conduct a series of integrated exercises involving Federal, State, and local agencies; NGOs; and other related organizations in the Gulf Coast region to improve the response to the 2005 hurricane season, identify and implement improvements to existing evacuation plans and procedures, and test the improvements prior to the 2006 hurricane season. It is essential that Federal response agencies and the Gulf Coast State and local jurisdictions coordinate their efforts and institute a series of planning events and exercises to identify immediate coordination and preparedness improvements that will have an immediate impact on preparedness. In the spring of 2006, DHS sponsored a Gulf Coast Hurricane Preparedness Exercise series in coordination with the States of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida, in an effort to validate the revised coordination and response plans and improve preparedness, should another catastrophic storm strike during the 2006 hurricane season.

Integrated training opportunities that cross jurisdictional borders (e.g., county, parish, or State) were not referenced in discussion, other than attendance at regional seminars or training conducted by the Federal government. Florida conducts an annual statewide exercise prior to each hurricane season and involves all appropriate State agencies and multiple county and municipal agencies in the area impacted by the training scenario. Integrated training at the State level was not discussed in any detail. This includes Gulf Coast State participation in regional conferences to review hurricane response. All of the Gulf Coast States participated in a recent February 2006 conference in Orlando, Florida, on contraflow operations sponsored by the Florida Department of Transportation. At this conference, that was supported in part by the FHWA, States shared strategies, techniques, and lessons learned.

The questions of having plan updates based on lessons learned were addressed in the written plans, but many of these plans had not been updated in the recent past. Methodologies for incorporating changes to plans based on lessons learned were not observed.

Lessons Learned from Recent Evacuations

Training: Training of key personnel in emergency management agencies is well accepted as an integral part of ensuring readiness for catastrophic incidents. However, the skills and capabilities of personnel assigned to "surge teams" that deploy to assist with on-site support must also be maintained and updated through training and exercises. The after-action report for the ESF-1 program for the 2005 hurricane season found the volunteers from throughout the agency to be important resources to help meet the demands of a catastrophic incident, but that some needed more training in the established ESF-1 and NRP processes.

An integrated training program is needed, in part because of the steep learning curve for complex operations that cross jurisdictional boundaries and involve a regional response that is facilitated by Federal assistance. Additionally, the learning curve required for understanding Federal programs and assistance can be steep, and this knowledge needs to be sustained and maintained.

Incorporating Lessons Learned: After-action reports from agencies involved in mass evacuations, including Federal agencies such as the National Hurricane Center, provide a valuable source of information to improve mass evacuation processes. The DOD's U.S. Northern Command and its components have participated in a number of full-scale exercises where the exercise scenarios were designed to overwhelm local and State assets to evoke a response under the NRP, including the employment of DOD assets. In addition, DOD is preparing a review of its military assistance to civil authorities in response to Hurricane Katrina, which will be another important source of information. The lessons learned from the responses to recent hurricanes (e.g., Katrina, Rita, Charley, Ivan, and Opal) as well as earlier hurricanes (e.g., Camille, Hugo, and Andrew) continue to be valuable. Lessons learned from major exercises such as Hurricane Pam in New Orleans identified evacuation issues for the city. Federal, State, and local agencies should establish processes to ensure findings and lessons learned from after-action reports are addressed and incorporated into procedures and training.

Senior-Level Participation in Training and Exercises: Government training exercises should be sufficiently challenging. In some cases after Hurricane Katrina, it was felt that top officials (from Cabinet-level secretaries and generals to governors and mayors), did not participate in exercises and that these training events did not last long enough.[51] The GAO, in a February 1, 2006 statement, also noted key players are not always involved in drills, the lessons from previous training and exercises are not retained, and the training and exercises are more targeted at terrorist events than natural disasters.[52] Based on exercises and drills, it is possible to learn and exercise a unified command through the ICS. This would allow exercise of these systems, which can greatly assist with major command and control issues, as were seen during Hurricane Katrina. This would allow for more effective and immediate direct support for incident response. The use of simulations or computer-assisted exercises allows for a more robust exercise to assess processes, procedures, and plan implementation and allow key leaders the opportunity to examine issues in a simulated environment.

Logistics Training and Exercises: Logistics will be critical to the success of sheltering for mass evacuations. In Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, private companies such as Wal-Mart and Home Depot were able to deliver large amounts of disaster relief supplies before the Federal government. There is a need to examine the provision of common supplies and services such as fuel, water, food, and transportation and learn from private sector companies that are experts in logistics. This includes the movement of material into and out of the evacuated area and into specific processes that would manage the supply or service cycle. Even in full-scale exercises, logistics is rarely fully addressed. Exercises are an important tool to test current logistics processes and expose potential weaknesses of logistics plans to support mass evacuations.

Best Practices

Training and Exercises: Orange County, Florida, has established an annual exercise program to determine the ability of local governments to respond to emergencies.[53] This training and exercise program, coordinated by the Orange County Office of Emergency Management, is the overall coordinator within Orange County for emergency management training and exercises. County departments and authorities, municipalities, and all other public and private emergency response agencies also bear the responsibility of ensuring that personnel with emergency responsibilities are sufficiently trained. The Orange County CEMP also requires that all agencies take necessary steps to ensure appropriate records are kept reflecting emergency training received by their personnel.