List of Figures
Exactions are used not only by jurisdictions to obtain compensation or avoid expenditures for additional infrastructure costs imposed by new development, they have also been used to protect the public interest from adverse impacts of development on view sheds or public land access. Yet landowners have frequently challenged exactions in court as takings that fail to meet Fifth Amendment requirements. Although courts generally uphold the right of jurisdictions to regulate property through zoning, historic preservation ordinances, and exactions, they have also invalidated some regulations as going too far.
The purpose of this subsection is to review the evolution of Supreme Court rulings on essential nexus and rough proportionality to indicate how jurisdictions can use exactions to protect the public interest while satisfying the court's demands that jurisdictions avoid uncompensated takings. (The Analysis of the Case Law subsection, p. 13, discusses Supreme Court rulings on exactions and their validity.)
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution limits the ability of the government to take private property. Such takings are subject to "due process," must be undertaken for a "public use," and must provide "just compensation" to the owner.[18] Thus, if government were to take private property for a public facility (such as a road, park, or courthouse), it would exercise eminent domain by condemning the property.
During the last hundred years, all levels of government have relied increasingly on economic regulations to satisfy various governmental objectives. Not surprisingly, when government regulations limit the type, intensity, or siting of development, property owners may feel that their ownership rights have been diminished and they might object to this by making a claim that the government has taken their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Such claims are sometimes referred to as "inverse condemnation" because instead of the government going to court to condemn a private property, the property owner must sue the government to show that the government, through regulatory over-reach, has effectively taken the property without providing just compensation.
The judicial record on takings, however, shows considerable deference to the exercise of police powers by local jurisdictions. Many rulings over more than 100 years have made clear that:
[C]laimants generally are not entitled to takings compensation for adhering to generally applicable obligations that advance the public interest,[19] safeguards that prevent owners from using their land in ways harmful to others,[20] or baseline standards for market and social interactions.[21],[22]
The fact that the regulations in each of these cited cases may have diminished the economic value of property or limited future development was not, in itself, a taking. Nonetheless, in 1922 in the case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922),[23] it was recognized that if the protection against physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully enforced, takings must include excessive regulation as well.[24]
In the case of Agins v. City of Tiburon,[25] Dr. and Mrs. Agins (the landowners) acquired five acres of land in Tiburon. Thereafter, a California law was enacted requiring Tiburon to create a general land use plan governing both land use and the development of open land. Tiburon did so and then enacted a zoning ordinance to help implement the plan. The zoning for the five-acre parcel limited use to single-family homes and related accessory buildings. Between one and five homes were allowable for development on the five-acre parcel. Shortly after enactment of the zoning ordinance, Tiburon attempted to acquire the parcel through eminent domain. Tiburon abandoned this effort after one year and reimbursed the landowners for their costs related to that proceeding. The landowners did not file a development plan nor seek development permits. However, the landowners sued on the grounds that the zoning ordinance constituted a "taking without compensation." [26]
The court denied this claim. The court cited Euclid v. Ambler Realty[27] and other cases to show that the proper use of a jurisdiction's police power does not constitute a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. The court found that the attempt to acquire the parcel by eminent domain was irrelevant to this proceeding.
When property owners file a claim that the exercise of police powers constitutes a "taking," courts often cite Euclid v. Amber which is the Supreme Court case that validated zoning law. They also mention Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City.[28] In this case, the Penn Central railroad company hoped to develop the air rights above Grand Central Terminal. Grand Central Terminal had been previously designated as a landmark by New York City. Pursuant to the City's landmarks law, any alterations required approval from the New York City Landmarks Commission. Penn Central submitted two plans to the Landmarks Commission which rejected both plans. In exchange, the Commission offered Penn Central transferable development rights. In other words, Penn Central could sell its development rights to another property owner (in certain designated receiving areas) where these owners could then add that development density to the density already allowed by existing zoning. Penn Central declined this offer and sued New York City for a taking without just compensation.
Of particular importance, in the Penn Central case, the Supreme Court articulated a three-part balancing test for deciding a regulatory taking:
In cases like Penn. Central Transportation Company v New York City and Agins v City of Tiburon, the Supreme Court determined that the burden of proof that a taking occurred was on the property owner plaintiff. Furthermore, the property owner would need to show that almost all practical use of the property has been prohibited in order to meet that burden of proof.[29]
Both the burden of proof and the court's analysis began to shift in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.
In the 1980s, the Nollan family owned an ocean-front property in Ventura County, California. A bungalow on the property had fallen into disrepair. The Nollans filed an application with the California Coastal Commission to demolish the bungalow and replace it with a three-bedroom house. The Commission agreed to approve the request, but only if the Nollans created a legal easement granting public access across their private beach, connecting two public beaches on either side of the Nollans' property. When the Nollans objected, the Commission stated that it was acting to protect the public's legitimate interests in having views of the beach and access to the beach. The Nollans sued the Commission on the grounds that the easement constituted an uncompensated taking. [30]
The court ruled in favor of the Nollans against the California Coastal Commission. The court agreed that the Commission had a legitimate public interest in assuring that the public had views of the beach and access to the beach. However, the court found no connection between these legitimate interests, the Nollans' development activity, and the creation of an easement for people who were already on public beaches to the north and south of the Nollans' property. In other words, there must be an "essential nexus" between the legitimate public interest and the condition imposed upon the property owner to achieve that interest.
In 1986, petitioner Lucas bought two residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island, intending to build single-family homes such as those on the immediately adjacent parcels.[31] At that time, Lucas's lots were not subject to the State's coastal zone building permit requirements. In 1988, however, the state legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, which barred Lucas from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his parcels. He filed suit against the South Caroline Coastal Council, contending that, even though the Act may have been a lawful exercise of the State's police power, the ban on construction deprived him of all "economically viable use" of his property and therefore effected a "taking" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that required the payment of just compensation.[32] The trial court ruled in favor of Lucas. South Carolina appealed and the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled in favor of the State. Lucas appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled in his favor.
For our purposes, the key finding of the court was that the ad hoc balancing tests (such as the one applied in Penn Central) are not necessary in two types of cases: where there is a physical invasion, no matter how small,[33] and "... where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land."[34] In these two types of cases, a taking has occurred categorically and all that remains is to calculate the value of the taking for the purpose of compensating the owner. [35]
Florence Dolan owned a 1.67-acre parcel in the city of Tigard, Oregon. On the eastern portion of the lot was a 9,700-square foot store and a gravel parking lot. The west side of the lot bordered Fanno Creek. Dolan petitioned to increase the size of the store to 17,600 square feet and to pave a parking lot for 39 cars. The proposed use was consistent with the zoning. Periodic flooding occurs along Fanno Creek. Tigard's comprehensive plan prohibits development within the 100-year floodplain and calls for properties within the floodplain to dedicate that area as a "greenway." It also calls for new development to create bicycle paths where possible (consistent with the bicycle plan) or to pay for their creation offsite if necessary.
Tigard accepted the proposed development plan provided that Dolan dedicate land in the floodplain to a greenway (to mitigate additional storm water runoff) and dedicate a 15-foot-wide strip adjacent to the floodplain for a bicycle path (to mitigate additional traffic generated by the store's expansion).[36] Tigard noted that the land dedication constituted 10 percent of the parcel and that it would count toward the 15 percent open space requirement for all parcels already required by zoning.
Dolan appealed for a variance without citing extenuating circumstances. The city denied the variance request and noted that the required dedication was reasonable to mitigate the proposed increase in impervious surface that would contribute to flooding of Fanno Creek. Upon appeal, the city found that the required dedication was reasonable and related to the goals of mitigating flooding and for providing bicycle access to mitigate increased traffic generated by the store's expansion.
The court begins by noting its deference to land use regulation generally and quoting the finding in Agins that "A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests" and does not "den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980)."[37] But then the court distinguishes the "legislative" nature of the land use controls in Agins against the "adjudicative" nature of the conditions applied to Dolan's particular property.[38] Furthermore, the dedication of land (deeding the land to the city) is not a limitation on use but a required divestiture of land.
The court found that there was an essential nexus between the required dedication of land, the legitimate need to reduce or mitigate storm water runoff, and the property owner's action to increase impervious surfaces on the site (by expanding the building's footprint and paving the gravel parking lot). There was also a legitimate interest in using bicycle paths to reduce traffic congestion.
However, the court then went on to "determine whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed development.[39] The court noted conflicting standards in the lower courts, with some courts relying on generalized statements by jurisdictions regarding this relationship and other courts requiring that jurisdictions provide "a very exacting correspondence, described as the "specifi[c] and uniquely attributable" test."[40] The court concluded that the first standard was too lax and insufficient and that the second standard was too strict. It therefore adopted a middle-level test adopted by some state courts seeking jurisdictional findings that the conditions imposed on development bore a "reasonable relationship" between the impact of development and the burden of the required dedication.[41] The court shied away from this language because it thought that "reasonable relationship" sounded too much like (and could be confused with) "rational basis," which is a very lax standard of review. [42]
Therefore, the court chose "rough proportionality" to indicate that a jurisdiction must make an individual determination about proportionality for each burdened property without requiring the jurisdiction to provide exact mathematical proof. And here, the burden of proof rests with the jurisdiction, not the plaintiff. The court justifies this shift by noting that generally applicable legislative regulations should be treated with more deference than property-specific adjudicative determinations.
Koontz owned about 15 acres of undeveloped land in Florida east of Orlando. He wanted to develop about 3.7 acres. Pursuant to Florida's Water Resources Act and the Warren S Henderson Wetlands Protection Act, Koontz needed a permit from the St. Johns River Water Management District, which could impose "such reasonable conditions" on the permit as are "necessary to assure" that construction will "not be harmful to the water resources of the district" and that any damage to wetlands be offset by creating, enhancing, or preserving wetlands elsewhere.[43] Koontz, in his permit application, offered to create a storm water retention pond (to handle runoff from the building and parking lot). Koontz also offered a conservation easement to preclude future development of the remaining 11 acres of the site. Because the 11 acres being offered for preservation were already an existing wetland, the district found it insufficient as mitigation for the wetlands being impaired. The district denied the permit request and proposed two alternatives. Koontz could either:
Actions related to 2.a or 2.b would improve about 50 acres of district-owned wetlands. Koontz filed suit seeking relief under Fla. Stat. §373.617(2), which allows owners to recover monetary damages if a state agency's action is "an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power constituting a taking without just compensation."[44] Koontz contended that the demands were unreasonable pursuant to the Nollan-Dolan standards. [45],[46]
By deciding the case in favor of Koontz, the court expanded Nollan-Dolan in two respects:
Before this case, a property owner was required to exhaust State court remedies before filing a suit in federal court for a violation of the Fifth Amendment. In this recent decision, the Supreme Court removed this requirement, thereby making it easier for property owners to access the Federal court system.
In this subsection of the report, key holdings of the Supreme Court are provided, along with questions and tips to help communities ensure that their exactions and special assessments are valid with respect to these holdings.[47],[48]
The court cases in Nollan, Dolan and Koontz involve exactions. Typically, Supreme Court decisions are narrowly tailored and applicable only to the facts of a particular case. Therefore, the analysis that follows is tailored to exactions. But similar rules apply to special assessments. Special assessments are levied on the basis that a governmental body is providing a special benefit to identifiable properties and is merely seeking compensation for costs incurred to confer that benefit. Therefore, the concepts of nexus and proportionality apply. Essentially, governmental bodies make findings to show that infrastructure projects will confer a benefit on a particular property or set of properties (nexus) and that the special assessments are proportional to the benefits received or the costs incurred to create the benefit (proportionality) and do not exceed either the value of the benefit or the costs incurred in their creation, whichever is less.[49]
A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests"[50] and does not "den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land."[51]
Are the goals related to a jurisdiction's powers as delegated by the state? In particular, are the goals related to the health, safety, and welfare of the community? Is there an "essential nexus" between these goals, the actions of private parties, and the regulations or exactions imposed upon them? This is the Nollan test.
Are the burdens imposed on a property owner (particularly in an adjudicative setting) "roughly proportional" to the harm or burden created by the property owner upon the larger community? This is the Dolan Test.[52]
If a case appears to be within the Nollan-Dolan framework, is the regulation or exaction "legislative" or "adjudicatory?" A legislative regulation or exaction would be a policy affecting many properties, a type of property or a type of situation. An adjudicative regulation or exaction would be the application of a policy to a particular property under particular circumstances. If legislative, deference is shown to the jurisdiction and the burden of proof is on the property owner plaintiff.[53] If adjudicatory, the burden is on the jurisdiction to prove essential nexus and rough proportionality.
Is the condition imposed on potential development possessory or nonpossessory? In the decisions mentioned above, the Supreme Court appears to use heightened scrutiny and defer to the property owner where the condition imposed on the property owner is possessory—as was the case in both Nollan and Dolan.
Possessory conditions include easements and dedications of land or waterways. These conditions infringe on an owner's ability to exclude others, which the court holds to be a fundamental aspect of property ownership. Nonpossessory conditions include impact fees, mitigation fees, and fees in lieu of land dedication.
Koontz, however, broke new ground by applying the Nollan-Dolan tests to nonpossessory interests (impact fees). Therefore, when imposing any condition on development or property utilization, it is prudent to always demonstrate an essential nexus between a legitimate State interest and the impacts or consequences of property owner actions and to ensure that the burden placed on the property owner is roughly proportional to the impacts being avoided or mitigated.
This invokes the three-part balancing test discussed in Penn Central:
The Penn Centraldecision does not appear to provide any criteria or standards against which this balancing can be assessed. If a regulation or exaction denies all economically viable uses, however, then per Lucas, no balancing of interests is required because the regulation is a per se taking.[54]
Does repeated denial of a permit application, without the imposition of easements, dedications, or impact fees constitute a taking under Koontz? A jurisdiction can exercise its discretion in denying a permit. As long as failure to comply with impermissible conditions is not the reason for the denial, as of yet there is no Supreme Court case indicating that the denial of a permit, by itself, constitutes a taking.
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,[55] the court ruled in 1985 that property owners could not file a taking case in federal court until they had exhausted their remedies in state courts. The court overruled this procedural holding in Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, No. 17-647, 588 U.S. (2019).
[18] The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, in part, "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." https://constitution.findlaw.com/amendment5.html
[19] See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1927) (holding that a setback requirement did not constitute a taking); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379-80, 395-97 (1926) (holding that a zoning scheme did not constitute a taking); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 103, 107-08 (1909) (holding that a statutory building height limit did not constitute a taking).
[20] See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474-77, 500-02 (1987) (upholding a Pennsylvania regulation that limited how much subsurface coal could be mined in order to protect surface structures); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 591-92, 595-96 (1962) (upholding a town regulation that prohibited excavation below the water table, which in turn rendered petitioner's quarry effectively useless); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 309-10, 324-25 (1920) (upholding a statute conditioning the burning of natural gas); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404-05, 409-11 (1915) (upholding a regulation that banned the operation of brick factories within Los Angeles' city limits); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1915) (upholding a regulation banning livery stables from certain areas in the community); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 653, 675 (1887) (upholding a regulation that banned the production of alcohol for recreational purposes); Powell v. Commonwealth, 7 A. 913, 914-16 (Pa. 1887) (upholding a law that outlawed the production of oleomargarine).
[21] See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 415-18, 445-48 (1934) (upholding the constitutionality of a state mortgage moratorium law, which allowed courts to extend the period of redemption for foreclosure sales); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153-58 (1921) (holding that a rent control law, which regulated rent prices and allowed tenants to stay in their apartments so long as they paid on time and satisfied any other conditions of the lease, was not a taking).
[22] Timothy M. Mulvaney, "The State of Exactions," William & Mary Law Review, Volume 61 Issue 1 (October 2019) pp 169-221 at pp 218-219. (The quote includes the three footnotes, numbered differently in the original.)
[23] https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/260/393/case.html
[24] Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) discussing Pennsylvania Coal at 1014.
[25] Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/255/
[26] Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/255/
[27] Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
[28] Penn. Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, at 122 (1978)
[29] Mulvaney, 2019 op. cit., citing 438 U.S. 104, 124, 128 (1978) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
[30] Nolan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), at 837
[31] Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
[32] Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 261.
[33] "Physical invasion" means that the government or its agent is physically possessing part of the property. An example could be a cell phone repeater or magnification device. Even if it is very small, because it is attached to the roof or outside wall of a building, this constitutes a physical occupation of part of the property. Likewise, if the government requires an easement for a bicycle or pedestrian path, this constitutes a physical invasion because this easement prevents the property owner from being able to exclude other people from his property. According to the court, the ability to exclude other people is a defining characteristic of private property.
[34] Lucas at 1015 citing Agins, 447 U.S., at 260
[35] Lucas at 1015. The court does make an exception if the regulation in question prohibits a use that would be considered a nuisance under common law. See Lucas at 1029. The rationale is that it's not a taking if, even in the absence of the law or regulation, a contemplated use would unreasonably obstruct, injure, inconvenience, or annoy others making reasonable use of their own property or public space. An example might be maintaining an impoundment pond for hog waste in an urban neighborhood. The stench would prevent others from making reasonable use of their adjoining properties. Thus, a regulation prohibiting hog waste impoundments in an urban neighborhood would not constitute a per se taking because, even in the absence of the regulation, the common law of nuisance would not permit such an activity.
[36] Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)
[37] https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/255/case.html
[38] A legislative exercise of power is a policy that applies consistently to a broad category of properties whereas an adjudicative determination is the discretionary application of a policy to the situation of a particular property. Thus, enacting a zoning regulation or setback requirement, applicable to many properties would be "legislative." But a determination applying the zoning or setback requirements to a particular property would be adjudicative.
[39] Dolan at 388. Referencing Nollan, supra, at 834, quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 127 (1978). ("A use restriction may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose.") https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/438/104/case.html.
[40] Dolan at 389.
[41] Dolan at 390
[42] Dolan at 391
[43] Koontz at 597 citing the Florida Water Resources Act, 1972 Fla. Laws §4(1), at 1118 (codified as amended at Fla. Stat. §373.413(1)) and the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act, 1984 Fla. Laws ch. 84–79, pt. VIII, §403.905(1), pp. 204–205.
[44] Koontz at 599
[45] Timothy Mulvaney, "The State of Exactions," William & Mary Law Review, Volume 61 Issue 1 (October 2019) pp 169-221 at 179. https://wmlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Mulvaney-State%20of%20Exactions-Final.pdf
[46] Id at 179 (see footnote 36)
[47] Insights and ideas for this section are provided by John J. Delaney, Exactions, Dedications and Impact Fees: Applicability of Nollan-Dolan Rough Proportionality Requirements to Non-Possessory Exactions And Exactions Imposed by Legislative Enactment, an outline prepared for the ALI-ABA Land Use Institute, Boston, August 19, 2000. http://www.impactfees.com/publications%20pdf/delaneyI.pdf ; and also by Timothy Mulvaney, "The State of Exactions," William & Mary Law Review, Volume 61 Issue 1 (October 2019) pp 169-221. https://wmlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Mulvaney-State%20of%20Exactions-Final.pdf
[48] Regarding TIF, there must be a relationship between an infrastructure improvement project and future development. This relationship has not been adjudicated by the Supreme Court. It is defined in the context of the but-for test and is discussed in the next section of this report.
[49] Eugene Mcquillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations [section] 38:39 (3d ed., 2008). See also "The Seattle Waterfront Local Improvement District," Miller Nash Graham & Dunn Attorneys at Law, October 30, 2013. http://www.millernash.com/the-seattle-waterfront-local-improvement-district-lid-10-30-2013/
[50] Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/255/case.html
[51] Keystone Bituminius Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484-485 (1987)
[52] In this context, Albuquerque, New Mexico, has an impact fee ordinance that developers must pay to offset the costs of needed infrastructure such as roads, drainage, parks, and public safety facilities. To satisfy the exaction requirement, the property owner could pay money, build the improvements, or give the city property. If the value of these exactions was more than the impact fees due, the developer would receive credits that could be used to pay for future impact fees, sold to others, or in some cases, exchanged with the city for cash. The credits expire after seven years. See Robert H. Thomas, "NM App: No Property in Impact Fee Gift Card," October 6, 2020. https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2020/10/nm-app-no-property-in-impact-fee-gift-card.html
[53] In a Florida case, an agency demanded an exaction related to "reclaimed water" for all new subdivisions. In this respect, the exaction appeared to be more legislative than adjudicative because it was applied across the board and not in relation to the specific conditions of any particular development. Yet, the Florida District Court of Appeals applied heightened scrutiny in lieu of a rational basis review. Nonetheless, the court found that Polk County met both the nexus and proportionality tests. "Highlands applied for a permit to develop a subdivision consisting of sixty residential lots as well as common areas. The County required the installation and dedication of reuse improvements in the subdivision that will be used by the future residents for landscape irrigation. The conditions imposed by the County are directly related to the impact of the subdivision on the state's water resources and do not impermissibly reach beyond that impact. The fact that reclaimed water was not available for two years, requiring Highlands to use potable water to irrigate the landscaping in its common areas during that time, does not alter the conclusion that the reuse improvements have a rough proportionality to the impact of the development. The unavailability of reclaimed water for the common areas for a period of two years is insignificant in comparison to the availability of reclaimed water for the indefinite future of the entire sixty-lot subdivision." Highland-in-the-Woods, LLC v. Polk County, No. 2D15-2801 (Apr. 28, 2017) as reported by Robert H. Thomas in his blog: "Fla App: A Sorta-Legislative Exaction Is Subject to Nollan-Dolan, But This One Passed the Test," April 28, 2017. https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2017/04/fla-app-a-sorta-legislative-exaction-is-subject-to-nollan-dolan-but-this-one-passed-the-test.html
[54] Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) at 1014-1019. Regulations that deny the property owner all "economically viable use of his land" constitute one of the discrete categories of regulatory deprivations that require compensation without the usual case specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.
[55] Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)
[56] See also Bridget Fisher, Flávia Leite and Lina Moe, "TIF Case Studies: California and Chicago," Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis, The New School, August 20, 2020. https://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/insights-blog/tif-case-studies-california-and-chicago
